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Climate change, continued economic development, and energy security have become 
increasingly pressing issues over the past two decades or so. One potential solution to 
this interrelated problem is the idea to capture the carbon dioxide (CO2) from large 
stationary emission sources, such as power plants, and permanently store it deep 
underground. In this way CO2 emissions can be prevented from reaching the 
atmosphere, whilst allowing for a continued use of fossil fuels, until other alternatives 
(i.e. wind, solar, biomass) are developed on a wider scale. This process is also 
referred to as carbon capture and storage (CCS). The literature review in this thesis 
identifies the need to present a more in-depth picture of the entire process of 
governance of CO2 storage. 
     The aim of this research is therefore to examine the extent to which the current 
legal and regulatory frameworks are able to mediate between managing the 
environmental risks of CO2 storage and the development/deployment of CCS in 
Europe. The analysis is underlined by the governance network theory (GNT), 
borrowing also elements from the theory of bounded rationality. Along with an 
extensive doctrinal legal scholarship, data analysis is also supported by 15 in-depth 
interviews with key CCS stakeholders in Europe.  
     The results show that there is a wide consensus that the current legal and 
regulatory frameworks are robust enough, albeit the existence of uncertainty in 
regards to a number of legal provisions. There is also wide agreement between 
stakeholders in regards to the ability of operators to manage the environmental risks 
of CO2 storage.  
     The discussion of these results show the applicability of the GNT as a framework 
for studying the management of environmental risks of CO2 storage, and the 
development and deployment of CCS technology in conjunction. Implications drawn 
from these findings also show that the management of environmental risks of CO2 
storage and the future of CCS technology depends heavily on the effective 
relationship between the government agencies (i.e. competent authority) and project 
developers. Furthermore, good communication and engagement with other 
stakeholders, in particular the general public, will also be significant in the future 
development/deployment of CCS projects in Europe. When these relationships are 
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CHAPTER 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Background information  
1.1.1 An interdisciplinary project 
This study is part of a critical niche research area in the field of carbon capture and 
storage (CCS), part of a tri-faculty effort at the University of Sheffield, between the 
Faculty of Science, led by the Department of Physics and Astronomy, the Faculty of 
Engineering, led by the Department of Civil and Structural Engineering with the 
Department of Materials Science, and the Faculty of Social Sciences, led by the 
School of Law. The overall project is titled Project Deep Carbon: Verification 
Engineering and Governance of Environmental Carbon Sequestration. This 
thesis, based at the School of Law, aims to support two other studies by identifying 
and recognising the socio-economic, legal and political issues that do and could have 
an impact on the science and engineering developments in CO2 storage.  
     The other two PhD projects aim to specifically tackle the CO2 storage issue of how 
to provide long-term monitoring of the underground CO2 deposits, how to guarantee 
the security of the stored CO2 against potential leakage and release into the 
atmosphere. Modelling CO2 containment in rock structures and the improvement of 
knowledge of the containment challenges, as well as the development of new 
measurement technologies that would ensure reliable and safe monitoring of this 
containment are their key objectives.  
     This collaborative effort falls within the vision of the University of Sheffield’s 
Environment and Energy agenda and within the EU and UK government’s 
environment strategy, where resources are being increasingly targeted. Although 
significant and growing funding potential for future carbon storage research appears 
through industrial, EU and international sources, the scholarship to pursue this PhD 
research came from the University of Sheffield. 
     While the original intended collaboration between the three PhD researchers was 
initially working as planned, in that we met frequently to inform each other on the 
progress made, over the course of the last two years, these meetings in practice did 
not work as well. As such, the direction of my research was slightly changed, so as to 
not focus as explicitly on the work being done by the other two researchers. Instead, 
the focus slightly shifted from examining how the regulatory framework for CO2 




broader analysis of the coherence and appropriateness of the framework in managing 
environmental risks of CO2 storage, whilst supporting the development of the CCS 
technology as a whole.  
 
Industrial participation 
Given the research potential of the project, and its importance to the industry, 
involvement of three specialist companies that were willing to contribute their 
expertise was negotiated. These include Alan Auld Engineering Ltd., an international 
underground design company based in South Yorkshire, CO2DeepStore Ltd., a new 
carbon sequestration company based in Aberdeen, and Cleveland Potash Ltd., owners 
of the largest and deepest active mine site in the UK. These companies were brought 
in to provide technical expertise and strong industrial links.  
 
  
1.1.2 Personal history and reflection 
Before turning to presenting the context and motivation for this study (see 1.2 below), 
I believe it is important for me to briefly describe my academic, research and 
professional background. I completed my Bachelors of Science (BSc) in 
Environmental Science and Policy, with a concentration in Environmental Economics, 
form the University of Maryland – College Park, in the United States. During my time 
at the University of Maryland, I also completed an internship at the Embassy of the 
Republic of Slovenia in Washington DC, and was a research assistant to Prof. Dr. 
Anna Alberini on a project researching mortality associated with heat waves and the 
effect of excessive heat advisories and warnings (funded by US EPA via Battelle 
National Laboratories; project officer: Hugh Pitcher). The research project, for 
example, evaluated the possible health consequences of climate change and 
opportunities for adaptation. It sought to address questions like: ‘Are excessive heat 
warnings issued by the US National Weather Service, and various city initiatives 
effective at reducing excess mortality?’  
     I also completed a traineeship at the Directorate for Global Issues and Multilateral 
Political Relations at the Slovenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where I helped 
organise a major international conference (Bled Strategic Forum). There, my tasks 
included writing press releases and speeches for various high-level officials, and 
engaging with other stakeholders, including industry representatives on matters 




Globalisation and Development, at the University of Sheffield, where my focus was 
on the impact of climate change on development.  
     My academic, professional, and research background, as briefly described above 
thus lies in a wider spectrum of interrelated areas: science, economics, and policy. 
This PhD research, situated at the School of Law, reflects this background and 
attempts to maintain a sense of these interrelated areas throughout the thesis.  
     I should also acknowledge at this point, that my academic and research 
background has over the years in essence led me to today being sympathetic to and 
supportive of the CCS technology and its role as a climate change mitigation tool. 
Although other mitigation technologies, such as wind, solar, hydro and nuclear, are 
required in the overall portfolio of technologies, I firmly believe that CCS is a crucial 
component as well, given its short- and mid-term potential to deliver large CO2 
emissions reductions. These reductions are necessary not only from an environmental 
perspective, if global warming of the atmosphere is to be limited to 2 or even 4 
degrees Celsius, and as such limit the severity of the impacts, but also from a legal 
perspective, given the commitments made by the EU, and the UK in particular, to 
deliver significant emissions reductions.  
     Lastly, I should note that in regards to the data collected, in particular the views 
and statements from various industry representatives represent a particular interest 
and as such could reflect an overwhelming argument that the risks of CO2 storage are 
low and that regulation can be burdensome. However, as a researcher I attempt to 
question their responses and make every effort to present as objective of a picture as 
possible throughout the thesis.  
 
 
1.2 The context 
Increased frequency of extreme weather events, sea level rise, reduced agricultural 
yields, and human migration, are only some of the already occurring, and future 
consequences of global climate change. In 2015, the human influence on the Earth’s 
climate system, primarily via anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases, has 
become clearer, and higher than ever. In the period between 1880 to 2012, for 
example, the globally averaged combined land and ocean surface temperature data 




CO2 level in the Earth’s atmosphere has been set above 400 parts per million (ppm).
1
 
In this regard, the recent IPCC Fifth Assessment Synthesis Report
2
 has concluded that 
emissions scenarios of GHG concentrations in 2100 of 450pp CO2eq or lower, are 
likely to maintain the warming below the 2°C threshold3, over the 21st century relative 
to pre-industrial levels. These estimates, however, are based on the notion of 40-70% 
global anthropogenic GHG emissions reductions by 2050, compared to 2010 levels, 
and near- or below-zero emissions levels by 2100 (IPCC, 2014: 21). In other words, 
climate change has taken hold and has the potential to bring devastating consequences 
by the end of the century. However, as this IPCC report also suggests, there is still 
time to limit climate change, whilst allowing for continued development.  
     Capturing CO2 from large stationary sources and storing it underground has to-
date been recognized internationally as one of the key tools for tackling the issue of 
climate change in the short- and medium- term, in order to decarbonise the economy. 
Ambitions to limit the impacts of climate change, which include carbon capture and 
storage (CCS), cannot be achieved without finding solutions that are themselves safe 
and environmentally acceptable. In the context of CCS, this refers to ensuring the 
integrity of the stored CO2 for decades or centuries, and the robustness of a new legal 
governance structures that support the development process and safeguard against 
environmental and social damage.  
     Personally, I acknowledge that given my academic and research background in 
environmental science, policy and law, I do believe that humans are to a great extent 
responsible for the dramatic rise in atmospheric CO2 concentration levels over the last 
150 years. At the same time, however, one must also acknowledge that there are still 
some who deny climate change, or at least the extent of the anthropogenic influence.  
      
Climate change denial 
Coastal flooding, drought, heat waves and other extreme weather events are all 
indicative that climate change is happening, and with all the evidence present today, 
in the form of temperature measurements, sea level rise, ocean acidification, melting 
of ice shelves in Greenland and Antarctica, as well as CO2 concentration levels, it is 
                                                     
1
 This is primarily a symbolic milestone, illustrating the significant rise in the CO2 levels of 280ppm 
before the industrial revolution (Thompson, 2014). 
2
IPCC (2014). Available at: http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-
report/ar5/syr/SYR_AR5_SPMcorr2.pdf. 
3
 This is a generally agreed upon temperature threshold, above which climate change will significantly 




becoming increasingly harder to remain a climate change sceptic or denier; denying 
or dismissing scientific consensus on global warming, its extent and significance as 
well as its connection to human behaviour. Denial, however, also differs from 
scepticism, which Peter Christoff (2007) argues is essential for good science. Denial, 
as Dunlap and McCright (2011) explain, has in recent years been intensified by 
contrarian scientists, fossil fuels corporations, conservative think tanks, and various 
front groups, which have assaulted the mainstream climate science, and built their 
arguments on the manufactured ‘Climategate’ scandal and minor errors in the 2007 
IPCC 4
th
 Assessment Report (p. 144). These actors, along with other amateur climate 
bloggers, self-described experts, public relations firms, conservative media and 
politicians, have been described as a coordinated ‘denial machine’ (Begley, 2007). In 
her article, for example, Begley (2007) cites that a conservative think tank, long 
funded by ExxonMobil, which offered scientists $10,000 USD to write articles, which 
undercut the above-mentioned IPCC report, and the computer-based climate models it 
is based on. The motivations behind climate change denials vary considerably, from 
economic (i.e. fossil fuel industry) to personal (i.e. celebrity status enjoyed by 
individuals). Furthermore, a recent report by The Guardian
4
 identified that over the 
last three years, around $125 million USD (82 million GBP) was channelled through 
two organisations (Donors Trust and Donors Capital Fund)
5
 to climate change denial 
groups and organisations in the US. These funds are then used by industry-friendly 
groups to create and disseminate books, put out briefings and editorials, bring in 
contrarian scientists, support other public relations efforts and the right wing media 
which promotes climate change denial, as well as to undermine regulations aimed at 




     In essence, what holds climate change deniers together, however, is in most cases 
the opposition to governmental regulatory efforts to ameliorate climate change, such 
as for example in the case of restricting carbon emissions. In other words, there is a 
strong commitment to free markets and a disdain of government regulations (Dunlap 
                                                     
4




 These are not-for-profit companies that distribute millions in grants each year to groups, organisations 
and projects, which offers anonymity to donors who do not with to make their donations publicly. 
6
 Some of the largest recipients include the Franklin Center, Federalist Society, State Policy Network, 




and McCright, 2011; see also Oreskes and Conway 2010), in large part because of a 
perceived threat posed by climate change to their interests. Hence, these actors most 
often strive to undermine the scientific evidence of the reality and seriousness of 
climate change.   
     In any description of responses and beliefs to and about anthropogenic climate 
change, however, the prevalence of views must be allowed (Levett-Olson, 2010). 
From a critical realist theoretical perspective, this means that while evidence of 
climate change is prevalent, the possibility of alternative accounts and perceptions is 
acknowledged. This study takes advantage of this wider debate about climate change 
and regulation, and advances it by placing it in the context of carbon capture and 
storage. In this respect, document analysis is supported by data obtained from 
interviews with those directly involved in CCS project development – the industry – 
in an attempt to examine the perception of the appropriateness and coherence of the 
regulatory framework for CO2 storage in Europe. In other words, the aim of this study 
is to examine whether and how regulation might stand in the way of developing CCS 
technology – a climate change mitigation tool.  
 
Dealing with climate change and the role of CCS 
There are a number of ways of dealing with the issue of climate change. The 
approaches include both adaptation
7
 as well as mitigation
8
. The latter category is 
where carbon capture and storage (CCS) is situated.  
     As impacts and potential future risks of climate change are becoming more 
apparent, interest in CCS as a climate change mitigation option has also been 
increasing since the beginning of the 21
st
 century, both in the private and public 
sectors. By capturing CO2 from large point sources (i.e. power plants), compressing 
and transporting it to suitable storage sites where it is injected deep underground, 
CCS is said to offer the potential to meet the challenges of dealing with increased 
                                                     
7
 Adaptation refers to the adjustment to the effects of the actual or expected changes to the 
environment. Depending on its context, refers to approach such as: integrated natural resources 
management, social and ecological asset development, information systems to support early warning 
and proactive planning, institutional and educational/behavioural change or reinforcement (IPCC, 
2014: 106).  
8
 Mitigation refers to efforts to limit the magnitude and rate of climate change, by tackling its causes, 
such as GHG emissions. Mitigation approaches, among other things, switching to low-carbon energy 
sources, such as renewable and nuclear energy, as well as things like expanding forests, which serve as 




energy demand, the need for energy security, whilst allowing for de-carbonisation and 
continued economic development.  
     Essentially, deploying the CCS technology would allow for the continued use of 
fossil fuels (i.e. coal and natural gas), only without the CO2 being emitted into the 
atmosphere. This is considered as a medium-term transition tool in combating
9
 
climate change, whilst other technologies (i.e. wind, geothermal, solar and hydro) 
become more widely deployed. On the other hand, one of the arguments against CCS, 
for example, is that fossil fuels should be eliminated entirely, and that CCS will not be 
able to achieve what it promises. However, the reality is that in order to meet the 
increased demand for energy, fossil fuels are still needed, given primarily the 
intermittent nature of those alternative sources of energy.  
 
The CCS process 
The entire process starts with the capturing of the CO2 at the (stationary) sources. 
There are essentially three types, or ways, of doing so, including:  
 Post-combustion: combustion of fossil fuels (i.e. coal, natural gas, biomass) is 
done in a traditional manner (i.e. using a boiler or a combined cycle gas 
turbine), followed by a separation of the CO2 from the flue gas, most often by 
a chemical sorbent such as amines or ammonia, which absorb the CO2 before 
it enters the atmosphere; 
 
 Pre-combustion: carbon is removed from the fossil fuel prior to combustion in 
a gas turbine. Coal is combined with oxygen to create a gas (‘syngas’), made 
up of Hydrogen (H) and carbon monoxide (CO). Water (H2O) is then added to 
the ‘syngas’, through a water gas shift reaction, whereby CO is converted to 
CO2, which is then removed from the fuel by a separation process. Hydrogen 
is then burned in a combined cycle gas turbine to generate electricity; process 
referred to as Integrated Gasification Combined Cycle (IGCC).  
 
 Oxy-fuel combustion: the fuel (i.e. coal, biomass) is burned in pure oxygen, as 
opposed to air, such as in other two capture methods. Once Nitrogen is 
                                                     
9
 Intermittent energy sources are essentially those that cannot continuously provide the energy due to 
some indirect factor. Solar, wind and/or tidal power are such examples. In other words, meeting the 
demand of a power system cannot always be guaranteed. As such, until the efficiency of some of these 




removed from the air, by an air separation unit, the pure oxygen is combined 
with the fuel in a boiler, where combustion takes place. This generates steam, 
which is used to power the turbines and generate electricity, while the flue gas 
consisting of CO2 and water vapour is recirculated to control the boiler 
temperature and to be cooled. The CO2 is then dehydrated, compressed and 
made ready for transportation and storage.  
 
Once the CO2 has been captured and pressurized into a liquid-like state, it is then 
transported through pipelines to pre-selected and screened storage sites. Possible CO2 
storage locations on-shore include depleted oil and gas reservoirs, un-minable coal 
seams, and deep saline aquifers. A second option, which is most likely the only option 
in the UK and for most of the continental Europe countries, is to store the CO2 under 
the seabed offshore.  
     During the storage process, the CO2 is injected deep underground (i.e. 1000-
3000m) into the sandstone layers, where it is to be contained by the natural pressure 
of the impermeable nonporous cap rock layers above. Although the saline aquifers are 
thought to hold the largest potential capacity for storage, they are also the least 
understood – i.e. CO2 movement and containment – as compared to depleted oil and 
gas reservoirs, for example. The fraction of the CO2 retained in appropriately selected 
and managed geological sites, as the 2005 IPCC Special Report pointed out, is ‘very 
likely’ to exceed 99% over 100 years, and ‘likely’ to exceed 99% over 1000 years (p. 
14). 
     However, despite experiences in capturing and injecting the CO2 underground, 
primarily for the purpose of enhanced oil recovery (EOR), the (new) integrated nature 
of the CCS-system presents a number of uncertainties, and therefore also inherent 
environmental risks. This is the case in particular with the storage component of the 
CCS chain.  
     As such, for the technology to be developed and deployed, and serve its potential 
as a climate change mitigation tool, a clear and strong legal and regulatory framework 
is crucial. This brings to the forefront the complex interrelationship between the areas 
of science, technology and law. This interrelationship comprises one of the underlying 
themes of this research. In addition, given that permanent CO2 storage is a relatively 




questions about governance are often raised. In other words, how and to what extent 
the environmental risks of this process will and can be managed.  
     To date, the literature on CCS has mainly focused on the capture, and the technical 
components of the storage parts of the chain. In the case of the storage part of the 
CCS chain, some amount has also been written about the importance of legal and 
regulatory frameworks. However, there is still a gap in the literature on CCS that 
would integrate and present the complex nature as a whole, in particular from a legal 
and regulatory perspective, and the views from those that would be primarily affected 
by the regulations – the industry 10 . Here is where this research steps in, by 
approaching the field of CCS from a governance and regulatory perspective, and 
offering a critical examination of both the governance process, as well as the legal and 
regulatory frameworks for CO2 storage in Europe.  
     When it comes to new technologies, such as CCS, in particular when these are 
laden with uncertainty and risk, it becomes crucial to strike a balance between 
managing those risks, whilst ensuring the technology is being developed in a timely 
manner. In this research, when discussing the notion of environmental risk, it 
primarily refers to the risk of CO2 escaping from a reservoir, in addition to seismic 
events or contamination of water resources. Given the relatively young literature on 
CCS, there has not yet been an attempt to approach the issues of governance and 
technology deployment from such a perspective or in conjunction.  
      
Choosing the focus of study 
Arriving at the focus of study started off with a review of the broad literature on 
governance and regulation of environmental issues, as well as more specifically as 
they relate to CCS, and how they have been examined thus far in the European and 
UK contexts.  
     The reason for choosing the UK as a case study within the European context, was 
because it has to-date developed one of the most comprehensive legal and regulatory 
frameworks for CO2 storage in Europe the world, as well as because a large majority 
of the overall storage potential for captured CO2 from Europe lies off its coast – i.e. 
beneath the North Sea.  
                                                     
10
 As is explained in Chapter 2, for simplicity and coherence purposes, ‘industry’ and ‘CCS industry’ 
concepts are used in general terms to encompass those companies that are involved in CCS project 
developments. Where ‘industry’ is used in the context of other heavy-emissions processes (i.e. steel 




     One of the major reasons for arriving at the research focus outlined below is that I 
do not come from a strictly legal background, but rather, as mentioned above (section 
1.1.2), from an interdisciplinary background consisting of environmental science, 
economics and policy. As such, the hope is to try to bring out the interplay of these 
fields within the context of the regulation and CO2 storage. In other words, the goal 
was never to focus strictly on the legal and regulatory aspects of CCS/ CO2 storage, 
but rather to give the reader an interdisciplinary understanding of the processes 
related to CO2 storage. Thus, I set out to examine not only how environmental risks 
are substantively accounted for within the legal and regulatory frameworks in Europe 
and the UK, but also, whether these frameworks in turn in any way inhibit the 
development and deployment of CCS technology as a whole.  
     With this in mind, the following key research question was developed: to what 
extent does the current legal and regulatory environment for CCS in Europe 
mediate between the development and the governance of the technology? 
     Based on this question, there are two main objectives set out for this study. The 
first is to identify the nature of governance of CCS in Europe. Doing so involves four 
steps/aims:  
 Identify key debates/characteristics of uncertainties and risks of CO2 storage. 
 Analyse the use of precaution in the current legal and regulatory regimes. 
 Undertake an analytical review of the CCS governance process in the EU, 
and the UK, and their respective regulatory frameworks. 
 Identify key legal and regulatory issues. 
 
The second objective is then to find out the effect of the ‘precautionary approach’ (see 
Chapter 6) in the regulatory regime on the CCS industry. Here, three steps/aims are 
laid out: 
 Examine the perception of the legal and regulatory frameworks among the 
CCS industry. How does the perception compare to that of other stakeholders? 
This will be explored by conducting a number of interviews with those 
directly and indirectly involved with CCS development. 
 Discuss the impact of the public factor on the CCS industry and potential for 




 Determine whether the legal and regulatory regimes stand as likely barriers to 
CCS development and deployment. 
 
Based on the set out research question and objectives, as described above, this study 
essentially represents a critical analysis of the law and regulation surrounding CO2 
storage in Europe. The chapters that follow provide insight into the various aspects of 
the overall governance process, with the end aim being to determine the coherence 
and appropriateness of the regulatory framework in terms of mitigating environmental 
risks of CO2 storage, whilst ensuring that the development of the CCS technology is 
not inhibited. As such, this analysis is also situated in a broader context of a debate on 
climate change, and a theoretical framework on regulation. The key argument of this 
research is that the current regulatory arrangements for CO2 storage in Europe and in 
the UK, as viewed form a governance network framework, are robust enough. Albeit 
certain potential improvements could be made in regulatory terms, at present the 
framework does not inhibit the development of the technology. The main reason 
behind slow development of CCS remains of financial nature – i.e. lack of sufficient 
short- and long-term financial support and certainty. Although the economics of CCS 
is not the main concern of this research, various aspects in this area are examined, as 
they inevitably relate to regulation. 
     To guide the argument being pursued and answer the main research question, the 
thesis is set out in the following way. In the second chapter, the theoretical 
perspective and methodology employed in this study are presented. This is followed 
by chapter three, in which an extensive review of the literature is presented. This 
serves the purpose of introducing the underlying theme of the research, which is the 
interrelationship between the science, technology and law. The fourth chapter then 
provides a critical examination of the governance of CO2 storage in Europe, before 
turning to analysing the UK as a key case study example, in chapter five. Chapter six 
then presents the data obtained from the interviews with a variety of CCS 
stakeholders, including government officials, university professors, researchers, and 
in particular the CCS industry. Lastly, chapter seven is divided to provide first a 
reflective conclusion on the study and findings, and second to summarise the work 






CHAPTER 2: Theoretical Framework 
and Methods 
 
This chapter now presents the chosen research questions, theory, and the methodology 
and methods employed in this study.  
 
2.1 Research Questions  
Carbon capture and storage (CCS), is a technology and process, which today still 
remains laden with a number of uncertainties, and hence risks. As has been the case in 
the past with other technologies (i.e. nuclear), the management of environmental 
risks, whilst ensuring timely development and deployment of the technology becomes 
crucial; in light of the importance of the issue at hand (i.e. mitigating climate change). 
Given the relatively young literature on CCS, there has not yet been an attempt to 
approach the issues of governance and technology deployment from such a 
perspective. As such, this project seeks to derive answers to the following key 
question: 
 
To what extent does the current legal and regulatory environment for CCS in 
Europe mediate between the development and the governance of the technology? 
 
To answer this research question, the study seeks to examine the nature of 
governance, the legal and regulatory regimes, as well as the perception of the latter by 
the stakeholders most affected by these regimes. So as to aid in answering the 
question, the following two sub-questions, and objectives, were also formed: 
  
 
1) What is the nature of governance of CCS in Europe? 
 Identify key debates/characteristics of uncertainties and risks of CO2 storage. 
 Analyse the use of precaution in the current legal and regulatory regimes. 
 Undertake an analytical review of the CCS governance process in the EU, and 
the UK, and their respective regulatory frameworks. 








2) What is the effect of the precautionary approach in the regulatory regime on the 
CCS industry?  
 Examine the perception of the legal and regulatory frameworks among the 
CCS industry. How does the perception compare to that of other 
stakeholders? 
 Discuss the impact of the public factor on the CCS industry and potential 
for future opposition in the EU/UK.  
 Determine whether the legal and regulatory regimes stand as likely 
barriers to CCS development and deployment. 
 
2.2 Theory  
Governance and regulation 
Over the past quarter of a century, the literature on governance has been steadily 
increasing. Chhotray and Stoker (2009) note that in this time, the term ‘governance’ 
has moved from the status of a lost word of English language to a fashionable and 
challenging concept in a range of disciplines and research programmes (p. 1).  
     The focus of this research is in broad terms the governance of CO2 storage in 
Europe. As discussed later on in Chapter 3, the concept of ‘governance’ often appears 
in the literature in a number of different ways. This study is underlined by the five 
propositions developed by Stoker (1998), who notes that governance: i) refers to a set 
of institutions and actors that are drawn from but also beyond the government; ii) 
identifies the blurring of boundaries and responsibilities for tackling social and 
economic issues; iii) identifies the power dependence involved in the relationships 
between institutions involved in collective action; iv) is about autonomous self-
governing networks of actors; v) recognizes the capacity to get things done which 
does not rest on the power of government to command or use its authority.  
     The above conceptualisation of ‘governance’ essentially seeks to understand the 
way collective decision-making is constructed. The objective of the decision-making 
process is the effective management of environmental risks associated with CO2 
storage, whilst facilitating the deployment of the CCS technology. Such 
understanding is deemed most suitable to address the set out research question, and in 
my analysis plays the role of developing a better understanding of the science, 




     At the same time, however, this study does acknowledge the potential critique of 
Hood et al. (2001), who start their work on government of risk with an observation 
that this kind of ‘grand theory’ perspective, or a helicopter view of the world of risk 
management, misses in particular the variety of approaches to regulation of risk, and 
the messiness of risk. The authors seek to comparatively understand risk regulation 
regimes and the diversity and commonality between approaches to risk regulation. 
This study does agree with their views as a fair criticism of risk regulation/risk society 
kind of literature, and is something it takes into consideration. 
     Essentially, the Hood et al. (2001) critique is that the risk society framework, as 
pursued by Beck (1994, 2006) or Giddens (1999), misses the kinds of diversity in risk 
regulation.
11
 However, the central focus of this research is not an explicit examination 
of the similarities and differences in approaches to risk regulation and management in 
EU Member States. Rather, the focus falls on a broader regulation and management of 
risks related to the storage of CO2 and the development and deployment of CCS 
technology in Europe. It complements the kind of ‘grand theory’ perspective, which 
Hood et al. (2001) criticise, by employing elements of bounded rationality theory (see 
section 2.2.1).  
     Seeing the nature and problems of regulation from a decentred perspective can also 
be very stimulating as Black (2002) notes, given that it opens up the cognitive frame 
of what ‘regulation’ really is. Decentred in this case refers to as it being separated 
from the state, and other well recognised forums of self-regulation. In this way, 
‘decentred’ regulation resonates with the globalisation and governance debate. By 
looking at regulation as ‘decentred’, it enables commentators to spot regulation in 
previously unsuspected places, such as different configurations of state, market, 
community, associations and networks, which deliver public policy goals (Black, 
2002: 1-2). As Black (2002) also notes, this throws into question what it is that we 
want the concept of regulation to do, and its implications. Moreover, it poses the 
question of what actors other than the state, and to what extent they might be 
harnessed by the state in the design of hybrid or post-regulatory mechanisms in order 
to address and further public policy objectives. 
     In her article, Black (2002) for example, argues that decentred perspective of 
regulation embraces a wider set of techniques than simply the ‘rules backed by 
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sanctions’ of command-and-control regulation. In other words, the author suggests 
that much of the theoretical analysis is rooted in the systems theory or other similar 
analytical roots and tools, which have at its conceptual core use the following five 
central notions: i) complexity; ii) fragmentation; iii) un-governability; iv) 
interdependency; and v) blurring of the distinction between the public and private.  
     Within a decentred analysis of regulation, complexity refers to the dynamic of 
interactions between the actors and/or systems, which often have different goals, 
intentions, purposes, powers and norms, as well as the operations of forces, which 
produce a constant tension between the stability and change within a system. 
Fragmentation on the other hand refers to the fragmentation of knowledge, as well as 
of power and control. In other words, no one actor has all the information and ability 
to employ the instruments necessary to solve social problems, and make regulation 
effective. Not only is knowledge fragmented, but information is also to an extent 
socially constructed, meaning, that there is no such thing as complete ‘objective’ 
truth. Furthermore, no single actor can dominate the regulatory process unilaterally 
given that all actors can be severely restricted in reaching their own objectives not just 
by limitations in their own knowledge, but also by the autonomy of others 
(ungovernanility). Also, given that regulation is never a one-way street, each actor is 
seen as having both problems (needs) and solutions (capacities), and is in turn 
mutually dependent – interdependent - on each other for their resolution and use 
(Kooiman; in Black, 2002: 7).  
     As such, regulation is not the product of exercise of formal control, but rather of 
the interactions between both the public and private actors within a system. 
Identifying the blurring of the public-private boundary involves identifying and 
analysing so-called ‘hybrid’ organisations or networks that combine both 
governmental and non-governmental actors (Black, 2002: 8).  
     In the five notions mentioned above, is essentially where the connection between 
governance and regulation, and where this research is situated in. In other words, the 
theoretical analysis of regulation for CO2 storage in Europe in this research is rooted 
in the so-called governance network theory discussed below. The critical stance taken 
by the analysis employed is essentially to examine whether the current regulatory 





2.2.1 Governance network theory 
It should first be noted that governance, as a conceptual framework, is used in this 
thesis not at the level of a causal analysis, but its value rather lies in providing for an 
organizing framework. Using such a conceptual framework provides for both a type 
of language and a lens, or frame of reference, through which a complex reality can be 
examined. The reality in this research refers to the environmental risk and impacts of 
CO2 storage leakage.  
     In essence, this research employs the wider theory of governance networks, which 
essentially takes on the rules of collective policy and decision-making, in a setting 
where there is a plurality of actors and organisations, and where no formal control 
systems can exclusively dictate the terms of the relationship between these actors and 
organisations (Chhotray and Stoker, 2008). While governments are promoting 
governance networks as an effective and efficient setting in which (CCS) technologies 
can be developed and risks managed, there inevitably remains a sense of hierarchy 
and market also playing important roles. 
     The governance network theory, in this study, essentially focuses on the manner in 
which environmental risks are dealt with and managed through joint action and 
interaction. In this respect it examines the management of these risks through the 
legal and regulatory lens. In terms of the microelement of governance, the research 
analyses the process of interactions between the various public and private 
stakeholders that resulted in the development of the respective legal and regulatory 
frameworks for CO2 storage in Europe, and in the UK. The macro-element is 
examined by considering other influences that impact the process of governance, 
including the role of ‘precaution’ in a wider context of dealing with environmental 
and energy related issues, as well as the impact of other external factors, such as the 
global financial crisis and other political issues.  
     A general theory of governance, and other theories such as reflexive modernisation 
and risk society are useful to the extent that they provide a kind of ‘helicopter view of 
the world’. These theories, however, at its core miss out on, some of the sociological 
elements of governance, which are the focus of theories like rational choice or actor-
network theory. As such, the value of employing a governance network theory lies in 
that it attempts to combine the ‘best of both worlds’, by also drawing insights from 
the likes of Simon (1982) and Friedman (1953), including strands from behavioural 




     In this respect, employing the governance network theory is complemented by 
borrowing ideas from bounded rationality theory.
12
 While bounded rationality theory 
is today still primarily used in the fields of economics, in this thesis, it is used as a 
complementary concept, and is not intended to represent a core component of the 
thesis. Nevertheless, by using some of its elements, an attempt is made to help explain 
the rationality behind the functioning of the governance network (i.e. interaction 
between its actors).  
     The purpose, as well as the value of employing the governance network theory, 
with elements from bounded rationality, lies primarily at the explanatory level, resting 
on its ability to provide a framework for a better understanding of the process of 
governance and regulation. In other words, the theories will be used essentially so as 
to examine and analyse how the governance and regulatory regimes for CO2 storage 
in Europe have come together, and how they interact. As such, this study is primarily 
an explanatory type of research.   
 
Bounded Rationality 
Bounded rationality owes a great deal to notions of rational choice. Rational choice 
theory, however, uses a very specific and narrow definition of rationality, to refer to 
an individual, or business, acting as if balancing the costs versus benefits in their 
decision-making process, so as to maximize their personal advantage. However, it 
ignores some sociological and contextual factors, such as, for example, a history of 
extractive and fossil fuel industry in an area, or the issue of ethics and trust, all of 
which can turn out to be a significant factor in shaping public opinion about whether 
or not to accept or oppose a technology.
13
   
     Bounded rationality theory, in essence argues that rationality of X is limited by 
factors such as limited cognitive ability, availability of information and/or time. As 
such, behaviour is characteristic to utility satisfiers, as opposed to utility maximisers. 
Bounded rationality theory is in this respect part of a broader sociological group of 
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14, and at its core rejects ‘absolute’ rationality. Using elements from the theory 
of bounded rationality therefore helps in providing for a more accurate picture of the 
governance process.  
 
2.2.2 The approach in this thesis  
The main objective of this research is to critically examine the legal and regulatory 
frameworks necessary for environmentally safe geological storage of CO2, and the 
enabling of CCS technologies in Europe. A governance network approach, as used in 
this research, is a strategy for examining the integrated management of environmental 
risks of CO2 storage, and the promotion of the development and deployment of the 
CCS technology. Such an approach is based on the application of appropriate 
methodologies and principles, which encompass the essential structure, processes, 
functions and interactions among the network actors and their environment. Such 
focus is consistent with the definitions of governance in the literature, as described in 
Chapter 3. 
     Furthermore, the governance network approach to the study of risk management 
must not only deal with the complex and dynamic nature of the policy and decision-
making process, given the absence of complete knowledge and scientific uncertainties 
primarily in the context of CO2 storage, but also with the legal and regulatory 
frameworks themselves. By adopting such an approach, this study argues, a near-
optimal answer to questions concerning the effectiveness
15
 of the legal and regulatory 
frameworks can be provided, given the relatively young age of the frameworks and 
lack of any commercial-scale projects to-date in 2015. 
     It should be pointed out that the contribution of the governance network 
perspective to theory, as mentioned, does not lie at the level of causal analysis, nor 
offer a new normative analysis. Rather, its value is as an organizing framework, and 
rests on its ability to provide a framework for understanding the process of 
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governance. The following diagram explains the progression of the approach adopted 
in this study: 
 
Diagram 1: Progression of the study 
 
 





This study recognizes the limits of using the governance network concept and 
approach and their power to explain policy outcomes. As such, the study seeks to 
determine the nature of the CCS governance network in Europe, and comment on its 
role in the development of the legal and regulatory frameworks. In this respect, the 
driving force of explanation (explananda) is the characteristics of actors
16
 and the 
nature of governance network being the dependent variable (explanans). It is the 
characteristics of the actors – agency – as well as the institutional structure of the 
network, and the context in interaction, which determine the nature of the network  
     The nature of the network is determined based on a variation of the model 
developed by Rhodes (1998) in his study of policy networks. The so-called ‘Rhodes 
model’, and its variants, has been most widely acknowledged in the literature on 
policy networks, and in particular in relation to the study of EU governance. The 
‘Rhodes model’ is acknowledged by adopting two of its variables: i) the relative 
stability of the network; and ii) resource interdependency.  
 
2.2.2.1 Stability and Interdependency of a governance network 
Stability: core vs. the periphery 
The first variable here refers to a network’s structure. A structure of a network can be 
defined in a number of ways, however, as Borgatti and Everett (1999) suggest, this is 
best done by seeing whether it is structured as a core-periphery model. In such a 
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model, a network, as argued in this study, has a core-periphery structure if it can be 
partitioned into: i) a core, whose members are closely tied to each other and hold the 
main policy and decision-making powers; and ii) the periphery - members not in the 
core, but remain valuable to the core. The periphery does not determine, but rather 
seeks to influence the policy content.  
     While any node from the core can also be present in the periphery, the periphery 
nodes cannot be members of a core, unless a cohesive subgroup of a periphery is 
regarded as a core of a highly localized region of the network
17
. However, the 
possibility of multiple cores is not considered in this study. The concern is rather with 
detecting whether the CCS governance network as a whole forms to the core-
periphery structure.  
    While doing so is the first step, it does not reveal much about the nature of the 
governance infrastructure, and consequently the governance process itself. What is 
required is also examining the structure of the relations between the core and 
periphery, by looking at how they interact, be it in formal or informal ways. In a 
relatively stable network, for example, the interactions would consist of primarily 
formal ways
18
. However, informal ways would also to a certain extent be considered 
influential.  
     In a stable network, the core-periphery structure is relatively prone to withstand 
influences which would potentially threaten its stability – i.e. external shocks such as 
the financial crisis, political pressure or public opposition. In regards to the stability of 
a network, Bomber (1998) for example also argues that influence from other 
institutional bodies, such as the European Parliament in the EU, or other 
governmental departments, would indicate a relative unstable nature of the network. It 
is argued that in cases of a relatively unstable network, the outcome would be an 
overly stringent legal and regulatory framework. This would be the case as the 
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influence of the periphery would be weakened, and the policy and decision-making 
would be left primarily to the core, which would not receive the input from relevant 
stakeholders. 
     As such, the structure and the membership of the network
19
 are invariably related 
to the particular characteristics of actors – i.e. their resources and level of expertise, 
which essentially determines what they can ‘bring to the table’.  
  
Resource (inter) dependency 
This assumption relates to the second variable, resource dependency, which refers to 
the extent to which actors within the network depend on one another for resources 
such as finance, information, expertise and legitimacy. Typically, governance 
networks are characterized by the interdependence between various politicians, 
bureaucrats and interest representatives, where administrators (the core) need political 
support, legitimacy and coalition partners in their efforts to implement a policy. On 
the other hand, interest groups, including companies, environmental NGOs, academic 
and research communities (the periphery) seek access to policy (i.e. legal/regulatory 
frameworks) formation and implementation, and concessions in their interests. Access 
and influence is gained by building more stable and permanent relations based on 
trust, resources and expertise available – i.e. their characteristics. The difference in 
the needs, between the core and the periphery, in turn motivate and produce 
exchanges or transactions, which may become institutionalized in network structures 
(Van Waarden, 1992: 31).  
     At the level of the EU, the resource dependency is evident in the interactions both 
horizontally between various EU institutions, as well as vertically, for example 
between the Commission and the national and sub-national actors, at the various 
stages of the policy-making process. Given that the EU does not have its own 
implementation machinery in individual Member States, the Commission often 
depends on the national and sub-national actors for local expertise, information and 
the submission of projects, whereas the regional actors and interest groups, for 
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 (at the EU level), national civil 
servants, scientific experts, industry representatives, academics, environmental and business interest 
groups, etc. These actors are active within the network depending on the issue under discussion, its 




example, in return get information on Structural Fund programs and access to other 
EU policies from which they are generally excluded (Thielemann, 1998: 8). 
     Dependency on the exchange of such material and immaterial resources, can be 
either strong, and thereby signify a close relationship between the core and the 
periphery, as well as within the periphery itself, or it also be characterized as loose, 
informal, and/or relatively open, in which case it is more likely that there will be an 
uneven exchange of resources. In such case, certain groups or actors will possess a 
much greater amount of resources and thereby potentially more influence in the 
shaping of the policy outcome. Though this fact is acknowledged, the study is not 
considered with the emergence of the gap in the distribution of resources nor its 
influence per se, but rather considers the existence of the dependency in its own right. 
In this way it examines whether the greater amount of resources has led to that actor 
dominating in the network and if that dominance is in any way evident in the final 
outcome – regulations related to CO2 storage.  
     The study argues that a greater amount of resources, perhaps contrary to common 
intuition, at least in the context of CCS, would not lead to dominance in the network, 
and as such also no favourable sense in the legislative outcome. This argument is 
premised on the notion of the so-called ‘power paradox’, which states that power, or 
the capacity to exert influence on others, produces the most constructive results when 
exercised in a voluntary partnership with others. The more visible power is, the less it 
works (Van Auken, 1997). This is not to say, for example that large oil and gas 
companies do not seek to maintain a certain level of ‘power’ in a larger business-
oriented context, or that they intentionally seek to disguise their true intentions when 
they participate in the CCS/ CO2 storage governance process. At the end of the day, 
companies are business-oriented and have to see their investments into the technology 
be worthwhile. In this context then, social science reveals that the ability to get or 
maintain power, even in smaller network situations, depends on one’s ability to 
understand and advance the goals of other network members. As such, actions and 
behaviour of these powerful and/or resourceful actors becomes primarily 
characterised by cooperation and negotiations. In other words, those with a greater 
amount of resources, through cooperation and negotiations do not only use their 
power in just ethical ways or solely serve the interests of a network, but also because 




     This way of thinking about the vested interest and behaviour of large industry 
players, with significant resources, guides us to question the motivation behind the 
development of CCS technology in general. Is it simply a way for the industry to 
maintain their status quo and continue burning fossil fuels, or is it primarily oriented 
toward climate change mitigation? This research does not attempt to answer such 
questions directly, although it would venture into saying that it is the combination of 
the two; continue the business as usual whilst adapting to the changing climate. 
Nevertheless, this research is mainly concerned with the notion of managing 
environmental risks of CO2 storage, how and whether these are adequately covered in 
the regulatory frameworks in Europe, as well as whether these frameworks stand in 
the way of development and deployment of the technology.  
     In this way then, the argument that greater amount of resources controlled by 
certain actors does not imply dominance within a network and lead to a favourable 
outcome, can be made. In other words, this argument would prove to be invalid if 
there is evidence that the regulatory framework itself is in any way biased towards the 
industry
20
, or if other stakeholders, through interviews, would indicate that in the 
process of development of these frameworks (i.e. during consultations or working 
groups) the industry in any way exerted any influence on others or if they felt that the 
industry was a dominant actor. In essence, the lack of dominance and extensive 
influence on other stakeholders and on the development of the regulatory frameworks 
is because of its willingness to maintain the status quo. In other words, whereas the 
industry depends on the government, and other stakeholders, to maintain its status 
quo, others depend on the industry for its scientific and technical expertise on CO2 
injection and storage, for example.  
     This research also argues then that an optimal outcome, in terms of a regulatory 
framework, occurs when the resource dependency relationship between the members 
of a network is strong. This means that, as mentioned above, each actor is dependent 
on others for a particular resource – be it material (i.e. financing) or immaterial (i.e. 
knowledge). What constitutes an optimal outcome is thus considered to be what 
satisfies the majority of the respondents, all members of the so-called CCS 
governance network. The chosen methodology is in this way related to the chosen 
methods. 
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2.3 Methodology and Methods 
2.3.1 Methodology 
Understanding governance of CO2 storage: a critical realist perspective 
The research philosophy used in this thesis adopts assumptions both about the world 
and the nature of knowledge. The philosophy, or theory, a researcher adopts in their 
approach, needs to be compatible with their ontological and epistemological 
positions, which along with the chosen methodology serve as the basis for the 
research strategy, as well as influence how the observations made are 
interpreted. Whereas ontology refers to the status of reality, or the way we look at the 
world, epistemology on the other hand refers to how we conduct our research, or the 
style of research chosen, as a response to our views about the nature of knowledge 
and understanding (Saunders et al., 2009). The view adopted in this thesis is one of an 
interpretivist epistemology, within the confines of critical realist ontology. 
 
Critical realism 
A critical realist perspective in a way developed out of a critique of the positivist 
approach, and has been associated primarily with a British philosopher Roy Bhaskar. 
For Bhaskar and other writers on critical realism,
21
 the foundations essentially lie in 
criticizing positivism, its purely objective view of the world and its reduction of 
reality to the observable. For them, the nature of reality is intrinsically ontological, 
underlying the nature of reality. As such, a distinction between three ontological 
domains can be made: i) empirical; ii) actual; and iii) real. It is the observation of the 
‘real’ domain of reality that distinguishes critical realism. In other words, it is such 
deep dimension of reality that forces us to seek knowledge rather than simply 
accumulate facts. Since reality is differentiated then, there exist several parallel 
conceptual frameworks and sometimes competing interpretations (Lessem and 
Schieffer, 2006: 336). Critical realists also argue that the fact that social phenomena 
are concept-dependent (i.e. governance networks) should not be seen as if the social 
world only exists as a mental construction. Social science, for critical realists, brings 
into question and analyses everyday knowledge, and as such challenges power and 
dominance relationships, which can be invariably hidden from immediate view. These 
relationships then need to be conceptualized, from a perspective of hidden depth, as 
Lessem and Schieffer (2006) describe, given that they cannot be directly perceived 
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from an empirical surface. As such, conceptualisation becomes a central social 
scientific activity. If the dynamic dimensions of reality wished to be understood, 
abstraction is most often the best way to conceptualisation. In sum, the key underlying 
assumption of critical realism lies in that an objectively based reality is only partially 
pre-existent, and is also partly socially constructed. The table below encapsulates the 
core assumptions of critical realism. 
 
Table 1: Critical Realism - Core Assumptions 
 
Source: Lessem and Schieffer (2006). 
 
A critical realist perspective applies in this research in broad terms in that it identifies 
the relationship between science and reality. Within this perspective, the starting point 
is ontological realism, recognizing that essentially environmental risks associated 
with CO2 storage are real. However, it differs from realism in that it is critical in the 
sense that, in light of the existence of scientific uncertainties, the reality (or the extent 
of these risks) is questioned. In other words, a critical realist perspective argues that 
although the risk related to CO2 leakage can to an extent be observed (i.e. subsurface 
monitoring), there is no way of making objective observations about that risk.  
     A central issue in critical realism, as Lessem and Schieffer (2006) point out, is the 
active role of the human agent, in particular in regards to their interaction with an 
independent external reality, which guides their action. External reality in this 
research is, as mentioned, the existence of risks related to CO2 storage. The role of the 




risks) is then examined through the use of the governance network theory (see section 
2.2.1).  
     A critical realist, while denying that there is any entirely ‘objective’ or certain 
knowledge of the world/reality, accepts the possibility of alternative valid accounts of 
any phenomenon. In this study, environmental risks associated with CO2 storage, such 
as, for example, leakage from a storage complex, or a seismic event, are seen ‘as if’ 
real
22
. In other words, this means that because of unattainability of a 100% certainty 
when it comes to knowing the location of the CO2 underground for example, and due 
to existence of varying interpretations and perceptions
23
 of the concept, there cannot 
be a single correct or objective understanding and representation of the 
world/reality
24
. There is also no empirical test to determine which view is right.  
     In epistemological terms, knowledge is considered to come from human 
experience, and as such, adopting a critical realist perspective means that a researcher 
has to be in the place of inquiry, listen and talk to the right people, and extract the 
data primarily through interviews and observation.  
     Based on this understanding, the study, in essence, combines the philosophies of 
both the natural and social sciences in order to describe the relationships between the 
natural and the social worlds. A philosophical stand of worldview, as Sapsford (2007) 
suggests, underlies and informs a particular style of research, and as such, the chosen 
methodology also determines ones research design. 
  
2.3.2 Methods 
As mentioned, this thesis employs a qualitative research approach, as opposed to a 
quantitative one. In any case, both approaches have merits in their own right, 
however, for any researcher, the chosen method must relate to their ontological and 
epistemological perspective as well as their theoretical framework from which they 
operate. This research is primarily based on the adoption of qualitative type of 
methods, involving critical examination of various types of documents, as well as 
conducting a number of semi-structured interviews.  
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 Real in a sense that they exist independently of our perceptions, theories and construction, and that 
such an event is possible. 
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 Risk perception is defined as a subjective judgment people make about the severity and probability 
of risk. This perception varies between stakeholders, in particular between the industry, policy and 
decision makers, and the general public. 
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Document Analysis and Doctrinal Legal Scholarship 
In a qualitative-type research, one of the first and most common components is the 
analysis of documents, in order to give meaning to a particular assessment topic. 
Document analysis involves looking at things like primary and secondary legislation, 
scholarly articles, public records, textbooks, and as Wesley (2010) points out, also 
other forms of media. The key in the use of any types of documents is that that they 
are used with rigor.  
     This research started off with a review of the literature at a general level on climate 
change, environmental governance and policy-making in the EU and the UK, which 
included reading a great number of scholarly and peer-reviewed articles. It later on 
focused more specifically on carbon capture and storage, and even more so on the 
storage component. Doing a general literature review helped identify the underlying 
theme of the thesis, which can in a way be seen in the relationship between the 
science, policy, technology and the law discussed in Chapter 3.  
     Given that the idea of CCS is relatively young, as mentioned, so is the literature on 
the topic. In the early 2000s, scholarly documents pertained the focus on the 
technological viability of CCS, whereas in the mid- and late-2000s, an increasing 
number of pieces emerged which considered external topics such as public acceptance 
and the importance of a legislative and regulatory frameworks. Following the 2008 
financial crisis, understandably so, the major topic of discussion, in relation to CCS, 
was its economic viability, which is in sense still prevalent today. More specific 
articles, research papers and guidance documents on issues such as, for example, 
monitoring and verification technologies and techniques, injection well-stability, the 
CO2 stream composition and movement during transport and once injected 
underground, were also examined. 
     The next step was then to tackle the primary and the secondary legislation 
documents, which in the case of the EU namely involved the 2009 CCS Directive, but 
also a number of White Papers and Communications. While in the case of the UK, it 
involved critically examining things such as the Energy Act 2008 and 2011, as well as 
specific regulations (i.e. for licensing of off-shore CO2 storage). In this respect, so as 
to compare the extent of the transposition, texts of UK regulations on CCS was 






Qualitative interviews with CCS stakeholders 
The approach to knowledge in a qualitative-type research, as mentioned, involves 
becoming a part of the situation by understanding the views from the participants, 
who are considered as the experiential experts on the phenomenon being studied – the 
management of risks of CO2 storage. As such, in order to obtain a first hand account 
of the perceptions and experiences with the legal and regulatory frameworks for CCS 
in Europe, I chose to conduct a number of qualitative interviews with a variety of 
CCS stakeholders. This included members of the academia, policy- and decision-
makers, and people from research institutions and environmental NGOs, in order to 
obtain a representative sample. Given, however, that the focus of this research is to 
understand the views of those most affected by the legal and regulatory frameworks, 
the majority of the respondents were representatives of the CCS industry.
25
 Overall, 
15 people were interviewed.
26
 Although this was a relatively small sample of 
interviewees, they do represent some of the key people in the industry, making it an 
elite interviewing method. 
     Prior to the actual conduct of interviews, extensive preparation was done. First, 
this involved the identification of the groups of people to interview and arranging 
appointments. This was done based on what Bryman (2008) refers to as purposive 
sampling, allowing the researcher to identify the respondents who would be relevant 
to the research questions in advance. It should be noted that while attention was paid 
to the representativeness of the interviewee sample, it was difficult to get responses 
from the industry sector, hence the relatively small number of interviews conducted. 
However, every effort was made, including follow up with emails and phone calls, to 
get as many CCS industry representatives as possible. Selected interviewees were 
contacted primarily via email and phone calls, in some cases several months prior to 
the actual interviews, depending on their availability. While some were available a 
week or two after being contacted, others were more time constrained and agreed to 
contact me when they will find some time. While some interviews were conducted via 
phone and Skype, I also spoke to a number of people in person. 
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 For simplicity purposes, the CCS industry here refers to all those involved with project development 
throughout any aspect of the CCS chain. In this study, however, the main concern is with the storage 
component. 
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 Of the 15, nine were considered to be from the CCS industry, and the remaining six from other 




     Furthermore, in the end it also turned out to be the case that there was a certain 
amount of so-called ‘snowball sampling’ present. This means that when someone was 
interviewed, they were asked if they knew somebody else who might be a good 
person to interview, they provided names and contact information, or even got me in 
touch with them. This in fact provided almost half of the overall sample, and it was 
people from the industry, who turned out to be most helpful in this respect. 
Ultimately, one has to work with what they can get, however, every effort was made 
as to be aware of the overall sample, and any potential biased views in the analysis.  
     Secondly, preparation for the interviews involved a construction of a set of pro-
forma questions, which served as tools to draw out the participant to reflect on their 
experience and involvement with CCS. Pursuant to their responses, questions were 
then tailored so as to draw up as much as possible.     
 
2.3.3 Analyzing the data  
This research, as mentioned, adopts a qualitative technique to achieve the outlined 
aims and objectives (see section 2.1 above). As Guba and Lincoln (1994) would 
attest, qualitative approaches are better suited for exploring research questions from 
an epistemologically subjective perspective. 
27
 At the same time, however, as Cassell 
and Symon (1994) correctly argue, a qualitative approach is also more time 
consuming, with respect to data collection and analysis.  
     For a researcher adopting a qualitative kind of approach, there are a number of 
styles and strategies with which one can engage in the analysis of the data. The 
literature on qualitative research is in fact quite extensive. Many authors
28
 have come 
to conclude that rather than reducing qualitative research to a particular technique or a 
set of stages, this type of research involves a kind of dynamic process of linking 
together problems, theories and methods (Bryman and Burgess, 2002: 2). Bechofer 
(1974) describes it as a “messy interaction between the conceptual and empirical 
world, deduction and induction occurring at the same time” (p. 73). In other words, 
analysing the data, for a researcher, means going back and forth between the adopted 
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 In this study, qualitative methodology is chosen over the quantitative methodology. This is because 
of the adopted epistemological and ontological stance, which does not see an empirical, or a 
quantitative approach to uncovering the governance and risk management of CO2 storage in Europe as 
being able to reveal all the complexities involved.  
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 See also Bechofer and Paterson (2012), Ritchie and Spencer (2002), Miles and Huberman (2002), 




theories, concepts, methodology, and the end goal, or what they are trying to 
accomplish with their research.  
     In this thesis, importance is placed particularly on analysing the perspectives of 
those engaged with CCS projects directly, such as members from the industry and 
policy-makers, as well as other stakeholders, such as academia, researchers and 
environmental NGOs, who are involved in a more indirect way, so as to get a 
complete and a representative picture. Emphasis, however, is placed on the former; 
namely the CCS industry, given that they are the people whose companies will be 
most affected by the legal and regulatory frameworks. As mentioned in the methods 
section (2.3.2) above, those interviewed represented some of the key people in the 
CCS field.  
     Conducting in-depth elite interviews, allowed for the information and the 
phenomenon to be looked at and understood in its context. Due to the complexity of 
the issue at hand - the nature of governance and management of environmental risks, 
in general and in the context of CCS - it is important to consider also the underlying 
themes that run across all categories. These are encompassed by the relationship 
between the science, policy, technology and the law (see Chapter 3).  
     As mentioned above, the interviews were semi-structured, which meant that there 
was a general structure of the ground and main questions that was set up in advance. 
A detailed structure was then left to be worked out during the interview, giving the 
person interviewed a fair degree of freedom in what to talk about, how much to say, 
and how to express it (Drever, 2003).  
     Using semi-structured interviews also gave me, as a researcher, the opportunity to 
generate rich contextual data, and identify and explore insights, perceptions and 
values of those interviewed. In addition, it left space for new issues and themes to be 
examined/questioned more in-depth, depending on the interviewee’s responses. As 
Clough and Nutbrown (2007) note, overall, the effectiveness of the interview depends 
heavily on the communication skills of the interviewer - i.e. their ability to clearly 
structure questions, listen attentively, and encourage the interviewee to talk freely. 
For example, to be able to truly understand the other persons’ construction of reality, 
“we would do well to ask them…and to ask them in such a way that they can tell us in 
their terms…and in a depth which addresses the rich context that is the substance of 




     Equally important, however, is also then the analysis of the qualitative data. As 
Punch (2005) points out, for the individual researcher, the problem comes alive at the 
point of sitting down in front of, for example, the interview transcripts, and/or field 
notes from observations and discussions, and/or documents (p. 195), and deciding 
where to go from there. A good way to start is intensive and repeated reading of the 
material (i.e. transcribed interviews). As Schmidt (2004) notes, this reading is similar 
to study-reading of academic texts, where the aim is to note for each interview, the 
topics that occur and individual aspects of these, which can be, related to the context 
of the research question(s) (in Flick et al., 2004: 254).  
     In order to account for the semi-structured nature of the interviews, it was 
important to not only focus on the answers from the questions that were asked, but 
also to consider whether and how the interviewees take up certain terms (i.e. risk 
and/or governance), as well as which they omit. Although time consuming, attention 
had to be paid not to relate the responses too hastily to my own theoretical 
assumptions by reducing the analysis to a search for locations in the text that would 
be suitable as a proof or illustration of these assumptions (Schmidt; in Flick et al., 
2004: 255).  
     After spending some time reading the texts, the next part was to analyse the data, 
and code it. Coding here refers to “relating the passages in the text of an interview to 
one category, in the version that best fits these textual passages” (Schmidt; in Flick et. 
al, 2004: 255). To interpret the meaning from the content of the text data, a directed 
approach was chosen, whereby the analysis started with a theory and relevant research 
findings as guidance for initial codes (Hsieh, 2005).
29
 In this respect, during data 
analysis, as a researcher I immersed myself in the data and allowed the themes to 
emerge from that data. The purpose of such an approach, as Zhang and Wildemuth 
(2009) suggest, is to validate or extend a conceptual framework or theory.
30
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 Other approaches that the author analyses are a conventional content analysis, where coding 
categories are derived directly from the text data, and a summative content analysis, which involves the 
counting and comparisons of things like keywords or content, followed by the interpretation of the 
underlying context (Hsieh, 2005). Conventional content analysis approach, for example, is used for 
grounded theory development, whereas, the goal of a summative content analysis approach, is to 
explore the use of words/indicators in an inductive manner (Zhang and Wildemuth, 2009). 
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 The analysis sits in contrast to the grounded theory methods, in which data and concepts become the 
basis for a new theory. Rather, the adopted approach in this research is to critically examine the data to 
show how the governance network theory applies to the phenomenon under study. The key 
phenomenon under study in this research is the governance and management of risks of CO2 storage, in 





2.4 Research ethics 
     Any type of research must essentially be underpinned by good research ethics 
principles, including privacy, informed consent, protection from harm and avoidance 
of deception.
31
 All principles were considered, and were mentioned in the ethical 
approval application given to the University of Sheffield, School of Law Ethics 
Committee, which granted the approval. Two issues, privacy and informed consent, 
are discussed below, as the these were of most relevance to my research, and were 
also raised by the interviewed participants. 
 
2.4.1 Privacy 
     The issue of privacy is in particular in social science research one of the central 
issues of research ethics. A number of interviewees from the industry raised the issue 
before agreeing to participate in the research, specifically asking about data protection 
and about confidentiality. Their requests were followed, and those who did not which 
to be identified by their names, are in this thesis referred to as ‘a representative’ or 
‘respondent’. For all the data collected, sufficient protective measures were put in 
place, which involved deleting the recordings once transcribed, and all the files were 
protected by encryption on a USB key, which was kept in a locked filing cabinet 
when not in personal possession. 
 
2.4.2 Informed consent 
     Even in cases of non-sensitive type of research, all those requested to participate 
should have the option of either accepting or rejecting to be part of the research. As 
such, they should be provided with sufficient information on things like the scope, 
purpose, benefits and risks, timeline and sponsors. When contacting individuals for 
the purpose of interviewing them, they were each provided with a background and the 
scope of my research project, as well as on the funder and how their information 
would be used as part of the research. Those who responded and agreed to the 
interview were provided with a more detailed information sheet and a consent form 
prior to the conduct of the interview. Both were kept in a key-secured filing cabinet. 
Each interviewee was also asked whether they could be recorded. A number of 
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interviewees expressed the wish not to be recorded, and in those cases, notes were 
taken by hand. The audio from all the recordings was destroyed following their 
transcription.  
 
2.4.3 Limitations of research 
One of the weaknesses of adopting a critical realist perspective (see section 2.3.1), 
and a qualitative type of research methods, is that there was always the possibility of 
excessive researcher influence. As mentioned in the introduction (see section 1.1.2) 
my academic and research background has for the most part been situated within 
environmental sciences, economics and policy, and now law. Such an 
interdisciplinary background, I believe has in a way given me a generally supportive 
view of the CCS technology in general. As such, one of the main challenges I had to 
face during this research and analysis was to always stay ‘a step back’. In addition, 
coming from an environmental science and policy background, with no prior 
exposure to the field of law, coming to terms with understanding the concepts, 
principles, as well as reviewing legislative documents and other legal material, was 
another challenge on its own. 
 
2.5 Summary 
This chapter served the purpose of introducing the key research questions to be 
addressed in this thesis, as well as justifying the theory, methodology and methods 
used. In sum, the research adopts a critical realist perspective, whereby the reality (of 
risks related to CO2 storage) is seen ‘as if’ real – although risks are considered real, 
pure objectivity is unattainable. This perspective considers the reality to be in a way 
socially constructed and recognizes the active role of human agents, in particular in 
regards to their interaction with an independent external reality. It also considers other 
external influences to be of importance to some extent in determining the reality
32
.  
     The chosen theoretical framework, which supports such a perspective, is the 
governance network theory, which focuses on the manner in which environmental 
risks are dealt with and managed through joint action and interaction. The chosen tool 
of dealing with the said risks, are the legal and regulatory frameworks in Europe and 
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 For example, if there was no other political, social and economic issues on the agenda of the industry 
and policy- and decision-makers, unlimited monitoring and verification could, in theory at least, be 




in the UK. In other words, the governance network theory examines how and to what 
extent environmental risks related to CO2 storage are substantively and procedurally 
encompassed within the legal and regulatory frameworks, and whether/how, if at all, 
these frameworks serve as either an impediment or facilitator for the development of 
the CCS technology in general. In this way, legal and regulatory frameworks are 
considered to be the ‘mediator’ between the management of environmental risks and 
development of the technology.  
     The thesis now moves on first to examine the existing literature and the gaps 
within it, which the remainder of the chapters will then attempt to fill. The review of 
the literature, however, also serves a larger purpose of setting the underlying basis for 
the rest of the thesis. These can be best described and examined in the 
























CHAPTER 3: Literature Review 
 
It is not surprising that given the relatively young age of CCS technology, the 
literature on the subject is still emerging. In many ways, it was the 2005 IPCC Special 
Report on Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage (IPCC, 2005) that first presented the 
carbon capture and storage (CCS) technology to a wider scientific, and broader 
communities, as a potentially significant climate change mitigation tool. Amongst 
other insights, this report pointed out the technical feasibility of CCS, but at the same 
time warned of the uncertainties related to the understanding of the subsurface. More 
importantly, it deemed the management of storage risks as critical, given geological 
variability, and the potential risks and environmental impacts.  
     Since then, the literature on CCS has been growing steadily, with authors covering 
a wide range of CCS related topics, from the different the different components of the 
process (i.e. capture, transport and storage), to the various associated scientific and 
technical, economic, political and legal issues. However, the legal and regulatory 
coverage of CCS remains in the background to that which focuses on the scientific, 
financial or policy aspects. Nevertheless, coverage of the legal and regulatory aspects, 
related to CCS in Europe, has in the recent years increased, following the passage of 
the 2009 EU CCS Directive (2009/31/EC), and its transposition in a number of 
Member States. As mentioned in the introduction of this thesis, the United Kingdom 
has to date developed one of the most comprehensive legal and regulatory 
frameworks for CCS, not only in Europe but also in the world. As such, this thesis 
takes the UK as a case study example.  
     The purpose of this chapter is not only to examine what has already been said 
within the CCS literature, in particular related to the CO2 storage component, but also 
to identify some of the gaps, which the remaining chapters will then attempt to fill. As 
such, this chapter is structured according to three key themes, which serve as the 
underlying themes of the thesis. The first part focuses on science, in particular the 
notions of uncertainty and risk associated with CO2 storage. Again, although other 
types of risks are acknowledged, the main type of risk that this research focuses on is 
that of CO2 escaping from a storage reservoir. The second part will then explore some 
of the dynamics of the policy, technology, law, and their interrelationship with 




approach, and the set out research questions, are based on this interrelationship.  
Lastly, part three will address the broader role of CCS as a climate change mitigation 
technology, as well as the importance of uncertainty and risk of CO2 storage from a 
social science perspective.  
 
3.1 The science literature 
Climate change has undoubtedly become one of the greatest and fundamental threats 
to the places, people and the environment. Although some effects have already been 
experienced to date (i.e. increased drought, extreme weather events), the potential 
future impacts will not only vary by region, but also by the sensitivity of populations, 
the extent and length of exposure to the impacts, and the society’s ability to adapt to 
change (EPA, 2015). However, since the late 20
th
 and early 21
st
 century, the climate 
change issue has in a way started to come more to the forefront of global issues of 
concern, and become integrated more into other policy sectors (i.e. economy, energy). 
With that also came the growing recognition that innovative and affordable solutions 
will be required to reduce the emissions of greenhouse gasses (GHG), whilst allowing 
for continued economic development. One of such potential climate change 
mitigation solutions that has been gaining attention in the literature on climate change 
over the past decade, has been the idea to capture and permanently store the CO2 from 
large stationary emission sources, such as power plants, thereby preventing it from 
being emitted into the atmosphere.  
     Storing CO2 in deep geological formations, safely and for a long period of time, is 
the critical aspect of the entire CCS chain. The storage of the CO2 can occur on- or 
offshore, primarily in either depleted oil and gas reservoirs or saline aquifers. Other 
options for storage include un-mineable coal seems, however, the storage capacity of 
these is far smaller than for other two options. The majority of the technically 
accessible CO2 storage potential is said to lie in the saline aquifers (Benson and Cook, 
2005; Bradshaw et al., 2007; IEA, 2013, 2014).
33
 However, just as geographies differ, 
in turn so will the storage sites around the world. In other words, no one storage site 
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 For example, the UK’s potential storage capacity is said to be around 70 billion tonnes of CO2, of 
which almost 90% would be in saline aquifers, and the rest in depleted oil and gas fields, or 




will be the same. Furthermore, long lead times
34
 (6-10 years) required to make 
assessments for saline aquifers, uncertainties regarding the overall storage capacities 
or the location and movement of the CO2 underground, have been some of the key 
scientific queries over the past decade or so (DECC, 2012: 5). Because of the novel 
nature of permanent CO2 storage, the two key terms of uncertainty and risk, in a way 
have dominated the scientific CCS literature. The following section first discusses this 
nexus between the science, uncertainty and risk, in general terms and in relation to 
CCS. It then puts forth key scientific and technical uncertainties and risks in regards 
to CO2 storage, before presenting the role and importance of monitoring and 
verification as a key component in reducing the uncertainties and associated risks.  
 
3.1.1 The Nexus between the Science, Uncertainty and Risk 
 
Knowledge is the antidote to fear. 
— Ralph Waldo Emerson 
 
The basis of science, whether social or natural, is essentially the discovery of 
something new. This of course means that as long as discovery is possible, there will 
always be things that we do not know, that we are unsure about, and even the 
‘unknown unknowns’. Ambition to reduce such uncertainties, and find out these 
unknowns, is the driving component of the scientific vehicle. As Lewis Thomas, an 
American doctor and scientist once said, “science is founded on uncertainty…[and] 
whenever we discover a new fact it involves the elimination of old ones. We are 
always, as it turns out, fundamentally in error”35. What Thomas implied was that 
uncertainties, and associated risks, cannot be removed in its entirety, and that our goal 
is to reduce them as much as possible.  
     It is more important for scientists and other researchers to ask both why we are 
uncertain, as well as what we are uncertain about. Riesch and Reiner (2010) think 
about it in terms of sources versus objects of uncertainty. The authors suggest that 
there are essentially five levels of uncertainty, which interconnect to form an overall 
uncertainty of a particular risk: i) about the outcome, ii) about the parameters (i.e. 
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the suitability of a particular storage site. It has also been voiced as a major argument for the need to 
expedite early demonstration projects and assessments (Clarke, 2012; Scowcroft, 2012). 
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local conditions), iii) about the model, iv) about our underlying assumptions (i.e. 
sound science), and v) complete uncertainty” (p. 2-3).36 For conventional, or natural 
science, as McEldowney and McEldowney (2011) also suggest, the largest 
uncertainty-challenge can be seen in the risks linked to new technologies, such as 
CCS, which produce considerable uncertainty as to how to anticipate and prevent 
harm (p.3).  
     In the scientific literature in general, the notions of uncertainty and risk quite often 
appear in conjunction. As mentioned, uncertainties, and efforts to reduce risks, drive 
scientific progress thereby increasing the knowledge, which as an American poet 
Ralph Waldo Emerson would say, serves as an antidote to fear (i.e. of CO2 escaping 
from a storage complex). Uncertainty in itself is not necessarily a risk, however, it 
does impact the way in which risk is understood, determined and evaluated. As such, 
in the presence of uncertainty, risks should be graded and ranked conservatively. 
     In relation to conditions of uncertainty and risk, Stirling (2007) for example, also 
argues that trying to assert a single aggregated picture of risk is neither rational nor 
science-based. He is right, in that uncertainty in itself creates an ambiguous 
interpretation of a problem. In other words, interpretation of uncertainties can have 
both subjective and objective elements, which will ultimately determine the outcome 
of a particular decision and solution to a problem. Interpretation of uncertainties can 
become a problem, when statements about causation or correlation are made, which 
depend on certain assumptions. When these are incorrect, any associated measures, 
however accurate numerically, may provide misleading information (Agius, 2009). In 
this respect then, enhancing repeatability and consistency of risk assessments should 
be seen as a key challenge in making the associated processes and results verifiable 
and auditable (DNV, 2009: 68). This points to the fact that monitoring and 
verification, the process as a whole and specific technologies are crucial in reducing 
the uncertainties and provide for better-informed decisions. In addition, it provides for 
a greater degree of investor and general public certainty
37
.  
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 i) final uncertainty predicted by a model, which is then used by politicians; ii) lack of knowledge 
over precise nature of local conditions; iii) which (statistical) model is best for a particular reality of a 
situation; iv) in absence of detailed knowledge people are left to trust experts involved that the 
underlying science is sound (Riesch and Reiner, 2010: 2). 
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3.1.2 Uncertainty and Risk of CO2 Storage 
Carbon capture and storage is for the most part a response to the relative uncertainty, 
not about whether, but the extent to which the Earth’s climate will change, and the 
risks of continued CO2 emissions and the use of fossil fuels. At the same time, 




     Friedmann (2007) for example paints a fairly optimistic picture for the idea of 
permanent CO2 storage, by suggesting that the risks of this activity appear to be very 
small and manageable. He argues that the operational risks are no greater than those 
of oil and gas equivalents. Essentially, he makes this connection based on the 
assumption that experience with various tools and methodologies, and because 
mitigation techniques exist in order to limit leakage risks. Although Friedman does 
draw a parallel with oil-gas equivalents, he does not incorporate into his analysis risks 
and hazards such as contamination of marine life (when drilling is done off-shore), oil 
spills form platforms, underwater pipelines and/or tankers. One simply needs to 




 oil spills, and his arguments can become less 
convincing.  
     These events, however, were one-off events, whereas one of the major 
uncertainties about CO2 storage relates to the effects of leakage over a longer period 
of time. Geological storage of CO2 is a hazard to both the environment and human 
health. Interestingly, other anthropocentric geological, or geo-technical, threats (i.e. 
coal, oil and tar sands mining, injection of waste water in aquifer systems, shale gas 
‘fracking’, liquefied natural gas storage) are often not seen as hazardous, or at least 
not to the same extent. The main reasons for that is that our experience with CO2 
geological storage is still rather limited, apart from only a few commercial and small-
scale pilot projects. This means that there are still uncertainties about threats and 
risks, some of which have perhaps yet to be discovered – fear of the unknown, or 
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 Geo-hazards are both natural processes (i.e. flooding, ground cracking, tsunamis, et.) as well as 
human-induced ones (i.e. seismic activity resulting from ‘fracking’).  
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 One of the largest oil spills which occurred on March 24, 1989 when an oil tanker hit the Bligh Reef 
of the coast of Alaska, spilling an estimated 11million gallons of crude oil (EPA, 2014).  
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 Occurred in April, 2010 when the Deepwater Horizon oil rig exploded, allowing for crude oil to 
continuously, for a period of 3 months, escape into the Gulf of Mexico. It was estimated that overall, 





“…the oldest and strongest kind of fear”41, as an American novelist, H.P. Lovecraft 
would say.  
 
3.1.2.1 Migration and Leakage of the CO2 
CO2 Migration  
For CCS to deliver on its potential and promises, the CO2 injected into underground 
formations must essentially remain there permanently. Once underground, the CO2 
could in theory migrate both horizontally and vertically, however, much depends on 
the topography of a particular storage site. Lindberg et al. (2002) for example, suggest 
that a smooth topography of the top seal (i.e. depth variation is less than 80m over a 
120km
2
 area) would allow for the injected CO2 to spread over a very large area, and 
conclude that the long-term fate of the injected CO2 in a saline aquifer will strongly 
depend on the topography of the cap rock. Zweigel et al. (2000) came to a similar 
conclusion, identifying that even subtle topography differences (i.e. 0.3 degrees, or 4 
meters, over a distance of 1km) can affect migration patterns. While they point out 
that such simulations require geological input data, rather ironically, they openly 
admit that their simulations neglected input data like CO2 solution into water, leakage 
into the cap rock, changing pressure and temperature, and potential porosity or 
permeability changes (p.3), all of which have the potential to play a significant part in 
CO2 underground behaviour. Nonetheless they do in the end also point out that 
development of appropriate tools is consequently a major challenge to ensure safety 
and manageability of, and public confidence in underground CO2 storage projects 
(p.6).  
     Understanding underground CO2 migration is still mired by uncertainties. If 
reservoir capacities and leakage risks are to be assessed, as Macminn et al. (2010) 
point out “it is essential to understand the subsurface spreading and migration of the 
plume of mobile CO2” (p.1). Because of the potential of significant damage occurring, 
it is necessary to deploy technologies that measure, monitor and verify that injected 
CO2 remains in the subsurface (Wilson and Gerard, 2007).  
     The general sense in the literature on CO2 storage is that horizontal migration of 
the CO2 plume is expected and not a major issue per se, as opposed to CO2 migrating 
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into the overburden. As shown by Arts et al. (2008) in their study on the monitoring 
of the injected CO2 in the Utsira Sand at Sleipner, Norway, while the CO2 has 
migrated laterally, there has been no indication of any migration into the reservoir 
overburden.
42
 See Figure 1 below.  
 
Figure 1: Outlines of the extent of the CO2 plume in 2001 and 2006 over the top 
structure map of the top Ultsira Sand 
 
Source: Arts et al. (2008). 
 
Although, even horizontal migration, when this goes beyond the outlined storage 
complex, can be problematic. This, however, then becomes a CO2 leakage, and 




As mentioned, one of the underlying concerns behind most of potential CCS hazards
43
 
is the issue of leakage from a storage reservoir. For the most part, it has been 
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 To track the behaviour of the CO2 plume in the reservoir a combination of seismic monitoring and 
seabed gravimetry was used. 
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 Some of the main potential hazards of CCS, which include: i) exposure due to pipeline leaks; ii) 
exposure due to leakage from geological storage; iii) leakage from geological storage to groundwater; 
iv) leakage from geological storage to fossil fuel assets; v) leakage eliminates benefits of geological 




acknowledged that it is likely that some of the stored CO2 will leak. Thus, if geologic 
sequestration is to be proven effective, one of the main concerns, and goals, is to keep 
the level of leakage at a minimum, as trying to eliminate the risk of leakage would be 
both futile and impossible. Although, for legal and regulatory purposes, ‘leakage’ is 
defined as escape of the CO2 from a storage complex, and does not necessarily 
include leakage to the atmosphere for example, nor does it presuppose any 
environmental or health impacts. Unless otherwise stated, for simplification purposes, 
the same general definition is used when referring to the issue of CO2 leakage.  
     In any case, a number of studies
44
 have suggested ranges for ‘acceptable’ levels of 
leakage and the levels of associated uncertainties.
45
  Risks, including leakage, can 
always be reduced with the implementation of additional safeguards, however, at the 
price of a higher cost. Thus, defining acceptable levels of risk often comes down to 
the question of cost of implementation of these safeguards relative to the potential 
negative impacts and cost of possible corrective measures (DNV, 2009).
46
 
     From a scientific point of view, estimated potential leakage rates range from 
0.01% to 1% per annum (Chow et al., 2003: 1175). While the percentages might seem 
small and insignificant to some, in actuality, the implications are quite significant, not 
only in terms of its direct effects on human health and the environment, but also on 
the policies and legislation that are developed as a result of these estimates.  
     Hepple and Benson (2004) for example also offer an examination of the 
implications of CO2 leakage to the atmosphere on the effectiveness of geologic 
storage of CO2 as a climate change mitigation strategy. In the study they come to the 
conclusion that geologic sequestration can be an effective method even if some small 
amounts of CO2 escape from storage reservoirs back into the atmosphere. Their 
conclusions are based on the finding that the required sequestered CO2 quantities are 
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 The question that is often not address in such studies, however, is, whether acceptability differs 
between stakeholders, and/or whose matters the most. Is it for the businesses and companies making 
the investments, the governments, or the people (near and far from storage sites)? Acceptability 
essentially also ties in with the notion of perception of risk, which in the case of the general public, is 
often far more subjective than objective. 
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 DNV’s CO2QUALSTORE report: Guidelines for Selection and Qualification of Sites and Projects 
for Geological Storage of CO2 (2009-1425) identified an approach for risk reduction, known as As 
Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP), which allows project developers and regulators more 
flexibility, in terms of the project design and influence on risk management respectively, by giving 




in the range of the estimated global geological capacity,
47
 and that seepage rates
48
 of 
less than 0.01% per year may be ‘universally’ acceptable and a reasonable 
performance requirement for surface seepage. While their study is valuable in that 
their observation and analysis of the effectiveness of CCS as a climate change 
mitigation tool is based on several scenarios of desired atmospheric CO2 
concentration levels (at 350, 450, 550, 650, 750ppmv), their models do not account 
for any uncertainties in their estimations.  
     In any case, there is a fairly wide consensus in the natural sciences literature that 
there is the possibility and risk of leakage occurring, albeit some degree of variation 
in regards to the likelihood and the rate of leakage. A simple scholarly search on risk 
of CO2 leakage, however, can reveal that the largest potential pathways for leakage 




3.1.2.2 Well integrity 
One of the main potential concerns that has been associated with leakage from 
geologic sequestration sites, both on- and offshore, revolves around the integrity of 
wellbores that have not been appropriately sealed, or poorly constructed. As Duguid 
and Tombari (2007) suggest, the integrity of injection wells is crucial in that the wells 
and the annuli and pathways that may exist within them can serve as leakage 
pathways for the CO2 back to the surface, or act as a conduits for leakage between 
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 This means that no more CO2 is being stored that in theory could be dealt with by the environment. It 
should also be noted that there essentially could be a significant difference between the total geological 
capacity, and the total ‘technical capacity’, which does not take economics or security of storage into 
account.   
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 See also Macminn et al. (2010), Farcas and Woods (2009) for more on CO2 leakage. 
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Figure 2: An abandoned well used for CO2 storage and possible leakage routes 
 
Source: DNV, 2009. 
 
A study by Barlet-Gouédard et al. (2007), in which the authors look at the chemistry 
between the cement used in wells and the injected CO2, along with the potential for 
cement failure, also suggests that wellbore integrity is an important component in 
preventing CO2 migration/leakage. One of the greatest risks of CO2 leakage for any 
geological storage project, as mentioned, is that associated with old abandoned wells. 
In other words, the integrity of wells may become compromised as a result of poor 
completion or abandonment, and/or poor well operation (Zhang and Bachu, 2011). In 
this respect, it is particularly important that abandoned boreholes are located, plugged 
and then monitored for leakage, that selected sites are not near any large population 
concentrations, and that injection of CO2 is limited or ceased, if leakage or other 
significant irregularity is detected (Mathieston et al., 2010).  
     Le Guen et al. (2009) argue that performance assessments for the long-term well 
integrity is a crucial step that needs to be addressed if CCS deployment is to be an 
acceptable safe solution for CO2 emissions reductions. Similarly, Imbus et al. (2006) 





3.1.2.3 ‘Fracking’ and shale gas 
Extraction of natural/shale gas could potentially also pose a risk to the integrity of 
CO2 storage. In brief, shale gas is a natural gas located in tightly compressed shale 
rocks deep below the surface. The only way that that gas can be extracted is via a 
process called hydraulic fracturing, or ‘fracking’. The drilling is done thousands of 
meters below the surface, normally at depths of 1500m to 5000m. In contrast to 
conventional gas extraction techniques, however, the drilling is done horizontally (see 
image below), so as to maximize its economic feasibility
50
. Once the boreholes are 
lined with steel and concrete casing, a mixture of water, chemicals and sand is 
injected at very high pressure in order to fracture the shale, after which the shale gas 
flows back to the surface where it is captured.   
 




Source: BBC, 2013. 
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 By horizontally fracturing the shale, the rate of production increases, as opposed to simply drilling a 
vertical well. Estimates show that the production ratio for horizontal vs. vertical wells is 3.2 to 1, 
whereas the costs are only 2:1. In some carbonate formations, the productivity of horizontal vs. vertical 




Shale gas is important primarily because it has the potential to radically transform the 
energy future of many countries reliant on coal and other fossil fuels, such as the 
United States in particular, as well as other developing countries like China, India and 
countries in Latin America, where largest shale reserves are said to exist. It should be 
noted that while shale gas is still a fossil fuel, however, it contains more energy per 
pound than coal, and is considered a cleaner source of energy as it produces none of 
the other particulates that burning of coal does (Mares, 2012). In other words, in light 
of the commitments to reduce carbon emissions, many countries have began 
exploring, and/or heavily switching from coal to shale gas as their choice of energy 
fuel. 
     In relation to CO2 storage, the issue of hydraulic fracturing – ‘fracking’ – and shale 
gas exploration and production, has not yet been extensively explored, however, 
given the potential implications, it is an issue not to be ignored. It should be pointed 
out that ‘fracking’ is not a CCS process issue per se, but its implications relate to 
potential impacts on the integrity of storage sites, which in some cases, in particular in 
the US, are situated above the shale formations, where the CO2 is being stored. 
Furthermore, it is an interesting comparator to CCS in terms of a number of 
uncertainties and risks (i.e. leakage, well integrity), and the differences in views of 
those between the various stakeholders (i.e. government, industry, public).  
Nevertheless, as many authors
51
 have come to point out, shale gas extraction still 
carries a number of risks, including increased seismic activity, water contamination, 
and CO2 and CH4
52
 emissions during drilling (BGS, 2011).  
     The debates on fracking continue between the industry claiming that the risks are 
small, and that shale gas is good news for the climate as it would limit coal 
consumption, and the opposition, in most cases environmental NGOs and the public,
53
 
which point to the still prevalent uncertainties about the safety and risks of significant 
damage to the health of people and the environment.  
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 See for example Rozell and Reaven (2012), Vidic et al. (2013), Rahm and Riha (2012), McKenzie et 
al. (2012). 
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 CH4 = methane. As far as emissions of this gas is concerned, as a result of fracking, a recent MIT 
study showed that extraction of shale gas through hydraulic fracturing in fact emits only a fraction 
more methane into the air than conventional gas drilling (O’Sullivan and Paltsev, 2012).   
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 In spring of 2011 two small earthquakes in Blackpool were blamed to be the result of hydraulic 
fracturing activity done by Cuadrilla Resources – the UK company licensed to explore Lancashire’s 
shale gas resources. Immediately after those events, the UK government placed a moratorium on all 
shale gas exploration. This, however, only lasted until December, 2012, when the government lifted the 




3.1.3 Measurement, Monitoring and Verification 
As far as any new technology is concerned, for it to receive approval and investment, 
reassurance from both the government (e.g. competent authorities
54
), as well as the 
companies looking to invest in the project, reassurance as to the safety is pertinent. 
Though in case of the latter, as Chapter 6 of this thesis shows, in which data from 
stakeholder interviews is presented, the largest issue remains the lack of sufficient 
policy support in terms of short-term capital investment support and long-term policy 
incentives. Nevertheless, as far as reassurance as to the safety of geological storage is 
concerned, this is provided through the various monitoring and verification efforts. 
This includes both deployments of various monitoring and verification technologies 
and techniques, such as field surveying, 3D imaging, or muon tomography,
55
 as well 
as various legal and regulatory requirements. For example, Article 13 of the CCS 
Directive stipulates that project operators must, based on a monitoring plan, carry out 
monitoring of the injection facility, storage complex, and where appropriate also the 
surrounding environment. 
     As far as monitoring and verification is concerned, an interesting example is the In 
Salah project in Algeria, an industrial-scale CO2 storage project, whose main 
objective is to provide reassurance, through monitoring and verification, that 
geological storage of CO2 is safe in the long-term. In their analysis of the In Salah 
project, Mathieson et al. (2010) come to a number of important conclusions, including 
that: i) each storage site is unique, and the monitoring and verification program is 
specific to the risks at each site; ii) cost-effective technologies such as wellhead and 
annulus monitoring have proven to be very useful in the verification of long-term 
storage; iii) CO2 plume development requires high-resolution data for reservoir 
characterization and modelling (p.221).
56
  
     Essentially, monitoring technologies play a vital role in helping to define vertical 
and lateral migration of injected CO2 (Arts et al., 2002), and help to reassure that the 
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 A competent authority is essentially the main governmental body that is entrusted with the 
permitting and licensing of CCS activities. It is also the governmental body that takes over the 
responsibilities and liabilities once storage sites are closed. Under the EU CCS Directive, stemming 
from the provisions of the UK Energy Act 2008, the competent authorities in the UK are the Secretary 
of State and the Scottish Ministers, depending on where the activity takes place. 
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 See NETL, 2009; Mathieson et al., 2010 for a useful account of specific monitoring technologies. 
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 Other examples of projects focusing specifically on measurement, monitoring and verification of 
CO2 storage include the Heartland Area Redwater Project (HARP) CO2 pilot injection site in Alberta, 
Canada, the monitoring program at Slepiner field in the North Sea and Snøhvit CO2 injection program 




injected CO2 remains underground. As several studies
57
 have also pointed out, there is 
no ‘cookie cutter approach’ to the selection of monitoring technologies, as every site 
will be different based on its geology and/or capacity. As will be explained in greater 
detail in Chapter 4, the legal and regulatory frameworks in Europe take this notion 
into account in their provisions.  
 
3.1.4 Summary of Observations 
The three concepts of science, uncertainty and risk are interrelated in the sense that 
science is founded on uncertainty, and risk comes out of the uncertainties. While CCS 
is certainly a climate change issue, it is perhaps even more so a technical geo-hazard 
issue as well. Here again, the issue of uncertainties in relation to CO2 subsurface 
migration, and the risks of leakage appear. The scientific literature is for the most part 
in agreement that one of the main threats of carbon storage is that of the failure of 
wellbores, which would even further increase the risks of leakage. To attempt to 
reduce these risks, studies have shown that robust measurement, monitoring and 
verification technologies will be required to offer reassurance that the CO2 will stay 
underground for the long-term.     
     Essentially, the goal, and more importantly the duty, has become to limit these 
uncertainties and risks associated with carbon sequestration, thereby preventing 
human and environmental harm. The following section translates the above discussion 
of science, uncertainty and risk, and incorporates it into the debates on governance of 
CO2 storage.  
 
3.2 Mediating between the science, policy and law 
3.2.1 A complex and reflexive relationship 
When scientific findings are made, in particular in relation to potential significant 
threats to humans and the environment, bodies of environmental law (national, 
regional, and international) respond in a way to address that issue. When uncertainties 
exist, however, it makes things more complex, in particular for the policy and 
decision makers who have to incorporate the scientific findings into the developing 
policies and legislation. Production of sound science and a higher the degree of 
objectivity, or “usable knowledge” (Haas, 2004), the better the basis for policy 
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making and in turn the basis for good laws. In other words, setting the framework for 
environmental law requires policy and decision makers to interpret the science and 
adequately grasp underlining scientific assumptions and uncertainties. A crucial role 
in this process is often played by various advisory bodies and agencies, which provide 
an important platform for the cooperation between the scientists, policy and decision 
makers. One such example is the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution 
(RCEP), which advised the government on environmental pollution and had a 
substantial influence on environmental policy making. Yet another is the British 
Geological Survey (BGS), which has contributed substantially, both at the UK, 
European and international levels, in regards to the understanding of the character and 
capacity of potential underground storage reservoirs, chemical interactions 
underground, as well as monitoring and assessment technologies and strategies.  
     In light of the existence of scientific uncertainty, governments have for the most 
part used the principle of precaution
58
 to address and deal with
59
 many of today’s 
pressing environmental issues. Essentially, this means that even though the existence 
of uncertainties is acknowledged, and that of the ‘unknown uncertainties’ (i.e. the 
unknown unknowns), action is taken in order to protect the environment. It was the 
1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development first conceptualized this 
action in the precautionary principle, which essentially states, that “where there are 
threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be 
used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental 
degradation” (UN, 1992). An excellent example of the application of acting with 
precaution can be seen in the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the 
Ozone. In this case, all the signatory countries essentially came to an agreement that 
despite an incomplete certainty on the extent of the influence of the use of certain 
substances, such as chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), on the thinning of the Earth’s ozone 
layer, action must be taken.  
     All scientific approaches to dealing with environmental issues, in particular when 
uncertainties exist, involve scientifically rigorous techniques, such as risk 
assessments,
60
 which quantify and aggregate the different outcomes and multiplying 
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them by their respective probabilities, in order to yield a single picture of ‘risk’. It 
should be pointed out, however, that in light of uncertainties, ambiguity and 
ignorance, such techniques might not, or as Sterling (2007) suggests, should not be 
persistently adhered to.  
     Lastly, the relationship between the science, technology, policy and law can be 
said to resemble one of reflexivity. In the literature, definitions of reflexivity vary, 
depending on the context the term is used in. However, it is most often connected to 
the writings on reflexive modernisation by Beck (1992, 1994)
61
, who essentially noted 
that the processes that were designed to yield progress, also at the same time produced 
side effects and risks. This research considers reflexivity in broad terms, in that the 
scientific progress is achieved through re-examination of that which is already used 
by society. In the context of CO2 storage, this is evident in applying the existing 
technology for capturing, transporting and injecting CO2, that has been around for 
decades, to advance the idea of permanently storing the CO2, essentially for the 
purpose of mitigating climate change and continued use of fossil fuels.  
     Reflexivity is in this context also related to the concept of governance, in that 
knowledge production is integrated and based on cooperation, strategies and 
anticipation of long-term effects are based on adaptation (i.e. monitoring and 
corrective measure plans). Principles such as sustainability and precaution are 
examples of principles that reflect the possibility of unintended consequences, whilst 
reflecting the complex interactions within the governance system (i.e. between the 
scientific, industry and government communities). By creating and guiding interaction 
between various rationalities (i.e. of different actors), they take account of the 
complexity of interlinked social, technological and ecological development, the 
fundamental uncertainty with respect to system dynamics and the contingency of the 
effects of human action. Reflexivity is therefore geared towards continued learning in 
the course of on-going developments, rather than towards complete knowledge and 
maximisation of control (Voss and Kemp, 2006: 7).  
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3.2.1.1 Translating science into policy 
Translating the science, and its findings into policy is often complicated by the 
existence of the scientific and/or technical uncertainties. While the scientists, who 
produce findings acknowledge and understand the associated uncertainties, the policy 
makers most often do not; at least not to the same extent. This makes it necessary for 
the findings to be translated and communicated to them in an effective, efficient, and 
simple manner. The importance of the latter is often underestimated. This 
interpretation, or communication, is most often done by the so-called agents, also 
referred to as ‘knowledge brokers’ (Litfin, 1995), or by the ‘epistemic communities’ 
(Haas 1992; Williams, 2005). These agents play an essential role, as their ability to 
frame and interpret information is a substantial source of power, in particular under 
conditions of scientific uncertainty (Liftin, 1995: 254). Uncertainty, as Bryner (1997) 
argues, is a central feature of environmental crises. Essentially, policy and regulations 
are all formed in the context of uncertainty. The mere existence of uncertainty, as 
Williams (2005) would add, highlights the importance of science, and the important 
role of knowledge, as the basis for effective environmental policy-making.  
     The existence of scientific uncertainty, however, does not presuppose that effective 
environmental policies, agreements and legislation cannot be developed. One 
excellent example is the banning of man-made chlorines, such as chlorofluorocarbons 
(CFCs) and halons, the principal chemical agents said to be causing ozone depletion. 
While concerns around the effects of CFCs and halons on the ozone layer started to 
grow among the scientific community in the 1970s, it was not until the 1985 Vienna 
Convention that international cooperation on the issue was formalized
62
. Moreover, 
the Montreal Protocol, with its application of the precautionary principle, also serves 
as a prime example of what McEldowney, McEldowney (2011) refer to as the 
emerging paradigm shift in environmental policy- and law-making.  
     The key message here is that in order to produce sound policies, effective 
communication between the scientific and policy communities is essential and that 
even when a certain degree of uncertainty exists, effective agreements can be reached. 
In this case, Cash and Clark (2001) see effective communication in forms of 
distributive assessment systems, for which the effectiveness, saliency, credibility and 
                                                     
62
 On the basis of this convention, the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer 
was negotiated and opened for signature in 1987, entering into force two years later in 1989. To date it 
has been amended several times, signed by 197 countries and still serves as one of the most successful 




legitimacy is influenced by factors such as the historical context, characteristics of the 
assessment user or audience and of the assessment process itself. This plays into the 
main conclusion of their study, which is that the science-policy interface is not a sharp 
line or demarcation but rather a fuzzy, dynamically shifting boundary, constantly 
influenced by the communication process itself.
63
 The fact that this boundary is 
blurry, Jasanoff (1990) argues, can also increase the productivity of the decision 
making process itself. In this sense, productivity can be increased by a greater degree 
of cooperation and coordination, in terms of information sharing in particular, 
between the public and private stakeholders.  
     When examining the science-policy boundary in general, the context is an 
important component. This relates to the fact that there are different norms and values 
in institutions, which results in what Ruscio (1994) calls a policy culture. In his study 
of the science-policy culture in the US, the author also concludes that the policy 
culture in the end shapes the policy agenda, the debates and their eventual outcomes. 
The study of policy culture, in Ruscio’s view, helps us understand the ways in which 
values shape the science-policy boundary. As can be seen in the case of CCS in the 
EU, not all Member States appear to have the same aspirations to deploy the 
technology, which is evident in the extent that CCS is included in their environment 
and energy policies, for example.  
     The structure of the science-policy boundary is also an essential element for the 
description of variation in regulatory regimes, as Halffman (2005) points out. His 
study provides a useful in-depth systematic description of the national patterns in 
regulatory regimes in the United States, England, and the Netherlands, and concludes 
that the regulatory regimes are an important locus for the articulation of the science-
policy boundaries
64
. This research situates itself in such a context, in that the main 
research question sets out to explore the extent to which regulation mediates between 
managing the risks of CO2 storage, and the deployment of the CCS technology.  
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3.2.1.2 Science and law interface  
Similar to the interface between science and policy, the relationship between science 
and law can also be seen as complex and multi-dimensional. In the words of Oliver 
Houck (2003), the historical relationship between science and law is one of a “tale 
from a troubled marriage.” Gibbons (1981) also describes it as reflexive and complex, 
as both science and law to some extent exert an influence on each other (p. 44).  
     As mentioned earlier, science, uncertainty and risk are three interconnected terms. 
The idea of risk, and using risk assessments, then, has become increasingly important 
in environmental law, in particular in the light of the growing amount of 
environmental legislation and regulation aimed at reducing or managing the risks 
associated with a particular activity or process. In this field, the relationship between 
environmental law and science can often be seen best
65
.  
     One of the more in-depth pieces in the literature on the relationship between 
science and environmental law, by McEldowney and McEldowney (2011), puts the 
intersection between the two fields under scrutiny. The authors essentially argue for a 
more interdisciplinary, reflexive learning processes that should engage with the 
changing and diverse regulatory styles of governance and the complex nature of 
environmental problems. A reflexive learning process, in this context, refers to the 
science essentially being regarded not as an autonomous and external input into law 
and environmental policy making, but rather as an intrinsic part to the regulatory 
process. In practice, this means that for the governance network theory, as used in this 
research, it is important to examine, for example, how government officials 
considered the input of scientists and the industry. In other words, this means 
answering questions such as were consultations with the scientists and the industry 
throughout the policy development process meaningful, and to what extent were any 
expressed concerns by the scientific communities ultimately incorporated into the 
regulatory frameworks in the end. Such, and similar questions are examined both 
through document analysis and interviews with various key stakeholders.
66
  
     The McEldowney and McEldowney (2011) article also suggests, among other 
things, that developments in environmental law and policy, can push science and 
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technology development forward. It also puts forth the notion that science is not an 
external influence on policy making and law, but should rather be seen as intrinsic to 
the regulatory process, evidence of which can be seen in modern techniques such as 
the precautionary principle, polluter pays principle, eco-labelling, and environmental 
impact assessments (p.14). This notion, that the science is an intrinsic part of the 
regulatory process, is important for the underlying theory and direction of this thesis. 
In turn, the research then examines whether the law pushes the science and CCS 
technology development/deployment further, or whether it impedes it. 
 
Can the law capture science and technology development? 
It is often argued that law is unable to adequately capture the science and technology 
and its principles. In this respect, Marsden (2008) points out that there is a general 
consensus that “the [law’s] tendency to assume that science can provide clear, 
objective goals…[which then] provide a foundation for law and policy is a false 
assumption” (p. 52-53).67 
     Ellis (2006) also notes, for example, that while the law attempts to bring clarity 
and certainty to ambiguous situations, precaution on the other hand seems destined to 
defeat these attempts with its fluidity and flexibility, and the injunction to keep 
changing the rules of the game in light of new knowledge and understandings (p. 
462). Similarly, Hutter (1999) points to the difficulties of legislating in situations of 
scientific uncertainty, the status of scientific evidence, and the issue of risk and its 
relationship with the law. She goes on to suggest three important implications of 
examining the interface between law and science, including that: i) science and 
technological issues are related to political values; ii) there is no simple division 
between facts, values, and opinions; and iii) science and technology are related to 
broader societal changes (p. 7). In other words, the science, technology and law come 
into conflict most often in light of scientific uncertainty and the required use of 
precaution. It is the role of the policy and decision-makers then to aim to bridge that 
gap when developing legal and regulatory regimes. 
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3.2.2 Governing under conditions of uncertainty  
In the presence of scientific uncertainties, questions regarding governance are often 
raised, such as, for example, how uncertainties and risks (i.e. CO2 leakage) associated 
with the deployment of a particular technology (i.e. CCS) will be managed, or who is 
involved in the process of information gathering and the development of policy and 
legal frameworks. This, in essence, encapsulates the term ‘governance’, as understood 
and employed in this study.   
 
3.2.2.1 Principles in environmental law 
When placing science, uncertainty, and environment in the legal context, it is 
important to also recognize the importance and role of some of the main guiding 
principles. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, a principle is defined as ‘a 
source of action or a general law or rule adopted or professed as a guide to action’. 
Rules on the other hand, in contrast with a principle: i) operate in an all or nothing 
fashion (whereas principles have the quality of ‘weight’ or importance); ii) specify a 
course of action to be followed or avoided (whereas principles are about values and 
cannot, therefore, indicate particular actions); iii) can be justified by principles, but 
the reverse is not true (Perry 1997; Wilkinson, 2002: 100). What then is the 
importance of principles in (environmental) law in the first places? 
     The great advantage of legal principles, as Wilkinson (2002) suggests, is that 
“given their general or non-particularised nature, they have the flexibility to deal with 
novel and complex situations, and to act as general guides to action” (p. 101). 
However, the flexible nature of legal principles in turn also implies a certain extent of 
unpredictability, and uncertainty, which can make them seen as possessing 
unquantifiable legal obligations. For this reason many developed countries have not 
always supported the inclusion of environmental principles in treaties and other 
legislation (Wilkinson, 2002: 101). Alder and Wilkinson (1999) also point out that 
principles can be divided into three categories: i) legally substantiated principles; ii) 
legally binding principles; and iii) guiding principles
68
. Despite a large number of 
principles, international environmental law essentially relies extensively on several of 
the key principles: i) the preventative principle, or the no-harm principle; ii) the 
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precautionary principle; iii) the polluter pays principle; and iv) the principle of 
sustainable development. Each of these will now be addressed in turn along with their 
relationship to the issues at hand in this thesis.  
 
The precautionary principle 
As mentioned earlier, science is characterized by uncertainty. In this respect, Rayfuse 
(2005) adds that “developing on the awareness of the uncertainty of scientific 
information and prediction, and the possible catastrophic effects of this uncertainty 
and inaccuracy for humankind…has led to the development of the precautionary 
principle” (p. 360). This means that as people have become more aware of scientific 
uncertainties, a call on ‘the facts’ as the only rational basis for decisions has become 
weakened, which in a way places scientific uncertainty and the precautionary 
principle, at the centre of environmental decision-making.   
     The precautionary principle has today developed into one of the more influential 
modern techniques of environmental legislation. The use of the precautionary 
principle in developing environmental legislation encourages, and essentially 
requires, the interdisciplinary collaboration between the science, law and policy in 
response to ecological and health risks in particular. Furthermore, the precautionary 
principle is also considered as a risk management and a decision-making tool (Marr, 
2003: 22).  
     The precautionary principle, as mentioned in section 3.2.1 above, is a guiding 
principle for action being taken by governments to address the issue of climate change 
and other environmental matters, despite the existence of scientific uncertainty. It 
states that, “where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full 
scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective 
measures to prevent environmental degradation” (UN, 1992). 
     In any case, the precautionary principle also faces a number of criticisms
69
. As 
Stirling (2007) points out, these are often founded on an unfavourable comparison 
with ‘sound scientific’ methods of risk assessment. In this case the author suggests 
that the principle essentially fails as a decision rule. However, he does acknowledge 
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that the principle cannot be compared to specific methodologies, as it is rather meant 
to be more of a normative guide than anything else. To this effect, policy-making 
should give the benefit of the doubt to the protection of human health and the 
environment, rather than to competing organizational or economic interests (p. 312). 
Wilkinson (2002) would agree with Stirling (2007), as he also notes that the 
precautionary principle is only meant to be a guiding principle which is taken into 
account when formulating or interpreting legislation.  
 
3.2.2.2 Governance 
For any political science scholar, governance might at first appear as a fairly 
straightforward and self-explanatory term. It is often considered in relation, or as a 
synonym for other similar terms such as law, government, politics, policy, etc. In any 
case, the literature has over the past two decades or so been flooded with the writings 
on governance, to the extent that in fact the term has become in a way a ‘catchphrase’ 
in both the social and policy worlds (Haas, 2002). The literature on governance is 
anything but scarce, with the term being used by authors in a variety of ways
70
, 
making it, as Pierre and Peters (2000) describe, ‘notoriously slippery’. Even so, 
governance has become the concept with which to make sense of, or grasp modern 
policy making and implementation. In the words of a number of authors, governance 
has come to refer to a new process of governing, or the new method by which society 
is governed (Stoker, 2006; Rhodes, 1996).  
 
Governance networks 
When talking about governance, in any form or sense, the common thread in the 
literature has become that of a network. While both, governance and network are now 
often in the literature used in conjunction, it is important to make the distinction 
between these two similar but different terms, ‘network governance’ and ‘a 
governance network’. This distinction is important and can sometimes be neglected, 
or even used interchangeably to represent the same thing. While the former signifies a 
way of governing, the latter only encompasses the concept of a network, for the lack 
of a better word, as a ‘thing’ or a structure. Furthermore, whereas ‘network 
governance’ represents an explicit claim that the network is proliferating as a form of 
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governing and heralds a break with the past, using the term ‘governance network’ 
instead emphasizes and focuses on the recurring or institutionalized formal and 
informal resource exchanges between governmental and non-governmental actors 
(Davies, 2011: 3), and thus avoids any definitive or predictive claims about outcomes 
of such governing, which ‘network governance’ theories and studies essentially 
attempt to make. 
     In today’s complex, dynamic and differentiated modern societies, looking at the 
act of governing by focusing and relying solely on government arrangements is not 
sufficient.
71
 In other words, governance and the act of governing has become a matter 
for both public and private actors, “neither of which have the capacity to address 
public policy problems alone but find themselves participating in governing schemes 
characterized by resource dependencies” (Damgaard, 2005: 2). Ansell and Gash 
(2008) refer to the bringing of public and private stakeholders together in collective 
forums with public agencies to engage in consensus-oriented decision making as 
‘collaborative governance’. As such, governance as a concept encompasses not only 
the formal and informal interactions between stakeholders, but as Blanco et al. (2011) 
point out, also the procedures, processes and the rules developed as a result of those 
interactions. Stoker (1998) describes governance as ultimately being concerned with 
creating the conditions for ordered rule and collective action (p.17). 
     In the literature, governance networks are often referred to or used interchangeably 
with the term policy networks. While the governance network concept has not 
achieved any agreed upon definition within the literature, it most commonly refers to 
a set of “relatively stable clusters of operationally autonomous actors connected to 
each other by mutual resource (inter) dependencies that interact, frequently in 
institutionalized settings, in order to address a public policy problem” (Damgaard, 
2005: 3). Where governance network, as far as this research is concerned, differs from 
the concept of policy network, is in that, contrary to the arguments of the latter, actors 
within a governance network are not seeking to exert influence on a particular policy 
or legal outcome. Actors within a governance network, in other words, seek to 
primarily coordinate and pool together resources.  
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3.2.2.3 Application and implications 
In broad terms, whereas the governance refers to a process, governance network is 
understood as a structure. Briefly mentioned above was what governance and 
governance networks are. The main objective of governance (networks) is that of 
managing the uncertainties and risks, whilst ensuring the deployment of a technology. 
In this research, this refers to the management of main environmental risks associated 
with CO2 storage component of the CCS chain, and the deployment of the CCS 
technology as a whole. The medium for doing so is seen in the legal and regulatory 
frameworks, with the licensing and permitting regimes as their central features. 
 
Licensing and Permitting 
Since the late 19
th
 century, the role of the planning systems in environmental 
protection has broadened, from seeking to prevent and control pollution, to 
encompassing sustainable development as an objective (Holder and Lee, 2007: 503). 
An important, and core part of any planning system is the licensing of activities. 
Licensing or permitting, essentially serves the purpose of prevention, control and 
management of risks, and should be viewed as an important tool in regulation of 
activities that may cause harmful pollution or environmental damage. This mainly 
refers to the issuing of an administrative document provided by a responsible, or 
competent authority, which gives the project operator the permission to carry out the 
activity for which the license is demanded given that a number of conditions are 
fulfilled, certain use limitations are respected, and measures are implemented for 
containment, minimization and avoidance of those environmental impacts the activity 
or work may cause. It also, however, refers to a system of periodic control of the 
activity, by which compliance with the stated requirements in the permit itself is 
assessed (Martin, 2011: 14, 22). 
     Essentially, it is a way for a licensing authority to screen the applicants, and thus 
help to control the particular activity. In providing material consideration in such a 
decision, McEldowney (2011) also points out that collection of information and 
analysis are particularly important. As far as it relates to the storage of CO2, the main 




satisfaction with the information it receives from the permit applicant, in particular 
storage site assessment and characterization.
72
  
     Licensing and permitting is thus clearly a regulation mechanism, and its objectives 
are, as mentioned, mainly to control and manage environmental risks. In doing so, the 
licensor (i.e. the government authority), as well as the general public, can be assured 
that the activity is being conducted with respect to the law, and most importantly in a 
safe manner. However, licenses and permits are only effective to the extent that they 
are complied with. This makes, as mentioned above, the periodic control of a 
particular activity and its compliance with the requirements of the license and/or 
permit, a crucial component in the management of potential environmental impacts. 
In other words, it is not only sufficient to issue a license or a permit, but for the 
government, and other third and independent parties, to check up on the compliance 
with those permits. In that way then, the management of environmental risks and the 
controlling of the activity are done most effectively. As is the case in many 
jurisdictions around the world, however, verifying permit and license compliance is 
often restricted by the availability of resources (i.e. finance, regulators/inspectors), 
which in turn can raise questions about the effectiveness of the licensing and 
permitting as a regulation mechanism itself. The extent of the effectiveness, however, 
is dependent on a number of other factors, and varies between jurisdictions. 
 
3.3 Risk and Society  
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, science is based on the concept of uncertainty, 
which undoubtedly plays a part in the policy and legal contexts. Essentially, the 
overarching concept bringing the science, technology and governance into the same 
realms is ‘risk’. This section first discusses the notion of risk society and the 
relationship of the general public with science and new technologies, before 
concluding with a discussion on the importance of communication and public 
engagement. The aim is to bring the social science perspective into play, and present 
the general public as an important contributor, albeit at arms-length, in the 
governance process.  
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3.3.1 The ‘Risk Society’ 
Only those who risk going too far can possibly find out how far they can go. 
— T.S. Elliot73 
Risk is like fire: If controlled it will help you; if uncontrolled it will rise up and destroy you. 
  — Theodore Roosevelt74 
 
Many environmental matters are often not predictable, or at least not with certainty. In 
much of the adverse criticisms to which science is often subjected to today, it is a 
common misconception that it claims certainty, and is/can be completely objective. 
However, uncertainty involves more than the presence or absence of objective 
scientific knowledge. It is to a large extent both socially and politically constructed. 
As a result, uncertainty can lead the policy and decision-makers, the industry, the lay-
public and other stakeholders to acknowledge that there is a certain amount of risk 
when dealing with environmental issues. The term ‘risk’ essentially implies that there 
is a potential of failure or an undesirable outcome. 
    Our society in general could more or less, as far as it relates to environmental 
matters, be seen as risk-averse, meaning uncertainty causes reluctance in accepting 
and/or making decisions. For example, people might be more inclined to accept a 
technology, which has a lower payoff (i.e. lower emissions reductions) but has been 
around for a while and has been proven safe, than they would be to accept an 
emerging technology, which has a higher predicted payoff (i.e. higher emissions 
reductions), but is surrounded with a number of uncertainties. A good example of the 
former is nuclear power, though at its early stages of development it was also plagued 
with uncertainties, while a good example of the latter is CCS (Fleishman et al., 2010; 
Upham and Roberts, 2011; Corner et al., 2011; Roberts and Mander, 2011; 
Poumadère et al., 2011).  
     The idea of risk, and understanding risk, is really one of the fundamental aspects of 
human nature, our logic and our instinct. Within environmental law, it tends to 
become defined as the probability of a loss or probability of damage (i.e. to the 
environment or human health), which is often expressed in both quantitative and 
qualitative terms. Particularly over the past 30 years or so, the field of quantitative 
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risk assessments has grown in importance. Scientists and policy makers have come to 
use terms like acceptable levels of risk of some undesirable outcome. However, how 
far can we actually go with such estimates before it is too late? In this case, the two 
quotes above, by Elliot and Roosevelt, seem appropriate, in that taking and 
regulating/controlling risks has become nearly synonymous.  
     In other words, today’s modern society has become characterized and driven by 
(technological) development, moving forward despite uncertainties and associated 
risks, yet at the same time, acknowledging and acting cautious, by trying to control 
these as much as possible. As such, it would not be false to classify the modern 
society today as a risk society - a term coined by a German sociologist Ulrich Beck in 
his writings in the early 1990s.  
     Beck, for example, primarily wrote on the state of modernity, and the modern 
society’s problems, arguing that society’s advancements have as a side effect 
produced risks with potentially catastrophic consequences, on a scale never seen 
before
75
. Essentially, the modern society has turned into a risk society in the sense 
that it has become preoccupied with debating, preventing and managing risks brought 
upon itself. For Beck (1992, 1996, 2006) and Giddens (1999), another of the most 
prominent writers on the risk society, society has become preoccupied with the future, 
and safety, which in itself generates the notion of risk. For both Beck and Giddens, 
the primary interest lies not in the quantifiable part, but rather in the effects that risk 
awareness has on the functioning and self-awareness of late modern society (Riesch, 
Reiner, 2010: 2). One of the main contributors to the development of a risk society, as 
both Beck and Giddens would suggest, can be seen in the role of the mass media. 
Risk consciousness, exacerbated by the mass media, indicates that the concept of risk 
has become the signature of the contemporary society (Strydom, 2002: 4). 
     Many of the debates on risk society, however, miss the most important point about 
risk, in that the term does not itself imply a catastrophe, but rather its anticipation. In 
this way then, risk can be seen as a virtual construct, and becomes ‘topical’ only when 
it is anticipated. In other words, they are not ‘real’, but better said; they are ‘becoming 
real’ (van Loon; in Beck, 2006: 332). 
     Interestingly, Jarvis (2007) also points out to the paradox in the contemporary risk 
debate, stating that, “risk might in fact be increasing due to technology, science and 
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industrialism rather than being abated by scientific and technological progress.” The 
risk society debate and the paradoxes within it, also in the end lead to exposing the 
political and legal nature of many risk decisions. This relates to the idea that we also 
live in, what Majone (1994) calls a regulatory state, defined by the notion of risk 
regulation. In the process of risk regulation, the legislators, judges, regulators, as well 
as public opinion all have important, but distinct roles to play. In particular in the case 
of the latter, Majone also argues that people often tend to overestimate events 
associated with lower-probability of harm, while ignoring potential benefits (p. 294-
96).  
  
3.3.2 The relationship between the risk society and science  
In 2000, the UK House of Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology issued 
a report on the relationship between science and society, which pointed out that the 
society’s relationship with science is in a critical phase, defined by public unease, 
mistrust and occasional outright hostility (in Sturgis and Allum, 2004: 56). What the 
report also found was that even though people value science and technology on a 
daily basis, because of such a rapid scientific and technological progress, they become 
increasingly uneasy. This then further exacerbates the society’s problems with science 
in general, in particular if such progress is associated with questions of uncertainty 
and risk. 
     In the literature, the lack of or declining status of public trust in science and 
technology, and their role in identifying and solving society’s challenges, is often 
referred to as science’s ‘legitimacy problem’. According to Beck, Giddens and 
Habermas, some of the most prominent social theorists, this could be explained as “a 
symptom of a general disenchantment with the late modernity, mainly, the limitations 
associated with codified expertise, rational bureaucracy, and institutional authority” 
(Beck, 1992; Giddens, 1991; Habermas, 1997; in Gauchat, 2011: 752). Some would 
suggest that the legitimacy problem of science comes as a result of the lack of 
people’s scientific and technological knowledge, which is sometimes depicted as the 
so-called ‘deficit model’. Many scientists also believe that the public’s “scientific 
illiteracy [is] at the root of opposition to new technologies, environmental action and 
adequate science funding (Besley and Nisbet, 2011: 4).   
     Not surprisingly, given its rather simplified assumptions and the implications this 




For example, Douglas and Wildavsky (1983) have argued that what people perceive 
as risks is more in response to their cultural associations as opposed to being related 
to an ‘objective’ hazard. Slovic and Peters (1998) also suggest that one’s perception 
of risk is never primarily dependent on their level of scientific understanding. In her 
case study on the perception of science by the public and social elites in Croatia, 
Katarina Prpic (2011) for example finds that the general value systems and social role 
and position of individual groups, plays the most important part in the perception of 
science; as opposed to the level of scientific understanding.  
     Essentially, it is quite clear that culture, economic factors, social and political 
values, trust, risk perception, and worldviews are all important in influencing the 
public’s attitude towards science, and new and emerging technologies (Sturgis and 
Allum, 2004: 58).  
 
3.3.3 Public attitude and reaction  
Understanding the public’s attitude (i.e. opposition or support) towards science and 
technology is important, as it helps formulate appropriate responses in cases of 
objection (Upham and Roberts, 2010: 6339), as well as build upon in cases of support. 
This recognition becomes even more evident when it comes to new and emerging 
technologies, such as nuclear energy in the 1950s, or CCS today.  
     Attitude, as a concept, however, can be understood in a number of ways, including 
as an affect (i.e. emotion or arousal), or a distinct measure of favourability. 
Furthermore, attitudes can be explicit and implicit, both however, having a varying 
effect on people’s behaviour. Wood (2000) for example, in this respect also implies 
that people can become conflicted or ambivalent towards an object or a situation at 
different times, potentially holding multiple attitudes. This has to be acknowledged by 
the policy and decision makers in particular, as well as the industry, when it comes to 
communication and engagement efforts.  
     As the UK Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) pointed out in 
their 2003 Energy White paper
76
, it has become widely recognized that assessing 
public attitudes and perceptions of new technologies is vital for their future successful 
implementations. When assessing public perception, however, authors such as 
Scheufele (2011) would be eager to point out that there is a clear distinction between 
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the self-reported perception (i.e. what people think they know) and the objective 
assessments of knowledge (i.e. what people actually know). A study by Upham and 
Roberts (2010) on public perceptions of CCS, for example, found that perceived risks 
of new technologies often have far greater potential to undermine deployment, than 
do scientifically determined risk. Their findings essentially indicate and highlight the 
fact that risk perception has become highly culturally and socially significant, which 
is consistent with the popular discourse on risk society.  
  
3.3.3.1 Public opposition and participation 
When risks and other concerns associated with new and emerging technologies, such 
as CCS today and/or nuclear in the 1950s, are not adequately addressed, the public 
can become sceptical about the intentions of the main actors involved and the 
reliability of the technology itself. A number of CCS projects for example have 
already been cancelled
77
 or been delayed, in large part due to local public opposition 
(Hammond and Shackley, 2010: 11).  
 
Public Participation 
It would be true to claim that an informed public can participate better in the decision-
making process, and can more effectively call authorities and project developers to 
account. In this respect, the 1998 Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public 
Participation in Decision Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters
78
, 
has established a first set of rights of the public with regard to the environment. It 
requires the signatory Parties to implement the necessary provisions in respect to the 
right to access to environmental information, the right to participate in environmental 
decision-making, and the right to challenge public decisions made (access to justice). 
The Convention, has often been regarded a driving force for environmental 
democracy (Watts, 2005; Palerm, 1999; Hartley and Wood, 2005; Toth, 2010), as its 
aim is to essentially mediate between the public and the public authorities in regards 
to environmental matters.  
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     As a number of studies have shown, a significant amount of people, in the context 
of their everyday lives, are still not thinking about climate change, and even less so 
about CCS
79
. Furthermore, a 2011 Eurobarometer Survey on Public Awareness and 
Acceptance of CO2 capture and storage, for example, has shown that only about 10% 
of Europeans have heard of CCS. This also indicated that awareness of CCS were 
highest in EU countries that host demonstration projects, such as Germany and in 
particular the Netherlands (52%). Another important finding was that people were 
often confused about characteristics of CO2, such as the fact that it is not toxic or 
flammable. This goes to show that with insufficient, or false knowledge, people 
cannot correctly appraise the safety of long-term CO2 storage.
80
  
     As Wolf and Stanley (2010) point out, what the public values and what it fears are 
two related issues capable of forming important inputs into environmental policy and 
environmental decision making (p. 557). Thus, the significance and extent of the 
public’s participation should be of particular interest to all. Essentially, public 
participation encompasses everything from the traditional forms of participation such 
as voting, lobbying, demonstrating, and forming interest groups, to any organized 
processes adopted by officials, government agencies, or other public/private 
organizations to engage the public in environmental assessment, planning, decision 
making, management, and/or monitoring. 
     The public’s participation can most commonly be seen at the development stages 
of particular projects, such as with licensing and permitting decisions (Wolf and 
Stanley, 2011: 558). Since many project developments require some formal planning 
agreement by the public authorities, as Wynne (in Redclift and Benton, 1994: 17) 
suggests, there is a great opportunity for public participation in the formal planning 
procedures. A good example of such opportunity is in the environmental impact 
assessment (EIA) processes. Where the public is formally engaged in a particular 
project, the quality and local relevance of an EIA can be improved, which in turn also 
leads to the project itself carrying more legitimacy (Hunsberger et al., in Noble and 
Birk, 2011: 18). As Dietz and Stern (2008) add, by directly involving the public, it 
can also lead to a build up of trust and understanding among parties (p. 1-2).  
     On the other hand however, there is also the argument that the disadvantages of 
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public participation in decision-making need to be considered. In this respect, Irvin 
and Stansbury (2004) provide an interesting comparative account of the advantages as 
well as disadvantages of public participation. They point out that disadvantages can 
be seen in the process itself, both to the public (i.e. time consuming, pointless if 
decision is ignored) and the government (i.e. time consuming, costly), and in the 
outcomes. In this respect, for the public this involves worse policy decision if heavily 
influenced by opposing interest groups, and for the government when there is a loss of 
decision-making control, or a lower budget for implementation of actual projects (p. 
59). 
  
Environmental Pressure Groups and Lobbying 
Environmental pressure groups, such as Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth, WWF, etc., 
can to an extent also influence public opinion. In some cases, such pressure groups 
can have significant financial and technical resources that allow them to better 
influence and challenge, as well as monitor compliance in environmental law. 
Recently, for example, two environmental NGOs - Focus, and Environmental Law 
Service - issued a complaint to the European Commission, that officials in Slovenia 
have breached the Article 33 of the EU Directive on Carbon Capture and Storage, 
when issuing a building permit for the construction of the 6
th
 unit of the thermal 
power plant Šostanj (TEŠ). Along with the complaint, the two NGOs also enclosed an 
assessment made by Bellona Foundation on the feasibility of CCS at TEŠ. In the 
assessment, numerous abnormalities in the feasibility studies for CCS were found, 
which included a lack of transparency of data, cost estimates and poor analysis. If it is 
found that the officials were in breach of the EU law, the funding, which comes from 
the EIB and EBRD, will be in jeopardy.    
     To an extent, the work of NGO’s can be considered a type of lobbying. 
Undoubtedly, some NGO’s have come to acquire significant influence in global 
environmental governance (Corell and Betsill, 2001). In many respects, Brussels is 
sometimes also referred to as the centre for European lobbying, with the EU 
institutions being a target for various professional and voluntary lobby groups. These 
groups also differ in the type of lobbying - commercial and social. The latter consists 
of pressure groups, trade unions and concerned individuals based on non-commercial 
motives that are most often either ideological or political. Environmental NGOs fall 




of the environment (Biliouri, 1999), and their role in EU environmental governance 
system is best seen as policy ‘teachers’ or ‘exporters’ of policy lessons (Bomberg, 
2007). Some have also come to point out that EU institutions will often have low 
interest in the activities of environmental NGO’s given that they cannot provide 
specialized information due to their broad orientation (Michaelowa, 1998)
81
. 
     On the other hand, the industry lobbying groups fall under the commercial type of 
lobbying, and with their extensive resources, both material and immaterial, one could 
think that they can easily influence policy-making in Europe. Although industry 
lobbying groups, cannot prevent adoption of certain emissions targets, for example, 
they have in the past lobbied effectively (in their favour), and managed to stall the 
adoption of various measures and mechanisms, and shift the balance in favour of 
voluntary agreements, as Michaelowa (1998) points out.  
     In any case, successful lobbying groups will normally exhibit usual professional 
characteristics, such as resources, advance intelligence, good contacts with 
bureaucrats and politicians, and most importantly the ability to provide policy-makers 
with sound information and advice. Just as is the case elsewhere in the world, in 
Brussels, reputation for expertise, reliability and trust are also key resources in 
lobbying. In addition, the perceived responsibility of the lobbyists, or the willingness 
to be involved in the policy-making process without publicity, goes to show that the 
style of lobbying is perhaps even more important than the content and the objectives 
of the lobbying itself (Mazey and Richardson; in Jordan, 2005). 
     Key industry lobby groups for CCS, such as the Zero Emissions Platform (ZEP)
82
 
and the Carbon Capture and Storage Association (CCSA) have been relatively 
successful
83
 in promoting CCS technology development and deployment in Europe, 
thus far. Their primary role within the wider EU governance system continues to be as 
provider of advice on technical, policy and commercial issues related to CCS. The 
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emissions trading scheme, which will come in the form of 300 million allowances from the scheme 





question remains, however, whether, or to what extent the CCS industry lobby has 
had an influence in shaping EU policy and guidance on CCS. To some extent it 
certainly has, given the specific expertise of its members in oil and gas extraction and 
monitoring and verification for example, which was relied upon when developing the 
CCS policy and legal frameworks.  
     It would not be difficult to claim that maximizing self-interest or the interests of its 
members motivates the industry lobby. After all, companies are in the business of 
making a profit. Rather than making such a claim, however, this research would 
instead argue, that rather than utility maximisers, the industry, and the industry lobby, 
are better described as utility satisfiers. Their participation in the overall governance 
system hinges not only on a cost-benefit analysis of (non) participation, but also on a 
broader realisation of the importance of CCS. In other words, although to an extent 
profit oriented, the industry (lobby) recognizes the importance of developing CCS,
84
 
and as such will seek to obtain an outcome (i.e. funding and content of the policy and 
legal frameworks) that would satisfy them, and other stakeholders as well.  
     This premise is in line with the arguments of the governance network theory, in 
that no single actor holds ultimate authority or receives an ultimately favourable 
outcome by participating in the network. This is tested in the chapters that follow, by 
examining the legal and regulatory frameworks as well as speaking to the CCS 
industry representatives, as well as other stakeholders, in order to attempt to 
determine the remaining barriers for the industry, and as such come to a conclusion as 
to whether the industry did in fact receive a favourable outcome within the legal and 
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 Determining whether the importance of CCS for the industry lies in the legal requirements in their 
respective jurisdictions that are likely to ultimately mandate the implementation of CCS technology, or 
whether such realisation comes from understanding of a broader societal importance, is beyond the 
scope of this research. Although it would be an interesting direction to go in for future research work 




3.4 Summary and ways forward 
      
“Although our intellect always longs for clarity and certainty, our nature often finds uncertainty 
fascinating.” 
― Carl von Clausewitz85 
 
The purpose of this chapter was essentially two-fold: to introduce the underlying 
themes of this thesis, as well as to provide a critical overview of the general and 
specific CCS literature. This section now draws together the material discussed above 
into an overall picture, and offers some ideas for further research, some of which are 
to be taken up in the proceeding study.  
 
3.4.1 Summary 
Science, uncertainty and risk, are three extremely interrelated concepts that have 
come to characterize the development and deployment of CCS thus far. Most of the 
literature, as discussed above, whether scientific, technical, policy or social, have in 
some form or another focused on uncertainty and risk. Acknowledging the notions of 
uncertainty and risk revolves primarily around the potential for leakage of CO2 from a 
storage reservoir, and other consequences such as induced fracturing and seismicity, 
and harm to the environment and humans. These issues place CO2 storage, along with 
other already present geo-technologies (i.e. coal, oil and sands mining, shale gas, 
liquefied natural gas storage), making it not only a climate change mitigation 
technology, but also as a geological hazard.  
     As already mentioned, uncertainty as acknowledged and accepted by science, and 
applied by the policy and decision makers (i.e. via precautionary principle), implies 
that a certain amount of risk is taken. This makes the society of today, as far as it 
relates to dealing with environmental matters, risk-averse. Science plays an important 
part in the construction of such a society, along with other influencing factors such as 
the economy in particular. An argument could be made that to a good extent, the lack 
of commercial-scale projects in the EU, and elsewhere around the world for that 
matter, is a result of the recent financial crisis. Unfortunately, environmental issues in 
general, and projects often tend to be de-prioritized first.  
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     In any case, although not involved in the formal process of the development of 
policy, legal and regulatory frameworks, and the general public remains an important 
factor in the overall process of governance. This is evident from the power of public 
opposition and the cancelation/delay of a number of projects in the previous decade. 
Although this research acknowledges the role and impact of the public factor on the 
development and deployment of CCS technology, its primary focus is the governance 
process for CO2 storage in Europe, from a legal and regulatory perspective. This area 
of the literature on CCS remains underdeveloped, and this research hopes to 
contribute to its growth. 
 
3.4.2 Ways Forward 
As mentioned, although the literature on CCS has been increasing over the past 
several years, some issues remain to be uncovered, or explored in greater detail. As 
pointed out in section 3.3 in this chapter on risk and society, there have been a great 
number of studies done on the role and importance of the public, for example on 
(factors influencing) public awareness, perception, and acceptability, as well as on 
communication efforts. There is, however, a lack of those, for example, focusing 
specifically on monitoring and verification activities, and how they can provide 
reassurance. One study was found on this matter, by Seigo et al. (2010) who 
suggested that contrary to popular belief, communication and additional information 
about CCS monitoring activities may in fact not have a reassuring effect after all, and 
can even be alarming by causing greater risk, and lower benefit, perceptions.
86
 
Nonetheless, no study has yet to investigate, in regards to monitoring and verification, 
on what would reassure the public of the safety of CO2 storage.  
     A gap in the literature that this research is most concerned with is that related to 
the governance of CO2 storage. In this respect, although a number of journal articles 
and reports have been found which examine the legal and regulatory frameworks for 
CCS, there is no comprehensive account for the governance process as a whole. By 
examining the so-called CCS governance network(s) (i.e. their structure and 
interactions), as well as the legal and regulatory frameworks more in depth, and by 
speaking to those directly involved in project development, as well as other key 
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stakeholders, a more comprehensive, and up-to-date picture of the governance of CO2 
storage in Europe will be presented. The main aim is to determine the extent to which 
the current legal and regulatory frameworks in Europe mediate between the 
management of CO2 storage risks, and the development and deployment of CCS 
technology. In this way, the research hopes to contribute not only to the general 
literature on CCS and governance, but also be available for reference use in light of 





























CHAPTER 4: Governance and 
Regulation of CCS in the EU 
 
 
Over the past several decades, the environment has undoubtedly acquired a more 
prominent role as an issue of public concern and established itself on the policy 
agendas of many countries around the world. Conditions of scientific uncertainty and 
environmental risks, brought up by the increase in scientific knowledge and 
emergence of new technologies, along with the political, economic, and social 
pressures to deal with climate change and energy security issues, has raised numerous 
governance-related questions 
     As explained in Chapters 2 and 3, the concept of governance has in the literature 
acquired a number of differing definitions and been used in various contexts. As a 
general consensus, it has come to refer to a two-way street, involving both those being 
governed and those governing (Kooiman, 2003), including both formal and informal 





concept of governance has, in essence, turned to represent a continuous and an 
interactive process of decision-making, cooperation and facilitation, whose 
effectiveness often in the end lies in, but is not determined by, appropriate and robust 
policy, legal and regulatory frameworks. The main objective of governance, in the 
context of climate change and emerging mitigation technologies, such as CCS, as 
understood in this research, however, remains the effective management of 
environmental risks associated with the technology, whilst enabling its development 
and deployment. 
     This chapter sets out to examine this objective of governance in the context of 
CCS in the EU. As mentioned in earlier chapters, given that environmental risks are 
primarily concentrated in the storage component of the CCS chain, this remains the 
main focus of the chapter, and the thesis as a whole. To do so, this chapter is 
structured as follows. First, the evolution of environmental governance in the EU is 
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 Moser (2009) also suggests that governance extends also to the institutional structures and 
mechanisms, as well as the division of authority and the underlying norms involved in determining a 
course of action.  
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 As Falkner (2003) points out, a more recent phenomenon is so-called ‘private environmental 
governance’, which sits outside of the traditional realm of state-centric international politics. Here, 
businesses, NGOs and other organizations work together to create norms, rules and mechanisms such 




discussed, followed by the analysis of the CCS governance regime, including the 
policy and legal context for CCS, and the overview of the EU CCS Directive. Lastly, 
a summary of the chapter is provided. 
 
4.1 The EU environmental governance regime  
This section first briefly examines the evolution of the EU environmental governance 
regime. Understanding the process of integrating environmental issues into the policy 
and legal spheres, as well as the role of various institutions and instruments within the 
EU governance system provides an important basis for understanding and analysis of 
the CCS governance regime (see section 4.2).  
 
4.1.1 Establishing the environment’s legal character  
Pre-Single European Act 
Following World War II, with the establishment of the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC) in 1952, and several years later, in 1957 also the European 
Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community 
(Euratom)
89
, there was no sense of any specific mention of a common European 
policy on the environment, let alone any provisions on environmental regulation.
90
 
This was because, at that time, Europe was still evolving into primarily an economic 
community. It was not until the late 1960s and early 1970s, as environmental 
awareness in Europe began to grow
91
, in light of the growing scientific understanding 
of impacts of human behaviour on the environment that policy makers began to 
consider the incorporation of such issues into the official agenda of the EEC. It was 
not long after the 1972 United Nations (UN) Conference on the Human Environment 
in Stockholm, which signified a turning point in international environmental politics 
                                                     
89
 The EEC and Euratom were established by the 1957 Treaty of Rome, also known as the Treaty 
Establishing the European Community (TEEC; or TEC), or the Treaty of the European Community 
(TEC), respectively, in order to establish a common market, a customs union, common policies and 
liberalization of trade (Art. 2 and 3 of the TEC), and to form and develop a European nuclear industry, 
and provide for energy security. Later on in 1967, the Merger (‘Brussels’) Treaty was signed in order 
to streamline the European institutions by creating a single Commission and a single Council to serve 
then three European Communities (EEC, Euratom, ECSC). The founding six member countries 
included Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. 
90
 The Art. 37 of the Euratom Treaty is by some argued to represent one of the first environmental 
legislations, in relation to protecting the environment and human health (Heul-Fablanek et al, 2008). It 
relates to the plans for disposal of radioactive waste and potential liabilities to result in the radioactive 
contamination of the water, soil or airspace of another Member State. 
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 In 1970 for example there was the first observance of Earth Day, by some to be considered the birth 




(Baylis and Smith, 2005), that the Heads of State or Government of the six EEC 
Member States met at the Paris Summit in July of 1972, recognizing that in the 
context of economic expansion and improving the quality of life, particular attention 
should be paid to the environment (Europa, 2012). As Grande and Peschke (1999) 
also explain, the link between [environmental] science and the industrial 
competitiveness began to be seen as indispensable. Finding compromise solutions 
between industry, government, and civil society from this point on starts to become 
increasingly difficult. As will be argued later on, CCS is essentially one of such 
solutions.   
     Following the development of the first official EEC Environmental Action 
Programme (EAP), at the 1972 Paris Summit, the foundations were set, and European 
environmental policy began to take shape.
92
 This essentially established the main 
policy framework for developing future EEC strategies in the environmental field 
suggesting priority themes and the development of a wider range of strategies 
(Stallworthy, 2008).  
     Yet another result of the 1972 Paris Summit was the setting up of an administrative 
unit called the Environment and Consumer Protection Service (ECPS), the 
predecessor of the present day Directorate-General (DG), at the beginning of 1973. 
As Jordan (2005) points out however, at that time the Commission’s bureaucratic 
capacity to effect great change in the environmental field was still small, and with 
some notable exceptions, many of the early environmental policies in the 1970s 
related primarily to less politically important areas such as bathing water and wild 
bird protection, areas where it found it could operate relatively unsupervised by 
pressure groups, national politicians and government officials (p. 6). In some respect, 
much of the focus for these actors at the time was, as far as environmental policies 
were concerned, still concentrated at the national level. Essentially, having been given 
a formal role in the EEC, the environment still took the backseat to other issues, 
especially the economy. Arguably, to some extent, the economy versus environment 
remains one of the key debates to-date. 
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 Since then, there have been six EAPs implemented, and the 7
th
 EAP is soon to be finalized, as the 6
th
 
is set to expire in mid-2012: 1st Environmental Action Programme 1973-1976 (OJ C 112, 20.12.73); 
2nd Environmental Action Programme1977-1981 (OJ C 139, 13.6.77); 3rd Environmental Action 
Programme1982-1986 (OJ C 46, 17.2.83); 4th Environmental Action Programme1987-1992 (OJ C 
328, 7.12.87); 5th Environmental Action Programme1993-2000 (OJ C 138, 17.5.93); 6
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     This being the case, it is unsurprising that the form and manner of EEC 
environmental policy up to the mid-1980s was in large part dictated by the use of 
economic means to achieve political ends, meaning it had to deal both with cross-
boundary pollution flows as well as the consequences of environmental regulation for 
the functioning of the single market (Weale et al., 2005: 29). Nevertheless, in the 
years between 1973 and 1983
93
, over 70 environmental Directives were adopted, and 
well in excess of 150 pieces of environmental legislation had been put in place 
(Stallworthy, 2008: 95).  
     As economic integration remained the primary focus for the EEC, many 
environmental measures were ‘cloaked’ as being for the harmonization of trade. As a 
result, the expansion of the European environmental acquis in the period before the 
SEA has in large part occurred through a pragmatic and an incremental approach via 




Post-Single European Act 
In light of the expansion of the European Community (EC) in the mid-1980s,
95
 the 
1986 Single European Act (SEA) aimed to remove some of the barriers to economic 
integration, increase harmonization and competitiveness among the Member States, 
and to streamline the decision-making within the EU. The SEA is seen as 
instrumental in many respects, including, perhaps most importantly, that for the first 
time the EU became committed to include environmental protection in all of its 
sectorial policies
96
. Over the past 25 years, environmental protection has become 
entrenched even further into the functioning of the EU, essentially giving it a firmer 
legal basis and a legally binding character.  
     The 1992 Treaty of the European Union (TEU), also referred to as the Maastricht 
Treaty, for example, expanded the requirement to include environment as a 
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 In this period pressures from some of the greener Member States such as Germany, Netherlands and 
Denmark, as well as national and transnational environmental pressure groups, also increased, which 
lead to quickening of the stream of environmental legislation, in particular in the early 1980s on issues 
such as natural habitats, sewage treatment, genetically modified organisms and climate change.  
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 Early years of EU environmental policy-making have also often been characterized as ‘integration by 
stealth’ (Weale et al., 2000), or away from the spotlight of political attention (Weiler, 1991).  
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 By that time, the members of the European Community included France, West Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Great Britain, Ireland, Denmark, Greece, Spain and Portugal. 
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 Art. 130r(2.2) TEC for example states that ‘environmental protection requirements shall be 




component of the Community’s other policies97, by placing it along the economic and 
social objectives of the EU. This was to be based on the principle of sustainable 
development
98 99
, which in turn also made the principle one of specific policy goals in 
EU’s external relations100.  
     The overall profile of EU environmental policy and legislation was further 
heightened by the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam, as well as the more recent 2009 Lisbon 
Treaty, both of which emphasized the principle of environmental policy integration 
(EPI)
 101
. Whereas the former also moved environmental consideration to the forefront 
of the treaty,
102
 the latter on the other hand, is instrumental in that it included specific 
reference to climate change as a policy objective of the EU,
103
 which could have 
positive implications for further integration of environment and climate change 
considerations into other EU policy sectors, such as energy in particular.  
     Given that the Lisbon Treaty includes a separate chapter (Title XX) on energy, 
essentially giving the EU energy policy for the first time its own legal basis, it can be 
seen as a progressive piece of legislation. Whereas before, energy policy
104
 was 
primarily incorporated under various provisions throughout the TEC but without 
explicit recognition of the EU competence on energy related issues, the new chapter 
on energy essentially made it possible for the EU as a whole to develop a more 
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 Art. 130r(2) of the TEC. Whereas in the SEA it is stated that the environmental protection shall be 
integrated, the TEC rephrased it, noting that it must be integrated into the definition and 
implementation of other Community policies. 
98
 Article 3 of the TEU states the objectives of the EU and defines the sustainable development 
principle in terms of its economic, social and environmental elements. The term was initially coined by 
the UN Brundtland Commission in its 1987 Brundtland Report on Our Common Future. It argued for 
the “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs" (UN, 1987).  
99
 The TEU also included in the principle of preventive action, the principle of rectification at source, 
and the polluter-pays principle in its wording. Ex-Art. 174 of TEC now Art. 191(2) of TFEU. These 
principles were, however, already present in Article 130r(2) of the TEC. 
100
 See paragraph 5 of Art. 3 of the TEC, which states that the EU “shall contribute to peace, security, 
the sustainable development of the Earth, ... as well as to the strict observance and the development of 
international law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter.” 
101
 For more on EPI see Lenschow (2002), Lafferty and Hovden (2003), Jordan and Lenschow (2010). 
In terms of the EPI, Art. 11 of the TFEU keeps the meaning as under Art. 6 TEC and states that: 
Environmental protection requirements must be integrated into the definition and implementation of 
the Union policies and activities, in particular with a view to promoting sustainable development. 
102
 This was achieved by changing the preamble and Article 2 (ex.Article B) of the TEU in order to 
strengthen the principle of sustainable development and underlie the EU’s commitment to the 
principle’s objective. 
103
 (Art. 191 of TFEU). 
104
 See Art. 81-88 TEC concerning competition; Art. 95 of the TEC concerning the internal market; 
Art. 154-156 of the TEC on trans-European networks; Art. 175 of the TEC concerning adoption of 








Choosing the legal basis 
A legal base essentially entitles the EU to legislate in a particular field, setting out the 
scope for legislation in that area. The legal base also determines the legislative 
procedures and the type of laws that can be adopted, which consequently determine 
the powers and influences of the various EU institutions and national governments in 
the law-making process. As Chalmers et al. (2008) also note, in choosing the legal 
basis for the adoption of a legal provision, different institutions will often seek to use 
the legal basis that provides the procedure that is most advantageous to them. Given 
that different procedures privilege different actors, the EU institutions and Member 
States will often actively litigate over the choice of the legal base (p. 140). 
     The 2009 Lisbon Treaty allows for a choice of legal basis for specific legislative 
measures to be based on either the environmental or the energy titles of the TFEU. 
The choice of the legal basis, depending on the area of the stated objective and the 
content of a measure, influences not only the legislative competence of institutions to 
take action, but, as mentioned above, also the procedures by which legislation is 
adopted, and as such also the scope and the content of the policy. As de Sadeleer 
(2014) explains, the choice between legal basis which requires unanimity or only 
qualified majority voting (QMV)
106
, or the choice between a base which implies an 
ordinary, as opposed to a special legislative procedure, is fundamental, and also 
exemplary of the inter-institutional power struggles,
107
 as well as has significant 
repercussions for the institutional equilibrium within the EU governance system, and 
on the leeway enjoyed by the Member States in employing secondary law (p. 172).  
     The choice of the legal basis is important, yet at the same time contentious, when it 
comes to issues and measures pursuing objectives that concern more than one policy 
area at the same time, such as environment and energy for example. Such measures 
(i.e. harmonized energy efficiency targets or percentage of energy created via 
renewable sources) have in particular been slow to develop. This comes largely as a 
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 The four main objectives of the EU energy policy include: i) ensuring the functioning of the energy 
market; ii) security of energy supply in the Union; iii) promoting energy efficiency and energy saving 
and the development of new and renewable forms of energy; and iv) promoting the interconnection of 
energy networks (Art. 194(1) of the TFEU). 
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 See Appendix A on the (changes in) EU voting procedures. 
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 The institutions will often seek to chose the legal base, which provides the procedure most 




result of such choice, between legal bases, given to the EU institutions, which often 
choose the base that provides the procedures most advantageous to them (de Sadeleer, 
2014: 149).  
     Moreover, for example, while such measures could be adopted under the 
environmental legal base if their aim is to ensure environmental objectives, they 
would not be justified under the energy provisions under Article 194 (2) of the TFEU, 
as they could (significantly) affect a member states’ right to exploit its energy 
resources. Furthermore, under the energy chapter of the TFEU, some EU measures 
based on environmental principles (i.e. precaution, rectification at source, preventive 
action, polluter pays), could not be justified, and would have to be based on the 
provisions of the environmental chapter (Ballesteros, 2010: 10). In any case, it is not 
to say that energy related measures cannot or should not take environmental 
principles into consideration
108
, however, this study does suggest that such a dual, or 
multiple legal base, creates many grey areas, thereby precluding the implementation 




The principle of precaution 
To date, versions of the precautionary principle have been adopted in over 50 
multilateral instruments, and been signed and ratified by a majority of the world’s 
countries, including the US, the EU, Australia, and Japan. The fact that the principle 
has been signed and ratified, however, does not presuppose that these countries will 
abide by the principle. Instead, it raises questions as to how, and to what extent, these 
countries will abide by it (Montague, 1999).  
     Whereas the EU has endorsed the principle as a rule of customary international 
law (Sirinskiene, 2009; Trouwborst, 2009; Kazhdan, 2011), the US, for example, has 
in contrast sought to downplay its legal nature, by referring to the term precautionary 
‘approach’ as opposed to a ‘principle’ (Bodansky et al., 2007: 601). The reason for 
the US being in favour of a precautionary ‘approach’ rather than a ‘principle’, as 
explained by Recuerda (2008), is because of the stronger connotations that a 
‘principle’ carries in the legal language, than an ‘approach’ does for example.  
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 Art. 194(1) of the TFEU. 
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 The SEA has also had an important symbolic effect on the EU policy process on matters related to 
the environment, and recently on energy as well, by making it also about the notion of ethics. This can 
be seen in the shift in the debate away from whether the EU should act, to a more technical question of 
how it should act, which as Jordan (2005) explains, has accelerated the development of the EU 




     The principle itself, however, is just that: guiding as opposed to binding. Some 
authors may suggest that as usage appears and develops through treaty making or 
other legal procedure, countries may come to consider the practice to be required by 
law, or that the implementation of the precautionary principle through national 
legislation and national judicial decisions can also be evidence of customary 
international law (Deloso 2005: 37).
110
 As a study by Sirinskiene (2010) found, in the 
case of the European Communities, there is sufficient state practice and opinio juris 
that would suggest that the precautionary principle has already crystalized into a 
general customary rule (p. 360).
111
 Nevertheless, given that there are 14 different 
interpretations of the precautionary principle in various treaties and declarations, as 
Foster et al. (2000) finds out, an argument could also be made that the principle 
remains pre-eminently an illustration of ‘soft law’, and cannot as yet be elevated to 
the harder status of customary international law. Ultimately, its impact depends upon 
how far it becomes effective in legislative, administrative and judicial law making 
within jurisdictions of the Member States.  
     What is certain, however, is that, as discussed earlier in Chapter 3, the link 
between the science and law has become embedded in the principles/approach of 
precaution, which has to a good extent become characteristic of the legal and 
regulatory frameworks for CO2 storage in Europe. See section 5.1.2 on how the 
precautionary principle has been implemented in practice within the legal and 
regulatory frameworks in the EU and the UK.  
 
4.1.2 (CCS) Governance Network  
Governance in this study is in broad terms understood as the interaction of various 
stakeholders, through negotiations and cooperation, all of which are to some extent 
interdependent on one another on formal and informal resources, and have a common 
goal. In this case, the goal is the development and deployment of CCS technology, 
and the management of environmental risks related to CO2 storage. As such, the role 
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 Whether it is part of customary international law is essentially an argument between those who see 
its incorporation into international conventions and judgments as the proof of its customary status 
(Cameron and Aboucher 1991; Hey 1992; McIntyre and Mosedale 1997) and those who oppose its 
existence in customary law and cite the uncertainties and its lack of consistent state practice and opinio 
juris (Gundling 1990). 
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 Others, such as Basili et al. (2008) would add also that its ‘soft nature’, or the fact that the lack of a 
unique and clear formulation leads to different notions that can be labelled as either a strong or a weak 




and purpose of main institutional actors and their available instruments are examined 
in this section, so as to provide the framework that constitutes the so-called CCS 
governance network.  
 
4.1.2.1 Institutions 
Within an environmental governance system, technology deployment and risk 
management, it can be said, is as much an intellectual activity as it is an institutional 
process. Institutions, for example, help determine not only the scope of issues that are 
dealt with, but also, to some extent, dictate who is involved. European institutions and 
institutional actors, as Weale (2000) points out, therefore occupy a pivotal position in 
the EU environmental narrative. As such, it is important to look at the character of 
various institutional actors and the range of their capabilities and responsibilities. 
Important to keep in mind is the complexity of the process of developing 
environmental law, as each institution contributes to the process at one stage or 
another. The diagram below serves to demonstrate this complexity in a simplified 
format. 
 






The European Commission   
The European Commission (hereinafter the Commission) is essentially the executive 
body of the European Union, primarily responsible for proposing legislation, 
implementing decisions, and the general day-to-day running of the Union. Its 
functions are both political as well as administrative, making its presence in the 
European environmental governance network as the primary “agenda-setter, 
consensus-builder, manager, and the formal initiator of legislation” (Weale et al., 
2000: 87). It is also responsible for the monitoring and controlling of the formal and 
practical transposition of EU law by the Member States.
112
 It should also be pointed 
out that for each of the Directorates-General (DG)
113
, their image within the 
Commission is important, making it necessary to build coalitions of support for any 
legislative proposals among other DGs and EU institutions.
114
 
     To date, the Commission has done a great deal in relation to the environment. 
Apart from initiating a great amount of environment-related policy and legislation, the 
Commission has also enforced its legislation, and continues to do so, by initiating 
infringement cases and pursuing legal action against Member States not in 
compliance.
115
 After all, legislation is only as effective as it is implemented and 
complied with. Otherwise, the law is essentially only words on paper. By the end of 
2014, there were 334 open environmental infringements, for the most part in the 
waste, water and air sectors. These came primarily as a result of bad application (189 
out of 334) and non-communication (86 out of 334).
116
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 Ex-Art. 211 TEC, now Art. 17 TFEU. 
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 Within the more than 40 Directorates-General (DG), the primary responsibility of which is policy 
leadership and agenda-setting of the EU, it is the DG Environment and DG Energy respectively, that 
are responsible for proposing main EU policies that ensure a high level of environmental protection 
and creation of a competitive internal energy market, development of renewable energy sources, and 
energy security and independence. While a Commissioner is the central figure of each respective DG, 
Weale et al. (2000) suggest that they are only as good as their supporting cabinet staff, who together 
are also responsible for the specific sectoral and horizontal policies, reflecting the policy competences 
of the Union (p. 88-89). Furthermore, the Commission makes sure that the member states apply 
environmental law correctly, and can, in cases of non-compliance with EU regulations or directives, 
take infringement actions against a member state if it determines a case of non-compliance. It also 
represents the EU at international environmental negotiations and finances environmental protection 
projects (EC, 2012). 
114  Interview with Elena Visnar-Malinovská, Member of the Cabinet of Commissioner for the 
Environment Janez Potočnik. July 10, 2012. In addition, a number of in-formal conversations with 
people working in the Commission and the European Parliament were conducted around the same time 
in July, 2012. 
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 See EC (2015)a for an up-to-date list of infringement cases brought up by the Commission: 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/legal/law/press_en.htm. 
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     Moreover, the Commission (DG Environment and DG Climate Action) also 
manages the LIFE Programme, EU’s funding instrument for environmental and 
climate-related action. Since 1992, when it was first started, the programme has co-
financed some 4,171 projects, and contributed over €3.4 billion euros to the protection 
of the environment and climate.
117
 
     The Commission also hosts a number of specialized ad-hoc committees, which in 
the DG Environment and DG Energy are composed of experts and scientists from 
each of the member states, and play an important role in environmental policy-making 
by acting as “policy entrepreneurs, or policy spoilers, for which they often quickly get 
an EU-wide reputation” (Wurzel, 2002: 73). This goes to show that policy 
development process, for example, involves both inter-institutional, as well as intra-
institutional dynamics. As this study argues, this makes the Commission the key 
institutional actor within the CCS governance network, in respect to the 
development/deployment of CCS technology in Europe, and the management of 
associated risks related to CO2 storage. 
     Although it can be said for the Commission that it is a key institutional actor, one 
should also consider whether its inputs are to any extent either facilitating or 
restricting the development and deployment of the technology. Upon doing extensive 
literary research, as well as speaking to various people within the various EU 
institutions,
118
 one aspect that came up often was that the Commission was a kind of 
‘bureaucratic monster where thousands of bureaucrats work’ (Arató: in Marchetti and 
Vidović, 2010). A former classmate119 at the University of Sheffield, who is now 
working for the European Commission, also noted that the Commission remains very 
understaffed, and often relies on external experts for advice (see also Diagram 2 
above). She also noted that with a significant number of other Directives, and 
Regulations, which need to be controlled, it should come to no surprise if things 
sometimes ‘do not run as smoothly’.  
     In any case, it would not be entirely true to make a claim that simply because of 
the bureaucratic reputation that the Commission sometimes seems to hold, the 
development and deployment of CCS is being inhibited. However, in the context of 
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this research, the most important aspect is that the Commission, and in particular the 
Environment and Energy DG’s, are dependent upon external organisations and other 
actors to aid them in advancing its goals – of developing and deploying CCS in 
Europe. Dependency is particularly important at the input stage of the policy making 
process in order for it to obtain a level of legitimacy (Bache et al. 2011).  
     This notion of dependence on other external expertise, whether at the policy 
development process, or later on in the management of risk (i.e. through review of 
permits), supports the claims of the governance network theory, which state that even 
though a level of hierarchy remains, managing environmental risks whilst providing 
for a facilitating environment for technology development and deployment, requires 
cooperation. This notion is particularly sounded by the industry community (see 
Chapter 6), which believes that rather than the legal and regulatory frameworks 
themselves, open and effective negotiations, both with the respective Member States 
and the Commission itself, will be key in moving the technology forward.  
 
The European Parliament 
Together with the Commission and the Council, the European Parliament (EP) makes 
up the legislature of the EU, and thus plays an important role in the CCS governance 
network. Unlike the Commission, however, it does not possess the power of 
legislative initiative, meaning, it only holds the power to amend or reject legislation. 
Thereby, it plays an important part in the legislative process, somewhat indirectly, 
through non-binding resolutions and committee hearings, as well as the power of a 
second reading of legislation for example, under the ordinary legislative procedure. 
The EP also holds supervisory powers, in terms of checks and balances, essentially 
giving it the option to call under questioning other EU institutions and if necessary 
take them to the European Court of Justice, if they are found to be in breach of EU 





     When it comes to environment and energy related issues, the EP has to a good 
extent proven its democratic legitimacy, by not only sending strong signals to the 
Commission requesting for tougher measures to be taken.
122
 For example, in light of 
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 Art. 263 TFEU. 
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subsequent treaty. 
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the recent delays in the development of CCS, in particular in the EU CCS 
Programme, the EP called on the Commission for the need to deliver and publish a 
direct CCS Communication
123
 as well as to work more closely with the member states 
and the industry on building public support for CCS (Bellona, 2013).  
     However, the EP is not simply a kind of ‘controller’, in a sense that it checks up on 
the Commission and other institutions. It also plays a part in bringing together key 
stakeholders, in an effort to identify how to ensure that the heavy industry sector, for 
example, achieves decarbonisation in the most cost-effective manner. One such 
example was a hearing held in November 2014
124, initiated by the EP through ZEP’s 
General Assembly,
125
 which brought together both EU officials and representatives 
from the industry and NGO sectors. The goal of this hearing, and others that occurred 
in the past, and will continue in the future, is essentially to provide for an interactive 
debate through which a common understanding of key issues, sharing and exchanging 
of ideas, can be achieved. In other words, the role of the EP extends beyond simply 
supervisory powers, but also to facilitate this interaction between stakeholders, 
thereby contributing to the achieving a common goal – wide deployment of CCS.   
  
The European Council 
Although the European Council has no formal legislative power, its role is best seen 
as the political organ of the EU, defining the general political direction and priorities 
and also providing the momentum to guide legislative policy.
126
 It also works closely 
                                                                                                                                                        
directly affects the citizens of all Member States, it makes the EP is an institution with a strong 
democratic legitimacy. However, as Menon and Peet (2010) point out, “there is more to democratic 
legitimacy than just being elected. Any institution aspiring to such a status must also be considered by 
voters to represent their interests” (p.2.) While the authors argue that it is in this respect that the EP has 
failed to deliver, and to some extent they are correct, I would be more inclined to suggest, that whether 
the claim towards democratic legitimacy is justified is better, or more appropriate, to be looked at from 
an individual policy or issue perspective, as opposed to a generalized view as a whole. With the latter, 
it is only too easy to come to such a negative conclusion, and thereby ignore the positives that occur at 
the micro, or specific policy/issue level. However, it is also important to acknowledge the macro-level 
conclusions, such as the ones developed by Menon and Peet (2010), as they help increase the overall 
understanding of the institution itself, or a particular research area. 
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with the Commission and the EP as well, through the various working groups, where, 
for example, the Commission explains and defends its proposals (Krämer, 2006). 
Perhaps a more important, or better said, a more prominent role, as far as substantive 
development of environment policy and legislation in the EU is concerned, is played 
by the Council of Ministers, whose identity depends on the policy sector in 
question
127




     In general, the Council is seen as pivotal to the overall environmental governance 
system of the EU, as it is often the ‘last port of call’ for European environment 
legislation, and represents a forum where differences of national preferences can be 
expressed. Here, the decision-making process is influenced by the preferences that 
each of the Member States brings to the discussions. It is also where the leader vs. 
laggard dynamic
129
 plays out, as Weale et al. (2000) describe it, which in turn can 
either slow down or expedite the pace of environmental legislation development.
 
 
     Essentially, what the Council has done, and continues to do, in relation to the 
environment, is to provide for an institutional framework, where national differences 
and other issues can be ironed out. In other words, it has provided a platform where 
political agreements on legislation (i.e. Directives and Regulations) can be reached, 
and further legislative policy is guided from. In relation to CCS, the Council, along 
with the EP, for example, reviewed and adopted in February 2014 the report from the 
Commission on the state of the implementation of the 2009 CCS Directive.
130
 This 
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 According to this view, member states can either be ‘leaders’, in pressing for example for higher 
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demand for stricter environmental standard (Weale, 2000: 94-97). In the 1990s and the 2000s, 
however, the leader vs. laggard boundary was beginning to blur, leaning towards more leadership. 
Nevertheless, today, in some respects, this debate is still present.  
130





means that the general legal framework for the environmentally safe geological 
storage of CO2 in Europe was confirmed.  
     Nevertheless, a further review, by the EP and the Council, of the CCS Directive is 
scheduled for the end of 2015, with the objective of assessing the effectiveness, 
efficiency, and ease of application and legal practicality of several CCS Directive 
provisions. Moreover, the review will also provide an assessment on how the enabling 
policy of CCS in Europe has thus far worked in practice (Ricardo-AEA, 2015). In this 
way then, the Council, through the review of the Directive, and consequently with any 
changes to it, can impact the development and deployment of CCS in Europe.  
     Although no major changes are expected to occur in the 2015 review, the main 
issue remains clarification on practicality of certain legal provisions. As was 
discussed in a number of interviews (see Chapter 6), on the legal and regulatory 
frameworks for CCS in Europe, this review is unlikely to cause any significant delay 
in the development of CCS projects. It could, however, result in better clarity on those 
provisions, and other issues, and hence expedite the technology’s development and 
deployment. 
 
Other Institutions  
Apart from the three main bodies of the EU, as mentioned above, a number of other 
institutional actors are worth mentioning, given their influence on the future of CCS 
in Europe. The European Court of Justice (ECJ), for example, acting as an 
institutional court, aims to determine how European law is interpreted across the EU. 
National courts, when facing problems in applying and interpreting EU environmental 
law, can also look to ECJ. For example, in an event of a dispute over whether an 
environmental impact assessment (EIA) is required at a particular stage of the CCS 
chain (capture, transport, storage), although it rests first with the national courts, they 
could also ask the ECJ for help in interpreting the CCS Directive and respective 
national legal frameworks. In addition, the ECJ also acts as an international court, in 
cases in which it sanctions EU Member States for violating European law, and can in 
cases of non-compliance with a Directive or Regulation, also, at the request of the 
Commission, impose significant financial penalties, for example, if Member States 
failed to transpose the CCS Directive.
131
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     Also worth mentioning, although lacking the institutional powers of others 
mentioned above, is undoubtedly the European Environment Agency (EEA). With a 
specifically environmental objective, its role and value to addressing environmental 
protection, has, and continues to be the collection, analysis and dissemination of 
environmental information. It is important in that it supports the Commission and 
other institutions in the formulation and implementation of EU environmental policy 
and legislation. It does so, in large part through consultations with the Commission, 
and via publication of various technical reports,
132
 which make it an essential 
information tool for all stakeholders, including policy and decision-makers as well as 




4.1.2.2 The Instruments 
Just as it is important to understand the main institutional actors, their roles and 
objectives, as well as the institutional dynamics between them, so is it to be familiar 
with the instruments, or tools, with which they build the overall environmental 
governance system in the EU. Bähr (2010) offers the following classification of 
instruments: i) governance instruments; and ii) legal instruments. Whereas the former 
is divided into command and control, economic, and persuasive instruments, the latter 




     The majority of EU environmental legislation comes in the form of Directives
135
, 
primarily as a result of geographical, as well as institutional and political variety of 
Member States (MS). The intention of Directives is to give the MS sufficient 
flexibility in achieving the objectives, as opposed to issuing Regulations, which some 
MS might see as intrusive and unfair. Although, this same flexibility can become a 
hindrance, as there is no clear guidance on how a directive should be interpreted, 
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transposed and practically implemented, which can lead to significant delays in 
achieving a particular result. Also important to note is that while directives are 
intended to generally standardize environmental requirements across the EU, 
variations are possible under EU law, following the principle of subsidiarity
136
 and the 
sharing of competences
137
 between the EU and member states. 
     In general, the use of legal instruments of hard law (i.e. directives) and command 
and control type of governance instruments, have been associated with the traditional 
environmental paradigm and represent the dominant form of coordination and control 
of EU environmental policy (Carter, 2007; Diedrichs et al. (2011). In recent years, as 
Holzinger et al., (2006) point out, the Commission has been increasingly advocating 
the use of persuasive (i.e. voluntary agreements) and economic instruments (i.e. EU 
ETS) in its Environmental Action Programmes as well. These could be classified 
under the ‘soft law’ category. From a legal perspective, ‘soft law’ in general, 
according to Boyle (2006), is only a convenient description of a non-legally binding 
instrument, making it, similar to multilateral treaties, a vehicle for focusing consensus 
on particular rules and standards. Nevertheless, as Boyle (2006) warns, the legal 
significance of soft law, should not be dismissed, as it does contribute to the corpus of 
international law (p. 118). A number of authors have also argued that even though, 
given that they imply almost no real obligations, it remains difficult to evaluate their 
effectiveness, soft law can still represent an important instrument for climate change 
mitigation (Rezessy and Bertoldi, 2011; Borck and Coglianese, 2009).  
 
Economic instruments 
Economic instruments, such as the Emissions Trading Directive (2003/87/EC) and the 
Environmental Liability Directive (2004/35/EC), make use of market mechanisms 
and can provide for increased efficiency, by allowing flexibility in deciding on how to 
meet targets while at the same time encouraging technological innovation; in theory at 
least. Economic instruments, such as the ETS, can be prone to failure, as a result of 
being subject to the uncertainties of the financial markets. At the Member State level, 
government expenditure, most often in a form of a subsidy, intended to encourage 
development and adoption of cleaner technologies, is another form of 
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economic/financial instrument. These, along with long-term economic policies, as 
will again be mentioned later on in Chapter 5, remain at this stage the key factor in 
the (slow) development of CCS, in Europe, and in the UK. 
     In any case, it is important to acknowledge and point out a number of things. Since 
the passing of the SEA in 1986, along with the increased institutionalisation of the 
environment, the diversity of instrument portfolios dealing with such matters has 
certainly also increased. Furthermore, whatever the choice of a policy instruments, it 
is both a technical matter of selecting the instrument that can offer an efficient and 
effective means of delivering a policy objective, as well as a political process, shaped 
by decisions between competing interests (Carter, 2007: 322). In both the EU 
environmental, and energy policy spheres, the policy instruments are adopted by 
actors who have to interact with other actors with potentially diverging interests, 
beliefs and preferences for a certain type of policy instruments
138
. Lastly, there is 
essentially no silver-bullet or one-size-fits-all tool in the broad spectrum of 
instruments in the EU environmental governance system. This allows for the use of 
different policy instruments for different purposes, or in conjunction, in order to 
achieve a particular policy goal, which can in the end also lead to the creation of 
tensions between actors and other stakeholders within a particular policy area.  
 
Standards and voluntary agreements  
The purpose of setting environmental standards is, generally speaking, to regulate 
human activities impacting the environment. When standards can be enforced, the 
process can be seen as one of the best ways of applying law to environmental 
problems (Wilkinson, 2002). However, many environmental standards are not legally 
binding, though they can still “give legislators valuable information about best 
practice in the field and thereby offer a viable model for the regulatory process” 
(Decarboni.se, 2015). Therefore, standards may in fact serve as to reinforce the 
regulatory frameworks, and can make compliance and enforcement of regulation 
easier, for all stakeholders involved (i.e. the operator, regulator, third parties). A word 
of caution is necessary, however, as giving standards too much credit can also lead to 
                                                     
138
 For example, whereas, within the Commission, “the DG Environment pursues more environment-
friendly policy, the DG Enterprise and Industry proposes policies that are more favourable to the 
industry. Within the EP, the greens are close to the environmental NGOs while the conservatives and 
Christian democrats tent to the position of the employers’ associations. The social democrats and 
socialists as well as the liberals take up a middle position between environmental protection and 




a reverse effect of weakening the regulatory frameworks (see Clapp, 2001). Equally 
significant, standard setting can also serve as an assurance, when compliance is 
achieved, and can lead to increased trust
139




      
Standards and CCS 
Vahjjala et al. (2007) describe in their report on the regulatory framework for CCS 
risk governance, that as a result of leakage-related climate risks for example, “a 
certain quality level in terms of minimum retention time for the stored CO2…[would 
give] important guidance for governance, site selection, and operation and for repair 
activities as necessary”. At present (March 2015), however, despite there being a 
number of research and demonstration projects underway, there are yet no recognized 
national or international standards for long-term CO2 storage. This comes primarily as 
a result of the differences in national environmental regulation, as well as the fear that 
specific standards would stifle improvement and innovation (Morrison, 2006). In the 
EU for example, there are no specific standards for CO2 transportation for storage, as 
things such as the CO2 purity is left to Member States’ discretion. Nevertheless, there 
are several existing standards applying oil and gas pipelines, which could potentially 
be applied for pipelines transporting CO2 for the purpose of storage. 
     While to some extent that might be true, it could be more likely that, unified, 
recognized and publicly available guidelines can provide the standards that can in fact 
speed up innovation. Furthermore, through collaboration with the industry, for 
example via so-called Joint Industry Projects (JIPs), which serve a number of 
purposes, including: i) develop methodologies suited to characterize, select and 
qualify sites for storage of CO2; ii) help assure regulatory compliance (i.e. with 
conventions, regulations, directives); and iii) manage risks and uncertainties. 
Essentially, such guidelines are for use by operators, authorities, verifiers, and other 
stakeholders, and help bridge the gap in need of moving CCS forward (DNV, 2009). 
     Examples of such guidelines already issued, include a set of criteria for the 
selection of potential storage sites and descriptions of the related geological 
parameters by the EU GeoCapacity project, whose aim was to adapt and define 
common standards in order to produce uniform assessments of geological storage 
                                                     
139
 Trust between the public, the government and the industry. Without a certain level of trust, between 
all stakeholders and the public, opposition and delays in achieving goals/outcomes can arise.   
140




capacity (Vangkilds-Pedersen et al. (2008). Yet another example includes the DNV’s 
guidelines for the qualification procedures for CO2 capture technology, design and 
operation of CO2 pipelines
141
. More recently, the DNV also published a new industry 
guidance document - CO2RISKMAN – to provide a comprehensive reference source 
to assist the emerging CCS industry appreciate, understand, communicate and manage 
the issues, challenges and potential hazards associated with handling CCS CO2 
streams (DNV, 2013). 
     In any case, international standards can have a number of benefits for CCS, such as 
promoting a common understanding of rules, reducing conflicting regulations, and 
facilitating the transfer of expertise and technology, and in this way facilitate and not 
impede innovation.
142
 While international standards on CCS might not be available 
just yet, there are a number of guidelines and best practices, which for creating 
requirements will help ensure consistency and fairness – crucial for a safe and 
sustainable deployment of CCS.  
     Despite the non-existence of any specific international standards on CCS, they are 
likely to become significant in the future, given their potential for increase in safety 
and perception, amongst other benefits. For various political, technical, and economic 
reasons, the industry will not always want to adopt standards it considers a burden 
rather than an advantage. Adoption of such standards is therefore often easier said 
than done. That being said, there are however number of existing sets of standards for 
the safe management of processing and capture of CO2, which have been in place in 
many of the EU countries, including the UK
143
. Nevertheless, since permanent storage 
of CO2 is the novel aspect in the CCS process, more standards in this respect will 
have to be developed. The CCS industry, however, has shown to be willing to 
cooperate with other stakeholders, including the regulators, government and academia 
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in the guidance and development of standards, not only for the purpose of storage, but 




4.1.2.3 Non-governmental actors, drivers and platforms for interaction 
As mentioned earlier, governance network actors are the various EU institutions and 
agencies, as well as other stakeholders such as academic and research institutions, the 
civil society (i.e. eNGOs), and the industry. According to the governance network 
theory, as explained in Chapter 2, each actor has, to a certain extent, something to 
contribute to the functioning of the network itself, albeit with a varying degree. 
     One of the largest issues for CCS to-date has undoubtedly been that of cost. In 
other words, the lack of capital investment and long-term policy certainty, essentially 
that the investment into the technology will be worthwhile for the company deciding 
whether or not to develop the technology/process. The issue of cost, however, is most 
often discussed in the context of the capture component of the CCS chain, given this 
part constitutes up to 80% of the total cost of a typical CCS project.
145
 This issue of 
cost, as was mentioned by a number of industry and academic interviewees (see 
Chapter 6), has been the main driving force of the interactions between the 
governments and the CCS industry.  
     A good example of a non-governmental CCS governance network actor is 
certainly UK’s Carbon Capture and Storage Research Centre (UKCCSRC), 
established by the EPSRC and the UK Department of Energy and Climate Change 
(DECC) in April 2012, as part of the Research Councils UK (RCUK) Energy 
Programme. Within the UKCCSRC, hundreds of academics, industry, regulators and 
others in the sector form a network where collaboration on analysing problems and 
undertaking world-leading research is possible (EPSRC, 2012). A number of state-of-
the-art capture research facilities will allow UK scientists and engineers to deal with 
the uncertainties and complexities of carbon capture, working with industrial partners 
in improving the technologies, and ultimately bringing down the costs.
146
 While the 
                                                     
144
 This finding, that the CCS industry has shown intent to cooperate with other stakeholders, as well as 
government institutions, on the development of standards, was obtained from the number of interviews, 
with both the industry, academic, and government representatives. 
145
 Capture costs include both capital and operating costs, and varies depending on the specifics of the 
facility and the chosen capture technology. 
146
 These new facilities include: i) a pilot scale advanced testing facilities in Yorkshire, with a 1 tonne 
CO2 per day amine capture facility; ii) a mobile testing unit to allow a range of tests to be conducted on 
real power station flue gases; iii) an advanced oxyfuel fluidised bed and chemical looping pilot 




UKCCSRC is primarily set to catalyse CCS research in the UK, it also serves as a 
platform for international collaboration and cooperation between researchers, the 
industry, governments and other stakeholders, by providing a platform for knowledge 
exchange and exploitation of intellectual property. 
     Yet another example of an interface, or platform where industry, government and 
academic stakeholders come together is in a good number of conferences that occur 
each year. These can be small, focusing on a specific component or issue of CCS, or 
large, encompassing a number of issues at once. In the case of the latter, a particularly 
important one for the development and successful deployment of CCS in Europe has 
for the past eight years been the Platts’ Annual European Carbon Capture & Storage 
Conference. Bringing together representatives from the political sphere, such as the 
DG Energy and DG Environment from the EU Commission, as well as leading CCS 
industry experts from major companies, and other leading utilities, academics, project 
developers, NGOs and regulators, it is here, and other conferences or meetings such 
as this one, that provide the mechanism for exchange of information, knowledge and 
ideas. These are then translated to and employed by individual actors in their 
respective environments. 
     Perhaps more influential, then individual conferences for example, when it comes 
to actual policy and CCS technology development, is the European Technology 
Platform for Zero Emission Fossil Fuel Power Plants (ZEP), which serves as a direct 
advisor to the European Commission on the research, demonstration and deployment 
of CCS. It also provides a diverse group of stakeholders, including European utilities, 
petroleum companies, equipment suppliers, scientists, academics and environmental 
NGOs, a unique platform for knowledge and information exchange, and promotion of 




4.1.2.4 Pooled Interdependence 
The above discussion demonstrates that the EU CCS governance network constitutes 
a wide range of actors and stakeholders connected to each other through an 
interdependent relationship. This relationship is evident in, for example, research 
institutions and/or companies looking towards some form of government funding, or 
                                                     
147





the government or EU institutions looking for outside expertise on a particular issue, 
also in order to in a way legitimise its policy goals.  
     In broad terms, the theory of governance networks applies in this case in that all 
actors in one way or another are driven by a common goal, to contribute to or 
facilitate the development of the CCS technology, either in scientific, technological or 
legal contexts. Interdependence can be measured either by the costs of severing the 
relationship between the actors of the network, or by measuring the benefits of 
developing/promoting the relationship. The higher the cost of severing the 
relationship, the higher the dependence would be.  
     This study finds that the CCS governance network is relatively stable and open. In 
other words, given that the actors can come and go as they please, the dependence of 
the network relationships can be considered to be relatively low. As mentioned above, 
when actors start to benefit from the relationship, it is considered to be 
interdependent. To measure the extent of the dependence between actors
148
 would 
involve extensive quantitative analysis, which is beyond the scope of this research.  
     However, as the sections above on the organizational structure of the CCS 
governance network in Europe have shown, the relationships within can be 
characterized as pooled interdependence, reflecting a lowest form of interdependence 
resulting in a relatively low amount of conflict. Thompson (2003) defines three 
different types of interdependence to describe the intensity of interactions and 
behaviours within an organizational structure.  
     Adopting Thompson’s classification,149 the character of interactions within the EU 
CCS governance network would fall under the so-called ‘pooled interdependence’. In 
broad terms, each part of an organization makes a contribution to the whole, and each 
is in some form or another supported by the whole. While the various EU institutions 
and other actors, are not directly dependent on one another, however they do interact 
with one another, and contribute to an overall goal. Outputs of each actor are 
essentially pooled together at an organizational level (i.e. the EU Commission). 
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 For example, measuring the monetary benefits of the relationship, and costs of severing it, for a 
particular company, institution, etc.  
149
 The other two types include sequential and reciprocal interdependence. The former occurs when 
output of one unit in the overall process is necessary for the operation/performance of the next unit (i.e. 
like an assembly line). The latter, is similar to sequential interdependence, in that the outcome of one 
unit becomes the input of another, in addition to it being cyclical. In other words, reciprocal 
interdependence reflects the highest degree of intensity of interaction and are often most complex 




Pooled interdependence refers to a situation where individual actors do not directly 
affect one another, but rather indirectly, given that their actions/functioning affects the 
overall success of the network as a whole. Such interdependence then requires 
standardization in the rules and operating procedures. This is clearly evident for 
example in the employment of the precautionary principle, and the qualified majority 
voting procedure.  
     In other words, the functioning of various EU institutions, including the EP, the 
Commission, the ECJ, and sub-units such as the various DGs and/or COREPER, 
rather than impacting one another directly, in respect to developing policy and 
legislation on CCS/ CO2 storage, the success or failure of each essentially affects the 
organisation (i.e. the EU) overall. As such, people and departments must rely on each 
other for information sharing, which makes communication and cooperation valuable 
to all parties in coming to a successful outcome. In this case, constructing a firm legal 
and regulatory environment, and developing and deploying CCS in Europe.  
     As mentioned, the main question of this research is concerned with the legal and 
regulatory framework for CO2 storage in Europe, and the extent to which they 
mediate between the safe storage of the CO2 and the facilitation of the development of 
the CCS technology. As such, the following section now turns to examining the legal 
and regulatory context within which CCS technology is governed. This will also 
provide the basis for answering the question of whether, or how CCS is being enabled 
or inhibited by the legal and regulatory frameworks (the focus of Chapter 6). 
 
4.2 Governing CCS and CO2 storage 
Although the focus of this research is the legal and regulatory frameworks in Europe, 
and respectively in the UK, it is important to be aware of such frameworks at the 
international level as well, as they too form a part of the overall governance network.  
     CCS became an eligible activity under the Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM)
150
 of the Kyoto Protocol at the 17
th
 Conference of the Parties (COP17) of the 
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in December 2011 in 
Durban, South Africa. This inclusion is significant as it reflects a formalized 
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 A project classified as a CDM essentially allows developed countries to offset credits for emission 
reductions generated from their investment in projects in other, primarily developing, countries. These 
credits, also referred to as certified emission reduction units (CER), can then be sold on a number of 
existing and emerging carbon markets, and help meet industrialized countries their emission reduction 




international acceptance of CCS as a legitimate low carbon technology, and is 
intended to facilitate its deployment on a large scale. As of January 2015, however, 
there are no projects classified as CDMs. Although development and deployment of 
CCS in Europe is not impacted by the CDM framework, given that it is more of a 
policy as opposed to a legal/regulatory framework, a number of pieces of international 
marine legislation are significant in that respect. 
 
4.2.1 International Marine Legislation 
Onshore storage is, of course primarily governed by national law, whereas offshore 
CCS activities fall under international law, with its legality depending on a number of 
global and regional marine agreements. This includes the 1982 UN Convention on the 
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the 1972 London Convention on the Prevention of 
Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, as well as its superseding 
1996 London Protocol, and the 1992 ‘OSPAR’ Convention for the Protection of the 
Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic
151
.   
     Under the OSPAR Convention, CO2 injection and storage is now allowed in the 
North East Atlantic waters.
152
 Furthermore, the 2006 amendment
153
 of Annex I of the 
London Protocol was significant in that it added the captured CO2 to the list of wastes 
allowed to be dumped in the subsea geologic formations. Another amendment to the 
Protocol in 2009 set out to distinguish the movement of CO2 across international 
borders for the purpose of injection and subsurface storage from the movement for the 
purpose of enhanced oil recovery (EOR), which under existing laws is allowed. This 
amendment, however, has thus far only been ratified by two contracting parties, 
Norway and the United Kingdom, and has not yet received the required two-thirds 
majority. This effectively means that trans-border movement of CO2 for the purpose 
of injection and subsurface storage, under the London Protocol, is prohibited. The 
following outlines some of the main points of each of the international marine 
legislation relevant to CCS in Europe. 
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 While the 1982 UNCLOS is considered to be more general in terms of providing protection to all 
marine areas, the London Convention and the Protocol are intended to regulate waste disposal at sea. 
The OSPAR Convention concerns the protection, and prohibition of pollution, in the North-East 
Atlantic Ocean, and is thus an example of a regional marine treaty (Haszeldine et al., 2007: 5).  
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 Pursuant to the 2007 amendment to the Convention, and its ratification in 2011. 
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The recognition, in the late 1970s, that the world’s oceans and seas needed an 
overarching international agreement that would regulate issues such as the use of 
resources, shipping, exploitation and pollution, led to the signing of the UNCLOS 
Convention in 1982, which entered into force in 1994.
154
 As the UNCLOS 
Convention was agreed upon without having CCS in mind, and does not mention it in 
its texts, some of its provisions have been considered to be a barrier, in particular 
whether CCS activities would be classified as dumping of waste or causing pollution 
(Art. 1(4)), under the Convention
155
. As Armeni (2011) points out however, while 
reference to CCS among permitted activities would create a stronger framework for 
CCS off-shore operations, UNCLOS is unlikely to be amended to clarify the issue of 
pollution and dumping, as it only constitutes a framework agreement, leaving details 
to be settled by other prescriptive instruments such as the London Protocol or the 
OSPAR Convention, as well as national legislation.  
 
London Convention  
The 1972 London Convention, was first to establish a legal regime for the ‘deliberate’ 
dumping, or disposal,
156
 of wastes and other matter at sea where as such it creates 
‘hazards to human health, [harms] living resources and marine life, [damages] 
amenities or [interferes] with other legitimate uses of the sea’ (Art. 1). Under the 
Convention, CO2 storage is ‘technically’ permitted. First, even though the 
Convention’s Scientific Committee classified CO2 from fossil fuels as industrial 
waste, consensus between the Contracting Parties on that has yet to be reached. Thus, 
it is not yet clear whether it falls under the prohibited (Annex I) substances, or even 
those (Annex II and III) requiring a permit prior to dumping. In any case, the 
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 One of its more important aspects includes the division of the various parts of the oceans into zones: 
i) the Territorial Sea; ii) the Contiguous Zone; iii) the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ); iv) the 
Continental Shelf; and v) the High Seas. For each of these zones, differing rights and duties apply. For 
example, under Article 33, the State retains rights to prevent or punish infringements of its customs, 
immigration or sanitary laws and regulations up to 24nm from its coast. Within the EEZ, coastal States 
also have the rights of exploration, exploitation and management of the natural resources as well as the 
seabed. Interesting to note is also that the UK for example has abstained from declaring its EEZ, but 
rather relies upon the Continental Shelf rights. Within the Continental Shelf, Art. 77(4) gives a State 
the right to exploit the natural resources of the seabed and subsoil, as well as to lay pipelines (Art. 79) 
to exploit those resources. No state however, can exercise any sovereignty in the High Seas zone, 
which is considered to be the ‘common heritage of mankind’ (Türk, 2012: 182). 
155
 Part V of the Convention, for example, also prohibits building infrastructure where it could interfere 
with recognized sea lanes. 
156
 For matter under Annex I, absolute prohibition is in effect, while for those in Annex II a special 





Convention’s definition of ‘dumping’ gives exemption to CO2 injection for the 
purpose of enhanced oil or gas recovery, or if it is considered as a purpose to mitigate 
climate change, suggesting the CO2 is being injected beyond mere disposal of waste. 
     The provisions of the Convention also exclude from its text the disposal, or 
discharge, from pipelines, and only refer to discharge from aircraft, ships or 
platforms, which is less likely to occur in the context of CO2 storage. 
 
London Protocol  
Nonetheless, CCS off-shore activities and operations are currently to a greater extent 
governed by the 1996 London Protocol, which entered into force in 2006, with an aim 
to modernize and provide for a restrictive
157
 and comprehensive oceans and sea waste 
management. Under the Protocol’s regime, the legal basis for regulating off-shore 
CCS activities was established by the amendment to Annex I in 2006 (entered into 
force in 2007), which adds CO2 on the approved list of materials to be considered for 
dumping, as well as explicitly states (Art. 1(4)) that CO2 may be considered for 
disposal, under the condition that it be disposed of into a sub-seabed geological 
formation, that it consists overwhelmingly of CO2 (though it may contain small traces 
of other substances), and that no other waste or matter be added during the disposal 
process.   
     Following the amendment, a number of specific guidelines for risk assessment and 
management, evaluation and monitoring of the CO2 storage in sub-seabed formation 
have emerged. Combined with other provisions of the Protocol, such as the licensing 
process under Article 4
158
 or Article 9, which set reporting obligations, these 
guidelines provide for a permitting framework for offshore CCS activities. 
Essentially, governments of each contracting party undertaking offshore CO2 storage 
activities must adopt administrative/legislative measures to provide for permits to be 
issued. The permitting requirements, and the general emphasis placed on impact 
evaluation and monitoring requirements, the latter seen as essential to ensure 
compliance, points to the coherency and inclusiveness of the Protocol. In particular as 
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 The dumping of materials listed in Annex 1 requires a permit, which must be issued in accordance 
with the provisions of Annex 2. Contracting Parties, when undertaking an assessment of wastes or 
other matters must, amongst other things: carry out a waste prevention audit to ascertain whether the 
waste can be reduced at source; consider the chemical, physical and biological properties of the 
material to be dumped and the site identified for the deposit; and make an assessment of any potential 
effects. (UCL-CCLP, 2012) 
158
 Requires Contracting Parties to adopt administrative and legislative measures for the permitting 




far as impact evaluation and monitoring is concerned, such emphasis also points to 
the important role of the sciences in providing an essential input to the entire 
governance framework. A strengthened science-policy-legal interface then also leads 
to a more informed and effective decision making.  
     Also, in 2009, amendment of Article 6 of the Protocol, which prohibits export of 
wastes or other matter for dumping in other countries, was adopted in order to allow 
for CO2 export for the purpose of CCS related activities. The amendment, opposed to 
by China on the basis of concern over hastiness of such an amendment and that it 
might result in export of other waste, essentially requires prior agreement between the 
countries concerned, including (IEA, 2011:11): 
i) Confirmation and allocation of permitting responsibilities between the 
exporting and receiving countries, consistent with the provisions of the 
Protocol and other applicable international law; and 
ii) In the case of export to non-Contracting Parties, provisions at a minimum 
equivalent to those contained in the Protocol, including those relating to the 
issuance of permits and permit conditions for complying with the 
provisions of Annex II, to ensure that the agreement or arrangement does 
not derogate from the obligation of Contracting Parties under the Protocol 
to protect and preserve the marine environment.  
 
This amendment, however, given the required two thirds of the Contracting Countries 
to ratify, the low number of ratifications to date (aside from Norway, who initiated the 
amendment, UK is the only other party to have ratified it), the difficulty of the 
ratification process itself, as well as the contracting party interest in CCS in general, is 
unlikely for the amendment to be ratified in the near term (IEA, 2011). This 
essentially means, that at this point trans-boundary CO2 transport with the purpose of 
CO2 disposal/storage is under the London Protocol still prohibited.  
      
OSPAR Convention  
Last, but not least, the OSPAR Convention, primarily focuses on pollution from land-
based sources (Art 3; Annex I), dumping and incineration (Art. 4, Annex II), and 
offshore sources (Art. 5; Annex III). While, unlike the London Convention and 
Protocol, OSPAR is an example of a regional maritime agreement, it is similar in the 




deployment. In 2007 the Contracting Parties also adopted amendments to the 
Convention’s Annex II159 and III,160 which added to the legitimacy for off-shore CCS 
activities and operation in the North-East Atlantic, as well a Decision 1/2007, which 
entered into force in 2008, and explicitly reinforces the requirement for sub-seabed 
storage by prohibiting storage in water columns. Furthermore, the number of 
guidelines and decisions
161
 on CO2 storage in geological formations similar to those 
under the London Protocol additionally enhance the CCS legal framework.  
     However, given that, as is the case with the Protocol, the OSPAR Convention has 
been ratified only by a number of countries to date and has yet to come into force, it 
means that CCS offshore activities under the OSPAR regime are, for the time being 
still prohibited (Armeni, 2011).  
 
4.2.2 Setting the legal and regulatory framework for CCS 
The EU has to-date established itself as one of the leaders in the international fight 
against climate change, playing important roles in the negotiations of the Kyoto 
Protocol, and in the post-Kyoto period pushing for more stringent and inclusive 
climate agreements (Claes and Frisvold; in Meadowcroft and Langhelle, 2010: 217). 
One of the key climate change policy tools in the EU has undoubtedly been the EU 
Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS)
162
, established to facilitate emission reductions and 
encourage investments into low-emission technologies, in particular for large emitters 
in the power generation and other heavily energy-intensive sectors.  
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 i) Article 3(2) of Annex II added CO2 streams from CO2 processes for storage to the list of 
substances allowed for dumping, following several conditions are met. See requirements of Art. 1(4) of 
London Protocol; OSPAR also adds that permanence of storage and guarantee of no significant adverse 
effects. 
160
 While the newly inserted Paragraph 3 adds that CO2 streams from CO2 capture processes are not 
prohibited, subject to conditions listed in Annex I, the new Paragraph 4 requires guarantee that CO2 
storage will not occur without authorization or regulation from the Parties’ competent authority.  
(Armeni; in Havercroft et al., 2011: 154). 
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 i.e. the OSPAR Guidelines for Risk Assessment and Management of Storage of CO2 Streams in 
Geological Formations, or the Decision on the Storage of Carbon Dioxide Streams in Geological 
Formations 
162
 Within this scheme, every member state is allocated an annual quantity of allowances on the basis 
of their emission reduction targets. These allowances are then auctioned off, and the revenues must be 
used to combat climate change, including for CCS. In addition to the revenues raised through the ETS 
scheme, an additional 300 million allowances, each equalling to one tonne of CO2, were allocated 
under the New Entrants Reserve 300 (NER300) for the financing of renewable, as well as CCS 




     In any case, CCS in the EU first emerged on the political scene in Brussels in the 
mid-2000s following the introduction of a number of ‘Communications’163  which 
outlined EU’s way of combating climate change and achieving energy security, and 
along with measures to increase energy efficiency and production of renewables, 
considered CCS as one of the key technological options and solutions. One of the key 
policy developments in that time was the Commission’s comprehensive 2020 Climate 
and Energy Package
164
, the goal of which was set to ensure greenhouse gas (GHG) 
reductions as well as signal a strong commitment to a low-carbon economy in Europe. 
Among the four proposed legislative texts included in the package
165
 was also the 
Directive creating a legal framework for the safe and environmentally sound use of 
carbon capture and storage technologies
166
, which only two years after its mention in 
the 2007 climate and energy package, was adopted in April 2009.  
     In a short span of time, the EU has asserted itself as not only a leader in the fight 
against climate change but as the first to develop a comprehensive policy, legal and 
regulatory framework for CCS as well, which has since served as a model for such 
framework developments throughout the world. Good examples of countries that have 
“borrowed” from the EU in this respect include Australia and Canada167.  
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 Most relevant of these Communications, among nearly 20 of them in the years 2005-2007, include 
the Commission’s 2005 White Paper on Winning the battle against climate change, and the Green 
Paper on Energy in 2006.  
164
 Also referred to as the ‘20-20-20 in 2020’ or the Merkel Miracle’, which in March of 2007, 
following the unanimous backing by all 27 heads of state, saw the EU establish itself as a world leader 
in the fight against climate change (Claes and Frisvold; in Meadowcroft and Langhelle, 2009: 219). It 
set out three specific targets to be achieved by 2020: i) a 20% reduction in EU GHG emissions from 
1990 levels; ii) raising the share of EU energy consumption produced from renewable resources to 
20%; and iii) a 20% improvement in the EU’s energy efficiency. On 23 October 2014, EU leaders also 
agreed on 40% reduction in domestic 2030 GHG emissions, compared to 1990 levels. The 2030 policy 
frameworks intends to make the EU’s economy and energy system more competitive, secure and 
sustainable. In addition, target of at least 27% for renewable energy and energy savings by 2030 were 
set (EC, 2015). 
165
 It also included, a directive revising the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), which covers 
some 40% of EU greenhouse gas emissions; an "effort-sharing" Decision setting binding national 
targets for emissions from sectors not covered by the EU ETS; and a Directive setting binding national 
targets for increasing the share of renewable energy sources in the energy mix (EC, 2014). 
166
 The package also engages with CCS by calling for the creation of a policy that would stimulate 
construction and operation of up to 12 CCS demonstration plants by 2015, create a Strategic Energy 
Technology Plan (SET-Plan) for Europe and prepare a road map for developing European Industrial 
Initiatives for key low-carbon emitting technologies, which would include CCS (Claes and Frisvold; in 
Meadowcroft and Langhelle, 2009: 219). 
167
 See the Global Status of CCS 2012 report from the Global CCS Institute (ch.4) for detailed 





Key elements  
This research considers the legal and regulatory frameworks to be a critical factor for 
the future of CCS technology. The purpose of such frameworks is not only to ensure 
that all environmental, social, and economic risks are taken into account and properly 
managed. It goes also without saying, that without favourable legal and regulatory 
frameworks, CCS will essentially be condemned to a small-scale market. As such, a 
key pre-condition for the development of this technology is the reduction of technical, 
legal and administrative barriers. For example, clear and simple regulations on the 
permitting process, or smooth application of other procedural requirements in general 
are particularly important. Good understanding of these frameworks, from the 
industry’s perspective in particular, is crucial, as they are the ones who will be facing 
the majority of the environmental, social, and of course financial risks. This research, 
as mentioned in the introduction, is primarily concerned about the environmental 
risks. Nevertheless, all types of risks should, at least to some extent, always be 
addressed in conjunction, given that they are invariably related. The European legal 
and regulatory framework for CO2 storage reflects this notion well.  
     In Europe, the key framework, as mentioned, is the 2009 CCS Directive, which 
introduces elements such as the monitoring plan, provisions for financial security and 
mechanism, and for the transfer of responsibility.
168
  
     Given that no CCS project is allowed to operate without an approved storage 
permit, the outcome of the permitting process is crucial to the project proponents. 
Often, this process takes a long time, as was the case in the ROAD’s CCS project 
experience, which took almost two years from the time of the application to the point 
where the permit was awarded, with full support from the Dutch competent authority. 
Through document research, and speaking with members of the CCS industry 
community, as well as with other government and academic stakeholders, the 
following key issues were identified in relation to permitting: i) storage complex and 
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 It is up to the Member States to interpret these elements into their respective national legislation. 
This flexibility is purposely given in light of the specific characteristics of each CCS project.   
169
 In respect to storage complex and site, although the definition is made in the CCS Directive, these 
are not as easily applied to a reservoir or aquifer. The financial security requirement makes the 
operator present a proof that sufficient FS will be available at the time of CO2 injection; not necessary 
at time of permit application. Lack of clarity on calculating amount of FS and acceptability of 




     In addition to the permitting process, equally important are the legal liabilities that 
may arise in the CO2 storage process, and could become reasons for which a project 
developer would either stop or become hesitant to continue their involvement with a 
project. There are essentially four different legal regimes under which liability may 
arise. These include the: i) EU-ETS – where the operator is liable for damage to the 
climate in case of CO2 release; ii) Environmental Liability Directive – where the 
operator is liable for the damage to the environment; iii) civil liability – where 
operator is liable for damage to third parties (persons or goods); iv) CCS Directive – 




     While Chapter 6 presents the views of the key stakeholders, in particular the CCS 
industry, on some of the above-mentioned legal and regulatory issues, so as to aid in 
understanding of those views, the following section turns to providing a brief 
overview of the CCS Directive and its provisions. A more in-depth analysis of the key 
provisions is provided in Chapter 5, where the UK legal and regulatory framework is 
also examined. Although the focus of this research is the storage of the CO2, 
provisions on the capture and transport components of the CCS chain are also 
provided below. 
 
4.2.3 Overview of the EU CCS Directive 
The CCS Directive was published in the EU Official Journal on June 25, 2009, with 
the EU Member States required to fully transpose its provisions by the deadline, on 
June 25, 2011. By that date however, only Spain was able to have fully transposed the 
Directive, which resulted in the Commission initiating infringement proceedings 
against 26 of the 27 EU member states, which have either failed to comply, or failed 
to communicate their compliance with the text and any other administrative measures 
of the Directive to the Commission
171
.  
     As the name suggests, the CCS Directive provides for a regulatory framework 
ensuring permanent containment of CO2 underground, and where this is not possible, 
                                                                                                                                                        
particular the amount and though which mechanism it should be made available before transfer of 
responsibility occurs, is also a key issue. Lastly, a key issue is also the lack of clarity on the transfer of 
responsibility, and what evidence is to be taken into account, and who is to assess the evidence 
(Havercroft and Macrory, 2014: 5-7). 
170
 Ibid. 5. 
171
 By end of 2013 all MS have notified the Commission of their transposing measures. The 




eliminate any possible negative effects and risks to the environment and human health 
(Art. 1(2)). It applies to the territory, the exclusive economic zone and the continental 
shelves of the 27 Member States (Art. 2(1)). It also explicitly prohibits (Art. 2(3-4)) 
any storage to take place in the water columns offshore, or between a EU and a non-
EU member states’ territories. For capture and transportation components of CCS, 
however, in order to avoid double-regulation and to remove an existing legal barrier, 
the CCS Directive amends several existing Directives, under which the two 
components will be primarily regulated.  
 
4.2.3.1 Capture 
As far as it relates to the capture component, Article 37 of the CCS Directive for 
example, amends the Annex I of the 2008/1/EC IPPC Directive to include CO2 
capture on the list of permitted industrial installation activities, which essentially 
means that all operators of power plants equipped with CCS are required to obtain a 
permit, as determined by the member state’s regulation. In the UK for example, this is 
an environmental permit, as the environmental permitting regime implements the 
IPPC Directive. As such, it also requires the establishment and application of best 
available techniques (BATs), and improvement of the composition of the CO2 stream. 
Furthermore, while Article 31 requires operators to comply with provisions of the 
EIA Directive (85/337/EEC) and conduct assessments of any likely significant 
environmental impacts form any capture facilities, Article 33 of the CCS Directive 
amends the Large Combustion Plant Directive (2001/80/EC) on the limitation of 
emissions of certain pollutants into the air from large combustion plants, to require 
operators of new coal-fired power plants with an output greater than 300MW to assess 
suitability of storage sites and available transport facilities, as well as technical and 
economical feasibility of retrofitting the power station for CO2 capture (Oberthur et 
al., 2010: 167).    
 
4.2.3.2 Transportation 
In terms of transportation of CO2, relevant provisions include Article 21, which 
requires Member States to ensure a fair and open access to the transportation network 
for all potential eligible operators, criteria for which is left to be determined by the 
Member States themselves. To account for any potential disputes related to access of 




establish a dispute settlement mechanism.
172
 Furthermore, the CCS Directive amends 
the Annex I of the Environmental Impact Assessment Directive (85/337/EC) by 
including pipelines with a diameter of more than 800mm or of length greater than 
40km to be subject to mandatory environmental impact assessments (EIAs)
173
.   
     Transportation of CO2 for the purpose of geological storage is also excluded from 
application and scope of the EU Waste Framework Directive (2006/12/EC), which is 
essential in that it excludes CO2, for the purpose of storage, from the definition of 
‘waste’. Important to note is also that for both capture and transport components of 
CCS, other relevant legal issues such as standards for health and safety, standards for 
design, construction, monitoring and maintenance, remain outside the EU framework, 
and are to a large extent left to the Member States’ discretion.  
 
4.2.3.3 Storage  
Pre-injection 
As mentioned, the CCS Directive allows for injection and storage of the CO2 to occur 
only in suitable storage sites that are carefully assessed and characterized (Art. 4). The 
goal is to minimize financial, environmental and human health risks, resulting from 
possible leakage, which the Directive refers to as “any release of CO2 from the 
storage complex.” 174  The site selection and exploration is also conditional on 
obtaining an exploration
175
 permit, procedures for which are determined by the 
Member States, but must be based on objective and non-discriminatory criteria (Art. 
5).  
     Once the site is properly characterized and proved suitable for storage, an operator 
may apply for a storage permit, from their respective national competent authority. In 
addition, all permit applications must also be reviewed by the European Commission 
(Art. 10), which provides a non-binding opinion. Member States can essentially 
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 In this respect, Art. 24 also requires cooperation on trans-boundary transport of CO2 between 
Member States. 
173
 Annex II of the EIA Directive is also amended by adding on the list other pipelines transporting 
CO2 for the purpose of storage, meaning Member States have the primary discretion of deciding 
whether an EIA is required. Also, other relevant environmental concerns will largely be covered by the 
EIA Directive and other national laws. 
174
 In the EC Guidance Document 2, a storage site is defined as a “defined volume within a geological 
formation used for CO2 storage and associated injection wells and pumps”. A storage complex 
definition includes both the surface and sub-surface facilities at the storage site, as well as the 
secondary containment formations/reservoirs, which may contain the CO2 in case it migrates beyond 
the primary seal (p. 26). Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/lowcarbon/ccs/implementation/docs/gd2_en.pdf. 
175




ignore the Commission’s opinion, only if it provides sufficient justification for doing 
so. While it is up to the Member States to issue such permits, Articles 7-9 of the CCS 
Directive provide for the minimum criteria for the conditions and contents of a permit 
application and a permit itself. Failure to meet the said criteria, as well as failure to 
communicate any matters of concern as to the operation and integrity of a site gives 
the competent authority, as well as the Commission, the right to deny, change, update 
or withdraw a storage permit (Art. 11).   
 
Operation 
Once injection of the CO2 starts, the most important provisions in the Directive 
include Articles 13-15, which relate to the monitoring, reporting and inspection, 
respectively. Monitoring of irregularities, migration of CO2 underground, leakage or 
significant adverse effects for the surrounding environment (Art. 13(1)) is essential. A 
monitoring plan is submitted for approval together with an application for a storage 
permit, and must be updated every five years. Annex II of the CCS Directive also sets 
out specific parameters to be monitored/measured, for which it suggests the use of 
‘best available technology’. Based on the monitoring required by Article 13, operators 
are then required to submit a report, at a frequency determined by the competent 
authority and in any event at least once a year, on the status of the storage site, the 
condition of the CO2 stream, as well as any other relevant issues, such as financial 
security.  
     In order to check for compliance with any of the Directive’s provisions, a 
competent authority must also set up a routine inspection system of storage 
complexes, which should occur at least once a year for the first three years after 
closure, and once every five years until the transfer of responsibility to the competent 
authority occurs. Non-routine inspections are suggested, however, the frequency of 
which is to be determined by the relevant competent authority.  
     In the event of any leakage or other irregularities, Article 16 sets out the measures 
to be taken by the operator as set out in the corrective measures plan submitted at the 
time of the permit application. If, however, the operator is incapable to take the 
necessary measures, the responsibility of doing so falls on the relevant competent 







Post-closure obligations (Art. 17) apply once a storage site has been closed, which can 
occur either if conditions stated in the permit have been met, a permit is withdrawn 
(based on Art. 11(3)), or a competent authority approves the request of the operator to 
close the site. Unless a storage permit is explicitly withdrawn, the operator remains 
responsible for any monitoring, reporting and corrective measures, based on the post-
closure plan submitted in the original permit application (Art. 17(2-3)), until the 
transfer of responsibility occurs (Art. 18). Such transfer can occur upon request from 
the operator, if: i) all available evidence indicates that the stored CO2 will be 
completely and permanently contained; ii) a minimum period, no shorter than 20 
years, determined by the competent authority has passed, unless the authority 
determines that criteria under (i) have been met; iii) financial obligations under Art. 
20 have been fulfilled; and iv) the site has been sealed and the injection facilities have 
been removed. Here again, the operator must prepare a report of the fulfilled 
conditions and that the CO2 is ‘completely and permanently contained’. As such, if 
conditions are met, and the competent authority approves the report, it has one month 
to submit the approval for review to the European Commission, which then has 




     Following the transfer of responsibility, any routine inspections and monitoring 
efforts may be reduced, unless significant leakage or irregularities are found, in which 
case they can be intensified, and costs incurred can be recovered from the operator, 
only if it is found that the fault has been on the side of the operator (Art. 18(7)). This 
relates then to the provisions under Article 19, which requires the operator who is 
applying for a storage permit, to present proof that sufficient financial security (FS) 
will be valid and effective before CO2 injection starts. The FS should cover the: i) 
operational period (monitoring, corrective measures & post-closure plans; surrender 
of allowances for any emissions; maintaining injection; and ii) closure and post-
closure period (sealing the storage site and removing injection facilities). In case of 
significant irregularity or incident, the competent authority can then use these funds to 
cover the incurred costs in case of corrective measures or premature closure of the 
storage site. However, the CCS Directive does not require the permit applicant to 
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 If however the Commission decides not to issue a opinion, it must inform the competent authority 





have the FS available at the time of the storage permit application, but only before the 
injection starts.  
     Lastly, according to Article 20 of the CCS Directive, an operator must make a 
financial contribution to the competent authority, before the transfer of responsibility, 
in order to cover the cost of monitoring for a period of at least 30 years, as well as to 
cover the costs incurred by the competent authority after the transfer to ensure that the 
CO2 is completely and permanently contained (Art. 20(1)).  
 
4.3 Discussion   
While the foundation for environment as an important EU policy paradigm has 
emerged in the early 1970s with the development of the first Environmental Action 
Programme (1973), it did not take long for it to also acquire a solid legal basis, 
following the passage of the 1986 Single European Act (SEA), ending its previous 
rather informal legal status. Over the next 25 years, environmental, as well as energy 
related matters have become more prominent, and an integrated part of other policies 
of the EU. In the years following the SEA, other important institutional changes 
emerged, such as the expansions in the use of qualified majority voting (QMV) in all 
sectors related to the internal EU market, including much of the environmental policy. 
In addition, procedural changes, such as the introduction of the co-operation and co-
decision procedures, increased the role of the European Parliament over the policy 
setting decisions by giving it the right to veto legislation. These changes have to a 
good extent shaped the dynamics of the policy and decision-making process in the EU 
It is important to note, however, that in environmental and energy policy, the 
institutional balance of power is constantly shifting, and decisions rules are 
manipulated in the struggle (Peterson and Bomberg, 1999: 185-99).  
     The environmental governance system, however, is not only composed of 
institutions. A wide array of non-institutional members and interests, including 
scientific experts, business interest groups and environmental NGOs, also come to 
form an important, but a messier than most, component of the overall governance 
network (Peterson and Bomberg, 1999). As discussed earlier in Chapter 2 (Section 
2.2.1) on the governance network theory, as employed in this research, what gives the 
governance network its character, or nature, are the characteristics of particular actors 
within the network, and their (material or immaterial) resources which the actors 




case, environmentally safe CO2 storage and deployment of CCS technology. As such, 
the resulting nature of the legal and regulatory framework in Europe is reflective of 
both the interdependency between the actors, and the institutional structure in place.  
     The CCS Directive is clearly evident of an outcome of extensive collaboration 
across a wide range of stakeholders, and is a model framework for the regulation of 
CO2 storage. This study argues that its provisions offer sufficient flexibility to the 
Member States to implement the Directive into their respective national legislation, 
yet at the same time provide sufficient rigor so as to ensure environmentally safe 
geological CO2 storage, whilst not impeding the development/deployment of the CCS 
technology. As also argued in this study, a strong regulatory framework, hopes to not 
only provide for certainty, to all stakeholders, including the public, as to its safety and 
importance, but also to encourage the increasingly necessary investments into the 
technology, and inspire confidence in the international arena, which would then 
hopefully translated into development of the technology across the developing 




















CHAPTER 5: Governing and regulating 
CO2 storage in the UK 
 
The CCS Directive represents the common denominator for the regulatory 
frameworks for CCS across the EU Member States, which were required to transpose 
the Directive into their national legislation. Essentially, there have been two methods 
by which MS have gone about doing so, either via: i) a literal transposition, such as in 
the case of the Netherlands; or ii) in greater details and specific regulation of aspects 
left by the Directive for MS to regulate
177
, such as is the case in the UK.  
     As of February 2015, the UK has no fully operational CCS projects, whereas in 
Europe, Norway
178
 for example already has two – at Snohvit and Sleipner – and 
elsewhere around the world, primarily in North America, six additional projects are 
currently capturing and storing CO2. None of these projects, however, are capturing 
CO2 from power stations, but rather from various industrial sources, primarily gas 
processing and fertilizer plants. Given that CO2 emissions from power generation 
represents the single largest source of global emissions, the UK could be praised for 
its efforts at CCS development in this area, despite having no operational commercial 
projects yet. This is because what the UK does have is one of the most comprehensive 
sets of legislation and regulations in place, and is considered as a leader in this 
respect, as well as in the case of developing a funding mechanism at the national 
level.
179
 This is an interesting state of affairs, in that the UK is in a sense the most 
developed in legal and regulatory aspects, but has yet no fully operational projects to 
date. 
     Development of the law is in essence the foundation for effective environmental 
protection. As such, when it comes to new technologies such as CCS, legislation and 
regulations will be developed before the technology itself is widely implemented. 
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 Given the principle of subsidiarity, which the EU is governed by, the Member States are left with 
some degree of flexibility in regards to regulating certain aspects of CCS.  
178
 Even though Norway is technically not an EU Member State, its membership with the EU is formed 
via its membership in the European Economic Area (EEA), and with the CCS Directive qualifying as 
being ‘EEA relevant’ it means that it must be implemented by all EEA members, including Norway 
(Decarboni.se, 2012). CCS development in Norway is largely driven by the oil and gas experience, and 
regulations. Although, the Norwegian Government announced its intention to transpose the EU CCS 
Directive in the near term, as of April 2014, it has not yet implemented any CCS specific legislation or 
regulations. 
179
 As will be explained later on the funding mechanisms at the national level involves both the direct 





This is done so as to account for all elements that would lead to a safe geological CO2 
storage. Effective regulations aim to provide the highest level of assurance, to the 
investors, operators and the general public that the long-term benefits of CCS will be 
achieved, whilst safeguarding against any potential risks or disasters. In respect to the 
latter, a clear allocation of risk and responsibilities over the short, medium and long-
term, is a crucial aspect in determining how liabilities are attributed, and for providing 
the confidence among investors.  
     As such, an effective regulatory framework should facilitate CCS development 
whilst protecting the environment. However, as the DECC’s 2012 CCS Roadmap 
openly acknowledges, although the UK has one of the most comprehensive regulatory 
frameworks for CCS in place, “this has yet to be tested in practice…[and] is 
inevitably an area where policy and practice will develop with experience” (p.4).180 In 
other words, the governance network can only get so far without actual practical 
experience (i.e. operational CCS projects). 
     Albeit relevant and interrelated, the chapter itself is less concerned with the 
funding mechanisms per se. The main objective of this chapter is to critically evaluate 
the legal and regulatory framework in which CCS is being debated in the UK. First, 
the context for CCS in the UK is set out, including the role of environment in policy 
and legal spheres, and the legal position of CCS. The second part then examines how 
CO2 storage is governed in the UK. This includes analysing the UK’s governance 
network, and identifying outstanding regulatory issues. Here the study also starts to 
draw on the interviews occasionally, however, the majority of data comes later in 
Chapter 6. Lastly, a discussion is provided. 
 
5.1 The context for CCS in the UK 
In light of the epistemological stance
181
 adopted in this research (see section 2.3.1), 
this section first turns to briefly presenting the historical development of environment 
in the policy and legal spheres, as well as the reasons behind developing CCS in the 
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 According to epistemological relativism (see Chapter 2), our understanding of this world is 
inevitably a construction from our own perspectives and standpoint. As such, governance network, its 
construction and operation, is understood as being under the influence of both horizontal and vertical 




UK. This will set the context for later on examining the governance of CO2 storage, 
and identifying the outstanding legal and regulatory issues. 
 
5.1.1 Environment as an emerging theme in the policy and legal spheres 
In the wake of the development of industrial towns in the early 19
th
 century in the 
UK, much of the early legislation that considered environmental measures was 
concerned primarily with public health issues, such as water pollution. It was in 1863 
that the first centralized regulatory authority, the Alkali Inspectorate, was established, 
at the time the first of its kind in the world. Much of the early history of 
environmental policy and law in the UK can be characterized by a somewhat limited 
focus on the local pollution problems and a reliance on common law, or the law of 
torts. However, it was not long before more comprehensive legislation would address 
the gross and widespread pollution problems caused by the industrial revolution. Such 
legislation was also directed towards addressing more specific problems such as 
atmospheric pollution from the chemical industry and water pollution controls. For 
the 19
th
 century, such developments were seen as quite innovative and placed the UK 
as one of the leaders in addressing environmental and climate related issues (Wolf and 
Stanley, 2010). 
     While it has been said that the late 1960s and early 1970s were the beginning of a 
modern form of environmental policy and law-making in the UK (Weale et al., 2000), 
there is a long history of environmental measures pre-dating this period, which have 
to an extent characterized and shaped them. For example, the Great London Smog of 
1952, a December-event in which the city of London was engulfed by smog for 
several days
182
 was significant in that it led to the passing of several legislative acts, 
such as the City of London (Various Powers) Act 1954 and the Clean Air Acts of 
1956 and 1968, marking significant development not only for the regulation of air 
pollution, but for environmental protection policy and legislation in general
183
. 
     Up until the mid-1980s, dealing with environmental issues in the UK can be 
primarily understood as based on informal, reactive and voluntary types of regulation, 
underlined by negotiations between industry and government. Research has shown, as 
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 This occurred as a result of windless conditions, cold weather and an anticyclone, which collected 
airborne pollutants to form a smog cover over the city, lasting from December 5-9, 1952. 
183
 Other events, such as the sinking of the Torrey Canyon oil tanker in 1966, or bad publicity received 
by the industry from the press in regards to poor waste management, led to a number of other 
legislations in the early 1970s, as well as significant organizational restructuring, with the creation of 




will be presented in-depth in the sections to follow, and later on in Chapter 6, that this 
relationship is still highly evident today.  
     In any case, the environmental governance at that time has been characterized by 
authors in a number of ways, including devolved fragmentation, disjointed 
incrementalism, (over)reliance on scientific and technical expertise, informal 
regulation, and close consultation with affected interests (Richardson and Watts, 
1985; Lowe and Flynn, 1989). With the signing of the Single European Act (SEA) in 
1986 then, a more integrated approach to environmental protection, not only at the EU 
level, but at the national level as well, was adopted. In other words, environmental 
concerns began to be incorporated into other policy sectors. In addition, the EU’s 
influence over national environmental legislation also began to expand. 
     On a global stage, the then UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, at the UN 
General Assembly in 1989 and the 2
nd
 World Climate Conference in 1990, became 
one of the first world leaders to explicitly warn of the dangers of climate change and 
global warming, and the need for working together to deal with these issues. This was 
significant in that it further entrenched the already strong position of the UK as one of 
the leaders in the area
184
 of addressing and dealing with the issue of climate change. 
While these were significant moves in a normative sense, the introduction of the 
principle of integration pollution control (IPC), codified in the UK Environmental 
Protection Act of 1990
185
, serves as an example of a way with which the UK sought to 
influence pollution control beyond its borders, within the EU (Weale et al., 2000).  
     In any case, over the past quarter of a century or so, the development of UK 
environmental legislation has served as a good example of the evolutionary nature of 
regulation. Today, the approaches to environmental policy and regulations in the UK 
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 It was Mrs. Thatcher who also signed the UK up to the Montreal Protocol, a treaty on banning the 
use of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), in 1985, and established the Met Office Hadley Centre for Climate 
Change, one of UK’s foremost climate change research centres, in 1990. While Mrs. Thatcher was in 
some aspects a controversial figure politically, when it came to climate change, she was largely seen as 
a political pioneer, with her stance based on the principle of precaution and encompassing conservative 
arguments – i.e. taking action now as being more cost-effective than wait and pay later on. 
185
 The principle is meant to bring about a way of proper management of substances in all media, 
applying to the most seriously damaging industrial processes, including the cement, chemicals, 
refineries, and iron and steel industries. Pollution from large industrial installations is further regulated 
under the Pollution Prevention and Control Regime, which implements the EU Directive on Integrated 
Pollution Prevention and Control (IPPC) (2008/1/EC), and applies to approximately 4000 industrial 
installations in the UK, including refineries, cement works, chemicals, and iron and steel. It requires 
each installation to have a permit containing emission limit values and other conditions based on the 
application of Best Available Techniques (BAT) and set to minimise emissions of pollutants likely to 
be emitted in significant quantities to air, water or land. Permit conditions also have to address energy 




owe a great deal not only to the historical legacy derived from the 19
th
 century 





5.1.2 Guiding principles 
In terms of enabling legislation in the UK, wide power is vested in statutory bodies, 
which enjoy a broad discretion affecting their exercise. These bodies, such as the 
Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC), are also supported by substantial 
legal powers that affect the regulatory control and enforcement through devolved 
regulatory agencies, such as the Environment Agency (EA). Overall, in terms of 
environmental regulation in the UK, there is a characteristic reliance on the licensing 
regimes, conditional consenting and setting requirements for information and data 
submission, inspection, and monitoring. In addition, as Smith (1996) describes, 
environmental regulation in the UK can be characterized as placing to an extent more 
emphasis on the science and policy, rather than the law. In the context of carbon 
capture and storage (CCS) regulation, the UK has adopted a risk- and evidence-based 
approach, supplemented by a reliance on a number of guiding principles, such as the 
principle of precaution in particular. 
     The guiding principles of the UK’s environmental policy, legislation and 
regulation, as mentioned, owe a great deal to the historical legacy since the 19th 
century. At first, this was based on the ‘best practicable means’ (BPM) applied to 
dealing with air pollution, taking into account local conditions, current state of 
technical knowledge, and financial implications. The traditional BPM approach 
developed into an approach based on best available technology not entailing excessive 
costs (BATNEEC) and best practicable environmental option (BPEO) principles. 
While the former identified ‘best’ in terms of new technological developments 
coming into light, the latter took into account the effects on the environment as a 
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 Up to 80% of the national environmental legislation essentially originates at the EU level (Scheuer, 
2005: 3). As mentioned in earlier sections, this comes due to the fact that the UK Government is 
obliged to implement EU directives and regulations through its primary (i.e. Acts of Parliament) and 
secondary legislation. Generally, EU environmental legislation, however, comes into national law via 
the latter. Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, environmental legislation in the UK is also influenced by 
the judgments and principles of the ECJ and various international treaties and agreements, which the 
EU is a party of. As far as the latter is concerned, the UK can also sign treaties and agreements with 
other states on a bilateral or multi-lateral basis (Wolf and Stanley, 2010: 14), which goes to show that 





whole (Weale et al. 2000: 180). More recently, over the past decade or so, there has 
been an increased focus on an approach that would apply policy more efficiently and 
effectively. Today, this approach is best known under the term New Environmental 
Policy Instruments (NEPIs)
187
, which intends to provide a more flexible approach, 
stimulate both technical and organizational
188
 innovation, and reduce the costs of 
monitoring and enforcement. In an effort for environmental policy to be most 
effective, a combination of both the traditional command-and-control and the NEPIs 
has been increasingly used in the UK over the past decade. 
 
The precautionary principle 
As examined in the previous chapter, in the context of CO2 storage, the principle of 
precaution
189
 is of most relevance, and has been the main guiding principle at both the 
EU level and in the UK. Essentially, the key purpose of the precautionary principle is 
to guide policy and decision-making in light of/despite the existence of scientific 
uncertainty concerning the nature and the extent of the risks involved. The principle 
should, in theory at least, also bring together all the relevant social, political, 
industrial and economic factors and stakeholders, and thus offer the best, or the most 
appropriate risk management option. Applying it essentially becomes a matter of 
making assumptions about the consequences and likelihoods of establishing credible 
scenarios and then, most importantly, using standard procedures of risk assessment 
and risk management to guide administrators and regulators to make decisions or 
develop policy in situations where scientific uncertainty is present and the likely 
impact of a hazardous activity is uncertain. However, there is in fact “no definitive 
statement of ‘the’ precautionary principle, nor any agreement on when it applies or 
what it requires. [It] is an overarching principle that will always require contextual 
elaboration” (Fitzmaurice, 2009: 64; Harremoes and Gee, 2005). 
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 Examples of NEPIs include: i) market based instruments – (i.e. the Landfill Tax, the Climate 
Change Levy); ii) UK emission trading scheme; iii) voluntary agreements; iv) information and 
awareness schemes 
188
 Technical innovation develops new technologies, whereas institutional innovation refers to the 
changes in organizational behaviour. 
189
 The precautionary principle states that “where there are significant risks of damage to the 
environment, the Government will be prepared to take precautionary action to limit the use of 
potentially dangerous materials or the spread of potentially dangerous pollutants, even where 
scientific knowledge is not conclusive, if the balance of likely costs and benefits justifies it” (HM. Govt, 






     Given that environmental and safety risks related to carbon capture and storage 
concern primarily the releases of CO2 during transport and geological storage part of 
the process, application of the precautionary principle essentially entails a risk 
assessment and management framework in which the scientific uncertainties 
associated with long-term storage and possible negative impacts are addressed. In 
other words, the precautionary principle is the characteristic and guiding element of 
the legal and regulatory frameworks, and for the overall governance of CO2 storage.  
     In practice, the application of the precautionary principle can be seen within the 
contents of the regulatory frameworks for CO2 storage – the EU CCS Directive and 
the UK’s Storage of Carbon Dioxide Regulations, which transpose the CCS Directive. 
As mentioned in chapters above, and emphasised in a number of interviews with key 
stakeholders (see Chapter 6), it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to prove that 
no leakage of CO2 from a storage reservoir is occurring. Apart from uncertainties in 
regards to CO2 leakage, there is also lack of certainty as to exact position of the CO2 
once underground, in particular when storage occurs in saline aquifers, which are 
much more difficult to characterise than depleted oil and gas reservoirs, for example. 
As such, the sense of the precautionary principles in these frameworks will be evident 
within the number of requirements for careful examinations, additional information 
and consistent monitoring. 
     For example, Article 4 of CCS Directive states that storage of CO2 is only allowed 
to occur in suitable storage sites that have been carefully assessed and characterized. 
The process of careful selection and characterisation
190
 is a critical component, as it is 
here where future risks are essentially reduced the most. Furthermore, throughout the 
operational phase of CO2 injection as well, it is critical to act with precaution, in large 
part due to uncertainties as to the exact movement of CO2 underground, in particular 
when injected into saline aquifers, as well as uncertainties related to other 
geotechnical, chemical and/or physical changes that might jeopardize the integrity of 
the storage site. Provisions within the regulatory framework, such as in particular 
Articles 13-15 of the CCS Directive on monitoring,
191
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 Provisions specify various parameters that have to be included in site characterization.  
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 For example, monitoring of any irregularities, migration of CO2 underground, leakage or significant 
adverse effects for the surrounding environment (Art. 13(1) CCS Directive). 
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 These provisions are transposed in the UK by the Storage of Carbon Dioxide (Licensing etc.) 





5.2 Why CCS in the UK? 
CCS technology has the potential to significantly curb CO2 emissions from large 
stationary sources, and thereby can help countries like the UK to achieve its climate 
change targets, whilst maintaining a competitive economy. As described by the 
Climate Change and Energy Committee (13 May 2014, HC 742, p. 13) in its report on 
Deploying CCS in the UK, successful CCS deployment could cut UK’s annual costs 
of meeting carbon targets by up to 1% of GDP, or by £30-40 billion per year by 
2050,
193
 as well as result in £2-4 billion per year by 2030 in gross value added (GVA) 
benefits per year by 2030.
194
 
     In the UK, the debates surrounding CCS have now slowly started to move away 
from the ‘how-it-works’ and the extent of its potential, and more towards the policy 
requirements, and the legal position and obligations where CCS actually needs to be 
developed, making this study a timely piece of research. In other words, the context 
for CCS does remain protection of the environment and ensuring a secure energy 
future. Nevertheless, the UK Government has also at the same time acknowledged 
that fossil fuels - coal and gas - will continue to play a vital role in providing reliable 
electricity supplies and a secure and diverse energy mix in the transition to a low 
carbon economy. In 2010, for example, fossil fuels still accounted for 72% of UK’s 
electricity generation (DECC, 2012: 15). As such, the reality is that in order to meet 
the emission reduction obligations, while maintaining the fossil fuels within the 
generation mix, the UK’s legal position is one in which it could be argued that the 
development and deployment of CCS is necessary. This contention will be explored 
in more detail in the next section. 
 
5.2.1 The legal position of CCS 
The 2006 Climate Change Programme, and the 2007 Energy White Paper
195
, set out 
the UK’s policies to move towards a long-term target of 60% cut in CO2 emissions by 
2050, from the 1990 base (Scrase and Watson; in Meadowcroft and Langhelle, 2006: 
162). The UK Government’s commitment to reducing CO2 emissions has gone further 
in the Climate Change Act 2008, by which ‘it is the duty of the Secretary of State to 
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 By avoiding spending on other more expensive alternatives for cutting emissions. 
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 HC (2014). Deploying CCS in the UK. Available at: 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmenergy/742/742.pdf 
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ensure that the net UK carbon account for the year 2050 is at least 80% lower than the 
1990 baseline’ with an intermediate target of 26%-32% by 2020 (compared to 1990 
levels) (DECC, 2012: 13). This essentially created a legally binding framework and 
set UK’s long-term CO2 emissions reduction targets into law. In addition, given the 
EU Commission’s recent ambitions to raise the EU’s long-term target of GHG 
emissions reduction to 40% by 2030 (compared to 1990 levels), only adds to the 
external pressure for the UK to implement emissions reductions measures in order to 
achieve these low carbon aspirations. The 2012 CCS Roadmap
196
, issued by DECC, 
pointed out that by 2050, emissions from the power sector will have to be close to 
zero if the UK is to meet its legally binding targets, mentioned above. This means that 
in the 2020s, deep cuts in emissions from the power sector will have to be achieved, if 
the targets are to be reached at the lowest-cost scenario. The potential role for CCS in 
regards to meeting climate change and emissions reductions targets is fairly evident, 
given that fossil fuels will remain a part of the future energy mix.  
     In this respect, as part of the UK’s decarbonisation efforts, the 2009 CCS strategy 
policy stated that there would be ‘no new coal without CCS’ and any proposed new 




     More recently, the Energy Act 2013 focused on establishing binding 
decarbonisation targets for the UK and establishing an electricity market reform and 
has been seen by CCS proponents as a significant piece of legislation for the future of 
CCS in the UK. Aims of the Energy Act 2013 include the phasing out and closing of 
coal-fired power stations over the next two decades, reduce dependence on fossil 
fuels, produce 30% of electricity from renewable sources by 2020, as well as cut 
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 The CCR requirement was again reiterated in the July 2011 Overarching National Policy Statement 
(NPS) for Energy (EN-1), and in a more specific NPS for Fossil Fuel Electricity Generating 
Infrastructure (EN-2) which stated the all new coal-fired stations would need to be built with “a full 
CCS chain fitted on at least 300MW net of their proposed generating capacity” (Richards, 2013: 3). 
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Much of the debate revolving around energy security
199
, as Scrase and Watson (in 
Meadowcroft and Langhelle, 2006) point out, revolves around the perceived ‘energy 
gap’, which is expected to arise in light of the planned closure of a number of power 
stations across the UK by 2020, and if new power generation capacity is not 
developed in the near future. This capacity, however, cannot be fulfilled by any single 
energy source, essentially requiring the UK to use a portfolio of energy sources to 
generate the electricity, balance the needs of low-carbon emissions, ensure the 
security of supply and its affordability (Grubb et al., 2006). In addition, as Haszeldine 
(2007) points out, the sense of an energy and electricity ‘crisis’ is exacerbated by the 
imposed phase-out of coal generation as a result of the EU SO2 directive. For the UK, 
this means that it will have to retire 40% of its coal-fuelled electricity capacity by 
2015. Furthermore, the potential future role of CCS in the UK has increased also 
given the fact that without a clear mandated re-build programme for the 
decommissioning of a nuclear generation capacity, and the rising natural gas prices, 
as well as fear of increased reliance on foreign supplies
200
. In other words, 
development and deployment of CCS is warranted not only ‘on the basis of the 
science and technology and evidence base’, as former Minister of Energy Malcolm 
Wicks pointed out in 2008 during the Environmental Audit Select Committee hearing 
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 Interestingly, the definition of energy security slightly differs between countries, for the most part 
depending on the context in which it is debated in. For example, the usual definition of energy security, 
refers to simply the ‘availability of sufficient supplies at affordable prices. As Yergin (2006) points out, 
energy exporting countries use the term ‘energy security’ to refer to focusing on the maintaining 
‘security of demand’ for their exports, which generate a large share of their government revenues. As 
an example, Russia’s aim in maintaining energy security, is to reassert the state control over strategic 
sources and gain the primacy over the main pipelines and market channels. On the other hand, for 
many developing countries, ‘energy security’ means how changes in the energy prices affect their 
balance of payments. In other words, energy security lies in their ability to adjust to their new 
dependence on global markets, in a way representing a major shift away from their former 
commitments to self-sufficiency. In Europe, however, the major debate centres around how best to 
manage the dependence on imported natural gas (excluding France and Finland), and whether to build 
nuclear power plants and possible return to clean coal (Yergin, 2006: 71). It is Europe’s definition of 
‘energy security’ that this thesis takes up.   
200
 The UK has been a net importer of natural gas and oil since 2004 and 2005 respectively, having 
previously been a net oil exporter since 1980 and net gas exporter since 1997 (Scrase and Watson; in 
Meadowcroft and Langhelle, 2006: 159). Similarly, the UK’s coal imports have been growing steadily 
since 1970, with, in 2012, 40% (18 million tonnes) of imports coming from Russia, and another 56% 
(25 million tonnes) from Columbia, the USA and Australia combined (DECC, 2013: 45). Along with 
Germany, the UK has consistently remained as one of the top coal importing countries in the EU, in 
2012, accounting for 22 and 14% of the total EU imports respectively. Nevertheless, it should be noted 
that in general, the UK’s coal consumption has been in decline over the last 30 years or so, primarily as 





on carbon capture and storage (HC 654),
201
 but also given the geopolitics of energy 
(in) security in the future, and UK’s legal position in relation to its climate change 
goals and obligations (p. 19). 
 
5.3 CCS Governance Network in the UK 
The context for CCS in the UK is situated in the long-standing nature and importance 
of environmental protection, including its main guiding principles, as well as UK’s 
legal position for emissions reductions, and maintaining energy security. In essence, 
these are the main drivers of the CCS governance network in the UK.  
     Given the nature of the problem at hand (i.e. risks of CO2 storage), this research 
argues that governance networks
202
 offer an effective mechanism and manner, in 
which ‘risk’ is dealt with and managed; through joint action and collaboration.  
 
5.3.1 UK’s CCS governance network 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the nature of a governance network can be examined by 
referring to its relative stability and the interdependency of the actors within the 
network. A governance network, as mentioned, consists of a network of public, semi-
public and private actors, who are to varying degrees interdependent on one another, 
either for material or immaterial resources. For this reason, and the fact that all actors 
are not equal in terms of expertise, authority, and available resources,
203
 the relations 
between the actors are horizontally, rather than vertically, structured. Such a structure 
essentially implies a level of autonomy within the network. In addition, given that 
participation is voluntary, in that actors are not ‘required’ to participate and can 
‘leave’ at any given time, no single actor can exercise complete control over the 
others. When talking about actors within a given governance network, this refers to 
governmental bodies, various research and academic institutions, as well as the 
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 Yeo (2009). 
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 See chapter 2 for more on governance networks. In brief, a governance network refers to: i) 
relatively stable horizontal articulation of interdependent yet autonomous actors; ii) interactions 
between actors occur through negotiations; iii) negotiations occur within a regulative, cognitive and 
imaginary framework; and iv) the framework contributes to the production of public purpose. Based on 
these features and characteristics, the essence, or character, of a governance network can be assessed. 
See for example Rhodes (1996), Jessop (2002), Klijn and Koppenjan (2000), Torfing (2005), who use 
these features to ascribe governance networks.  
203
 The skills are said to be to an extent innate, but are also a product of the actors’ learning from 
experience (Marsh and Smith, 2000). For the oil and gas industry, for example, this refers to their 
experiences with drilling and extraction, while for the policy makers it refers to the historical 
developments of environmental and energy policy on a broader level, and their employment history at 




industry. Industry actors in this context encompass a wide range of CCS-related 
sectors, mainly the oil and gas (i.e. BP, Shell), manufacturing and contracting (i.e. 
Alstom, BOC), power generation (i.e. Drax Power, E.ON, Progressive Energy), 
transportation and storage (i.e. National Grid, CO2DeepStore Ltd.). In addition, actors 
such as various independent organisations or ‘watch dogs’, including environmental 
NGOs and regulatory agencies, could be considered members of the network, 
however, these in a way rather sit on its perimeter
204
. 
     Within the UK, the lead responsibility for carbon capture and storage (CCS), was 
in 2008 taken up by the Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC).
205
 
Amongst its responsibilities, DECC serves as the primary authority for petroleum 
licensing, the licensing for gas storage and unloading, and carbon storage licensing. In 
terms of the latter, the Secretary of State for the DECC remains the primary 
(competent) authority (CA) for offshore CO2 storage in the UK, except within the 
territorial sea adjacent to Scotland (0-12nm), for which the Scottish Ministers retain 
the legislative, licensing and enforcement authority (i.e. the CA). Both the Secretary 
of State of the DECC and the Scottish Minister are given wide discretion to make 
regulations and determine the terms and conditions for the license for storage 
activities (Oladotun, 2010)
206
. In addition to the regulatory permission required from 
the government, any CO2 storage project developer must first also obtain a storage 
lease, which provides the rights to install, commission, operate and maintain the 
storage infrastructure, from the Crown Estate
207
. 
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 These actors, such as various environmental NGOs, in a way act by putting pressure on the 
government to demonstrate results, and ask for accountability and legitimacy in Governments’ actions. 
Given that in some aspects these ENGOs can have a strong influence on the level of public perception, 
the Government is in a way required  to keep them at least at an arms-length, or the perimeter of the 
network. In other words, it tries to keep them relatively informed by providing information on what is 
going on, etc., but at the same time then in turn also seeks some level of approval from them, and in 
turn from the public as well.   
205
 Previously, the main department in the UK responsible for CCS policy was BERR, with the help 
also from Defra – the industry and environmental ministries respectively. The Department for 
Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform was created in June 2007, and disbanded two years later 
in June, 2009, upon the creation of the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills. 
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 As Oladotun (2010) also notes, this wide discretion applies especially to the “persons or class of 
persons who can apply for a license, the manner in which an application must be made, the information 
which an application must contain, accompanying documents and application fee and the requirement 
of an applicant to provide financial security in respect of any future obligation arising from or 
connected with the licensed activities” (p. 9).  
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 The Crown Estate essentially manages a portfolio of asses, including the entire seabed around the 
UK, as well as other urban and rural areas, with profits going to HM Treasury. In relation to CCS, the 
Crown Estate manages the UK seabed up to 12 nautical miles and holds the rights for CO2 storage 
within the Gas Importation and Storage Zone (GISZ), which extends out to the continental shelf 




     Within DECC, the crucial role for development of CCS in the UK is played by the 
Office of Carbon Capture and Storage (OCCS), whose main objective has been to 
create the policy, legal and regulatory frameworks and support the various 
arrangements in order to stimulate the private sector, as well as to work with the 
variety of stakeholders, including other foreign governments, the industry, and the 
general public.  
     Governmental bodies are essentially in charge of writing the policy, the legislation 
and the regulations, and in fact do have their own internal experts, depending on the 
specific area in question. However, as one interviewee within the CCS industry sector 
pointed out when interviewed for this project: 
 
“what is often written down is written down by people who are not 
practitioners…[and] in my experience, ministers, civil servants, and regulators, 
are very risk averse, which is understandable. But what this has often led to in 
the past, in particular in relation to environmental issues and introduction of 
new technologies, is that they have tried to take account of absolutely 
everything written down. So the more that is written down, the more 
constrained [project developers] are…and the harder it is for them to try things 
out, as [they] have to overcome something that someone has written down”208. 
 
Essentially, depending on the issue at hand, the more constrained project developers 
are, or better said, the more they perceive to be constrained with what is written down 
in the legislation and regulations, it can also in a way serve to impede scientific 
development; and deployment of a particular technology for example.  
     Since the UK government is interested in facilitating scientific development and 
introduction of new technologies, it will aim to work closely with other stakeholders, 
from an early stage. Perhaps better said, given its legal position, when it comes to 
GHG emissions reductions for example, scientific and technological development and 
deployment, close collaboration and coordination between the government and other 
stakeholders is required. In other words, the government will seek and increasingly 
rely on outside expertise, in an attempt to facilitate the deployment of a technology, 
                                                                                                                                                        
Lease (AfL), a lease and a pipeline lease (if necessary). The AfL grants to the holder a time limited 
exclusive option to proceed through to a pre-agreed lease once a number of conditions have been met, 
including obtaining a storage permit from DECC (Crown Estate, 2012). 
208




such as CCS for example. At least that is its goal, and in essence represents the notion 
of governance in a nutshell.  
     So, for DECC, and the OCCS, the goal is to act in a facilitative way, creating a 
market and offer financial support in which CCS will then be able to grow. As such, 
they have worked closely with other stakeholders, by way of formal consultations on 
new policy proposals, participating in meetings and events, and via the CCS 
Development Forum.
209
Within these consultations, the government officially 
recognizes the importance of working closely with the CCS industry in order to 
achieve their mutual objective of a strong and successful CCS industry in the UK 
(DECC, 2013). The government’s dependency on the outside expertise, however, is 
not related to exchange of any material resources per se. Rather, it seeks to obtain the 
immaterial resources, or the information, the findings, the perceptions and views, on 
various aspects of CCS, which it then incorporates in the formulation of policies and 
regulations.  
     As an example, the British Geological Survey (BGS), a public sector research 
institute, is relied upon by the UK government on all aspects of geoscience
210
, in 
particular the mapping of the geology and conducting dynamic modelling of CO2 
injection. While the BGS has advised DECC at various times, given that they are a 
national survey, it does not have a permanent, kind of government approved role in 
CCS. As Dr. Andy Chadwick, team leader for CO2 capture and storage at BGS, 
pointed out in an interview
211
, “most of the consultations that BGS has done with the 
UK government has in fact been rather informal, apart from when it served on the 
DECC’s Advisory Panel during the first CCS Competition.”212 Generally speaking, 
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 Within the CCS Development Forum for example, approximately 40 members largely drawn from 
the industry directly involved in delivering CCS in the UK, but also other international, academic and 
NGO community representatives. While this forum initially ran from 2010-2012, the new format for 
2014 onwards, is designed with a particular focus on the industry and prospective projects so that it can 
provide an environment for common issues to be identified and resolved – with the aim of accelerating 
commercial deployment (DECC, 2014). 
210
 The BGS has been involved in coordination of the first EU (Geo2) project, which was the first sort 
of CO2 storage project back in 1993, thus, establishing its mark as a research institute interested in 
CCS. Since then BGS has had a contributive role in a number of projects across Europe, in particular in 
regards to surveying and monitoring. In addition, BGS undertakes its own research, surveying and 
monitoring, and institutional strengthening programmes in the developing world (BGS, 2014).  
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 The personal interview was conducted at the BGS offices in Nottingham, UK, in October, 2013. 
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 Even then, this came about only as a result of BGS approaching DECC and saying ‘we think you 
need some geologists on this’. When asked why that was the case, the interviewee noted that it was 
because “perhaps DECC was not very organised, having a lot of legal, financial and engineering 
people, with jobs for very short periods of time. And we went up to them and said, well you also need 




informal consultations with preselected stakeholders can often occur aside from the 
more formal official consultations, are based on relationships that can date back many 
years, and can come so late in the policy development process that it can be perceived 
simply as an attempt to legitimise or communicate decisions (Russel and Turnpenny, 
2009).  
     In a number of interviews conducted as part of this research, the point of 
consultations being simply a legitimisation tool was in fact brought up. In one case, 
an interviewee also pointed out that it was his institution that approached the UK 
Government, and not the other way around. The reference to the notion of legitimacy 
is used here in order to raise a question about the overall integration of various 
stakeholders into the policy-making process, and whether, or what deficiencies there 
exist in this consultation process. In other words, it questions the governance network 
theory in a sense that it questions the true nature of the cooperative and coordinating 
approaches to solving a common problem, which essentially sits at the core of the 
theory itself. So, is the CCS governance network then truly a governance network, if 
the government for example fails to include all relevant actors in the policy 
development process? Based on the literary research and interviews conducted as part 
of this research, I would come to conclude that it is not so much a question of whether 
the so-called CCS governance network is a governance network per se, but rather 
whether or not it is effective.  
     In any case, government bodies for the most continue to rely on actors such as the 
BGS, or private companies such as Shell or British Petroleum (BP), which have 
extensive experience in oil and gas exploration and injection, for their knowledge of 
the subsurface and the expertise relevant to the permanent storage of CO2. Whereas 
companies with large capital, might not require government funding, but instead 
interact with the government with an objective to reduce their investment risks, the 
UK Carbon Capture Research Centre (UKCCSRC) on the other hand, for example, 
does rely on government funding
213
 and in turn then provides for a platform for 
carrying out research and share delivery, thereby maximizing the overall impact for 
learning and common understanding on issues related to CCS in the UK.
214
  
                                                                                                                                                        
representative from the British Geological Survey, in 2013. Pursuant to confidentiality agreement, the 
name of the interviewee remains hidden.  
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 For example, in the recent Chancellor’s Budget for 2014, an additional £60M is to supplement the 
existing £125M R&D CCS programme.  
214




     When it involves emerging technologies such as CCS which are for the most part 
unfamiliar to the general public, a key ambition of the government has been to govern 
at a distance, involving a plethora of intermediary actors, as well as other citizen 
groups and environmental NGOs for example, in order to obtain a certain level of 
approval or credibility – critical when billions of pounds of public money are spent on 




5.3.2 (In)effective governance networks 
As is evident from the experience over the past seven years or so, since the first UK 
CCS tender competition, poor or ineffective negotiations between project developers 
and the UK government, can lead to projects being first delayed, and ultimately even 
canceled. 
     In 2007, for example, BP abandoned their efforts to build the world’s first CCS 
powerplant in Peterhead, Scotland, primarily because of the failure of negotiations 
with the government. The project would transform the natural gas from the off-shore 
Miller oilfield into CO2 and hydrogen, the latter which would be burned as fuel, and 
the former captured and piped back to the oilfield for storage. In hopes of receiving 
government funding, BP postponed the closure of the oilfield twice, despite the fact 
that there was a limited window of opportunity to keep the oilfield alive, before it 
became too technical and economically challenging.  
     For that year the UK government also announced the first UK CCS competition, 
with a goal of getting the first UK full-scale demonstration project off the ground and 
create an environment which would allow for further seedy deployment of CCS in the 
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 The UK Research Councils, a group of non-departmental government bodies, responsible for 
funding and coordinating research, play an integral part in the CCS governance network. One of these 
councils, the EPSRC, provides government funding for research and postgraduate degrees in 
engineering and physical sciences, which in turn then provide their ideas and findings and thus help 
shape the government’s capacity to meet a number of challenges – including dealing with various 
aspects of uncertainty and risk of CO2 storage. Supported by the EPSRC, with additional funding from 
DECC, and other private actors, the UK Carbon Capture and Storage Research Centre (UKCCSRC), 
made up of over 200 academics working in 36 universities, the industry, regulators and other 
stakeholders, provides a national focal point for CCS research and development with the goal of 
maximizing the impact of CCS to the low-carbon energy system for the UK (UKCCSRC, 2014). 
Lastly, the Carbon Capture and Storage Association, a non-technical trade association, which focuses 
on the facilitating the business side of CCS and the commercialisation of the technology, has thus far 
worked extensively with the UK Government, as well as with the EU Commission, in particular in the 
development of an appropriate regulatory framework for CCS. The CCSA, serves as a model for 
sectoral cooperation in business development, by representing over 70 different organisation across a 
number of sectors, including engineering, electrical utilities, law and insurance, and aims to bring 
together other specialist companies in the manufacturing and processing, power generation, 




UK. At that point, having had a good contractual agreement with Scottish and 
Southern Energy (SSE), a partner in the project, and having taken the project right up 
to the finishing front of the engineering and design, BP had to shelve the project, 
essentially because it could not afford to wait any longer for the government to 
guarantee a part of the funds needed for the project.
216
 However, the first CCS 
competition had criteria in place which limited it to only coal-fired post-combustion, 
consequently leaving out the BP’s Miller oilfield project, given that it was on pre-
combustion and based on gas. For a company like BP this was not a good signal. 
     The abandonment of the BP’s Miller field project for example, can today be seen 
as somewhat ironic, given that in the current CCS Commercialisation Competition,
217
 
one of the two preferred bidders announced by the government, the Peterhead CCS 
Project, is based on a gas power station, which would transport and store the captured 
CO2 to a depleted gas field in the North Sea
218
. Failure to reach an agreement with 
project operators also lead to the cancelation of the plans for the first UK CCS project 
at the Longannet coal-fired power station in 2011, four years after launching its 
funding competition, with the main reason being overall costs of the project 
exceeding the original estimates.  
     However, with the recent signing of the contracts for the Front End Engineering 
and Design (FEED) studies
219
 for the Peterhead CCS Project, in March 2014, and the 
White Rose Project, in December 2013, between the project developers and the UK 
government, there has been a renewal in the momentum for CCS, and the transition to 
a low-carbon future in the UK. For this momentum to be sustained, UK government 
will have to continue working closely with the project developers, not just in the 
above-mentioned projects, but also with others, in particular with the Teeside Low 
Carbon (TLC) consortium in order to develop the industrial CCS cluster in Teeside 
and the wider North East of England. As has been pointed out numerous times in the 
interviews, with both representatives from industry, academia and government, as 
                                                     
216
 Chipman (2007).  
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 This competition makes available £1 billion in capital funding, together with additional operational 
funding through the UK Electricity Market Reforms, to support the design, construction and operation 
of the UK’s first commercial-scale CCS projects. 
218
 The other project, White Rose in North Yorkshire, involves capturing of CO2 from a new super-
efficient coal-fired power station at the Drax site, before transporting it in a saline rock formation in the 
North Sea. 
219
 The FEED study is a two year programme of detailed engineering, planning and financial work to 
finalise and de-risk all aspects of the proposal ahead of taking the final investment decision, and 




well as during various CCS-conferences, one of the key areas of focus, as it pertains 
to negotiations between the government and project developers, is during the 
permitting process, and trying to get the projects permitted as quickly as possible. As 
such, careful cooperation and coordination between the stakeholders, in particular 
between the industry and the government, is key for getting the projects permitted and 
CCS technology deployed. 
     Essentially, governance networks are effective when the full potential of the 
interdependency is used. In other words, when the government listens to the concerns 
of the industry, environmental groups and other stakeholders, whilst in turn 
supporting them, most often financially. As soon as relationships between actors 
become unproductive, such as was the case of the BP’s Miller Oil Field example 
mentioned above, then governance networks become ineffective. When governance 
networks become ineffective, the development of CCS technology can be 
jeopardized. This has already been seen in light of the sigificant delays in the 
development of a commercial scale CCS projects.
220
 Environental risks, for example, 
could be jeopardized if Such a claim, however, ventures into the extremes 
 
5.3.3 A facilitating or impeding environment for CCS? 
From practical experience thus far, governance of CCS, from the government’s 
perspective can be seen as an on-going effort to improve the effectiveness of co-
ordination and cooperation. By doing so, consensus building on the various aspects of 
CCS, such as uncertainties and risks related to CO2 storage, is sought. In addition,  it 
seeks to provide instruments for the aggregation of information and knowledge, 
which when pooled together helps in the qualifying of political decisions (Torfing, 
2005) and for making informed, inclusive and evidence-based choices.  
     One could also make an argument for it being an example of proactive governance, 
in that the variety of actors seek to identify potential policy problems and 
opportunities at an early stage, and in this way also try to reduce the risk of 
implementation resistance later on. Governance in this respect can to an extent then 
also be characterised by separate, but loosely coupled links between government and 
individual actors or companies, and broader forums such as the UKCCSRC for 
example. These arenas are in a way linked primarily by communication, and perhaps 
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 Examples of when CCS governance network proved to be ineffective include the abandonment of 




less so by resource dependencies, and/or control, and are also rather cognitive rather 
than strictly political (Balme and Jouve, 1996; in Benz and Eberlein, 1999). 
According to the governance network theory, the structure and the interactions can be 
characterized as being embedded in a wider framework which is based on trust 
building, learning and common understanding (Torfing, 2005: 307). While such a 
framework is characteristic of the CCS governance network in the UK, it does not 




     Essentially, this means that given that these interactions between actors occur in a 
relatively institutionalized framework, or in an amalgam of contingent ideas, 
conceptions and rules as Torfing (2005) would describe it, the framework itself is 
shaped and reshaped in the course of action.
222
 However, more importantly, in doing 
so, it also conditions future interaction among the network actors. In other words, if 
actors, in particular the industry or the project developers, perceive the framework to 
be conducive, it will facilitate the development and deployment of technologies, such 
as CCS. This perception, however, develops over time, and is conditioned by the 
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 It is the physical, chemical and geological characteristics of a potential storage site that essentially 
determine its efficacy in trapping and retaining the injected CO2 for long periods of time. This thesis 
sets out to examine whether or not the CCS governance network facilitates the development of CCS in 
the UK. So, what can the nature of the network and the policy-making process tell us about its ability 
to do so? Going briefly back to what was said in chapter two on methodology and theory, the driving 
force of explanation, or the independent variables (explananda) are not the network characteristics per 
se, but rather the characteristics of components in networks, as Dowding (1995) would agree. In other 
words, it is argued that the available resources, or their control, and/or specialist knowledge of certain 
actors, gives them a kind of ‘power’ over policy decisions, as well as lead to their inclusion in a 
‘networkesque’ description of the policy-making process. In this case then, it is the components of the 
network - the actors and their interactions – as well as external forces and events (i.e. socio-economic 
conditions) – that explain both the nature of the network and the nature of the policy-making process 
(explanans). Based on the nature of the network and the policy-making process, assumptions can then 
be made about whether the network and the process produces a facilitating, or impeding environment 
for CCS. 
222
 Negotiations, or the deliberations and bargaining, between the government and project developers in 
particular, as Torfing (2005) would argue, do not occur in an institutional vacuum. Rather, they occur 
in a wider framework, which is a product of contingent ideas, conceptions and rules (p. 308-310). This 
framework, in the context of CCS, has a regulative aspect, in that it provides the rules, specifies the 
roles and procedures, for example, to obtain a CO2 storage lease or a permit, to undertake 
environmental impact assessments (EIA), conduct measurement and monitoring activities of the 
subsurface, etc. In addition, such a framework also has a cognitive element to it, in that it allows for the 
creation of concepts and specialized knowledge, such as for example in the increased understanding of 
the movement of CO2 in the subsurface, and an imaginary aspect, in that it produces, or reaffirms, the 
ideologies and common hopes. In other words, the imaginary aspect refers to the reaffirmation of the 
belief that the speedy development and deployment of CCS is crucial if UK is to meet its 
decarbonisation targets, and ensure a secure supply of energy in the future. As can be said to be evident 
from the lessons learned from the failures of the first UK CCS competition, and progress made in the 
more recent Commercialisation Programme, this framework is also in a way shaped and reshaped in 




interactions. So, if through experience project developers, for example, come to 
believe that their interactions – deliberations and negotiations - with the government 
are fruitless, this will then condition whether the developers will either continue to 
commit to a particular project, delay it, or abandon it completely. A good example of 
such a case is the abandoment of the BP’s Miller Field CCS project in 2007. 
     It appears as though the UK authorities are making an honest effort in trying to 
find the right solutions, and getting involved in the process of deliberation and 
negotiation (i.e. the FEED contracts with White Rose and Peterhead projects). While 
it is true that this has not always been an easy process, partially since the 2008 
financial crisis, but also because of other points or issues on the Government’s 
political agenda, some interviewees did in fact point out that not enough is being 
done.
223
   
     According to the governance network theory, the efficiency gains of governance 
networks are only fully realised in a well-functioning governance network. Things 
such as frequent change in the composition of network actors, the presence of 
unresolved tensions and/or conflicts, (perception of) weak and ineffective leadership, 
lack of clear and visible results, and external events that disturb the policy process, 
can destabilize the governance network, and venture it ineffective. For the most part, 
as discussed in sections above, the CCS governance network in the UK has thus far 
been functioning well, in that it involved a plethora of actors via a variety of 
mechanisms (i.e. formal and informal consultations) and relatively quickly produced a 
comprehensive legal and regulatory framework for CCS. However, it has also been 
‘destabilized’ to a certain extent, evident by the slow negotiations between project 
developers and the government, as well as lack of a clear and visible long-term policy 
framework that would incentivise investment into CCS, and perhaps most heavily by 
the financial crisis, which severely put the brakes on the technology development. To 
this extent then, efficiency gains of the CCS governance network in the UK have not 
been realized.  
     Nevertheless, as mentioned, the network did succeed in other ways, in particular in 
regards to developing a robust legal and regulatory framework that will, in theory at 
least, ensure a safe geological storage of CO2 and a long-term future for CCS. 
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 The information about the views and perceptions on the functioning of UK authorities, as 
mentioned, was obtained by interviewing various stakeholders, from the academia, industry, and the 




Regulation, as mentioned, is one way in which the government can influence the 
development and deployment of technologies such as CCS. When the regulatory 
framework is introduced in a timely manner, it gives a clear sign to the investors and 
project developers, effectively reducing their investment risk. In this way, regulation 
serves as a way to promote and enable development and deployment of CCS.  
     While some aspects of the regulatory framework will be fairly familiar to the 
project developers, given that they have been to an extent developed based on the 
existing oil and gas regulatory regime, other aspects that are specific to CCS, will 
create uncertainty amongst project developers thus serving as a break on technology 
development and deployment. It is still too soon to make any assumptions or 
assessments about the effectiveness of the legal and regulatory framework in the UK, 
given that, as mentioned, as of February 2015, there are still no operational CCS 
projects. Without having operational projects in place, it is difficult to understand how 
various aspects of CCS projects can be better regulated, in order to make sure these 
projects are safe and all the health and environmental concerns are effectively 
addressed.  
     The purpose of the next section is not to look at the entire legal and regulatory 
framework for CCS, and CO2 storage, in the UK. Rather, it is to identify and examine 
where the main regulatory uncertainties lie for project developers, and thereby, based 
on these uncertainties make an assumptions as to whether they serve as significant 
barriers, and as such whether the legal and regulatory framework impedes or 
promotes the development of CCS. 
 
5.4 Outstanding regulatory issues 
As mentioned, a clear regulatory framework is pertinent to facilitating the deployment 
of CCS technologies, in the UK and elsewhere, primarily because it allows the 
developers and investors to essentially quantify their exposure to investment risk. To 
date, evidence shows that for projects in Europe, the lack of clarity on certain 
regulatory provisions is inhibiting a faster deployment.  
     For high cost CCS projects to be developed, finance must somehow be sourced, 
and currently, funding is difficult to obtain – without direct government assistance. 
This is primarily because risks, their probability and consequences of occurrence, to a 
particular project must be identified and quantified in order to secure the necessary 




insurance costs to cover the various risks must be added to the overall budget, which 
will only become more conservative as the indeterminacy of risks will increase. 
Therefore, only when project developers are able to accurately quantify the risks and 
their exposure to them, will the CCS projects essentially start to emerge.  
     Based on such reasoning, this section thus aims to examine the current regulatory 
framework and identify which regulatory uncertainties, or provisions in particular, are 
still not providing the necessary confidence for the investors, and thus serve as 
potential barriers preventing a successful development and deployment of CCS in the 
UK. Three main challenges were chosen, following an extensive desk-based research 
exercise of documents as well as after consultations with a number of stakeholders 
from the academia, science community, the relevant authorities, and the industry, 
which identified these as key challenges that still need to be addressed. These three 
challenges relate to the transfer of responsibility, financial security and financial 
contribution, to be made during the permitting process and before the transfer of 
responsibility, respectively.  
     Transfer of responsibility, financial security and financial contribution, essentially 
fall right in the centre of the overall structure of the process of regulation in the area 
of CO2 storage, and the concerns of this thesis. The environmental risks and 
uncertainties related to CO2 essentially have to be eliminated or reduced as much as 
possible, so as to ensure the safety and the integrity of the storage site. If the 
competent authority believes this is not the case, no transfer of responsibility can 
occur between the project developer and the competent authority. Furthermore, if 
project developers cannot accurately quantify the risks and their exposure to them, it 
is very unlikely that they will proceed with plans to make the significant investments 
into the development of the project in the first place. As such, the three challenges of 
transfer of responsibility, financial security and contribution best encapsulate the 
underlying theme of this research, of managing environmental risks and development 
and deployment of the technology as a whole.  
 
5.4.1 Transfer of responsibility 
In the EU CCS Directive, Article 18 sets out the requirements that have to be met 
before key obligations (i.e. residual monitoring, corrective measures, and surrender of 
allowances in event of leakage) in regards to a storage site can be transferred from a 




Secretary of State or the Scottish Ministers, depending on the location of the storage 
site.  
     Before such a transfer can occur a number of conditions must be met, including 
that: i) all available evidence indicates that the stored CO2 will be completely and 
permanently contained; ii) a minimum period of 20 years after closure of a site has 
elapsed, iii) financial obligation for contribution towards post-transfer costs has been 
fulfilled; and iv) the site has been sealed and all injection facilities removed. This 
provision of the CCS Directive is transposed into UK law by the Storage of Carbon 
Dioxide (Termination of Licenses) Regulations 2011.
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     The key uncertainty in respect to this provision for the transfer of responsibility 
(section 8)
225
 is the requirement to prove that CO2 is permanently stored (section 
8(a))
226
 and that a minimum period of no less than 20 years has elapsed (section 
7(2))
227
 unless the competent authority – the Secretary of State or the Scottish 
Ministers - is convinced that conditions about permanent containment have been met 
(section 7(3))
228
, upon which transfer of can occur earlier.   
     A number of interviewees, for example, pointed out the unclear nature as to how 
the 20 years rule was determined. From my interviews with the relevant authorities in 
the UK
229
 as well as with several project developers
230
, it was found that most of them 
believe it to be nothing more than a political compromise. As such, uncertainty in 
regards to the situations when transfer of responsibility should occur before the 20-
year period was expressed. In this respect, it was noted that the competent authorities 
are to an extent given too much authority or discretion in determining whether and 
when the transfer can occur, which then creates a level of uncertainty about the 
objectivity of the decision of either approving or denying a transfer. The implications 
of this 20-year rule then primarily extend to its impact on the monitoring and insuring 
costs for the project operators.  
     Essentially, the 20-year rule provided a timeframe throughout which the project 
operator remains responsible for any problems that might occur after the injection of 
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the CO2 ceases. In other words, it is also at the same time about managing the risks of 
liability exposure for the relevant competent authority in a particular Member State 
where the storage site is located. Given that in the majority of the interviews in this 
research, it was pointed out that the 20-year provision, as mentioned above, was for 
the most part a political compromise, between the EU Commission and Member 
States, it could be said that this provision is an example of governance network theory 
in practice. At the same time, it points to the network’s capacity to deal with 
situations of intrinsic uncertainty and decision-making under bounded rationality 
(Haas, 2004). Bounded rationality refers to the idea that when it comes to decision-
making, rationality of individuals is limited by the available information, cognitive 
limitations and time. In this case, the policy makers who included the 20-year rule as 
a provision within the CCS Directive, acted as ‘satisficers’ who sought to arrive at a 
satisfactory solution, lacking the ability and resources to arrive at the optimal one. As 
shown by the responses from the industry, and other stakeholders including the 
academia, who largely believe that the 20-year rule is not necessary, the outcome was 
indeed not an optimal one.  
     In any case, given the principle of subsidiarity which the EU is governed by
231
, as 
mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, which gives Member States the ability 
to regulate certain aspects of the CCS directive in greater detail, the, UK regulations 
have a somewhat wider scope of the permitted transfer of responsibility, as compared 
to what is stated in the EU CCS Directive. For example, they specifically include 
actual or contingent liability, as well as liabilities for personal injury, damage to 
property and economic loss (section 15(3)(b)),
232
 which are not referred to in the CCS 
Directive.  
     Nevertheless, as of March 2015, the UK still lacks any clear criteria for when such 
a transfer of responsibility can occur. In other words, there are no conditions such as 
which evidence, or to what extent or detail, should be produced showing that CO2 
storage is permanently contained. This issue was also often brought up in a number of 
CCS-related conferences. 
     However, it is at the same time also widely acknowledged that, as demonstration 
and commercial-scale projects are deployed, and more information in regards to 
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safety of storage is readily available, it is likely to lead to greater reassurance for the 
competent authority and their decisions to approve the transfer of responsibility. In 
other words, as more information becomes available, the extent to which the 
rationality of the decision makers (i.e. competent authority) is bounded will also be 
reduced, and as such, their decision as to whether to approve or deny the transfer of 
responsibility to occur would be more optimal. 
 
5.4.2 Open-ended liability 
The second identified issue that has the potential to serve as a barrier to development 
and deployment of CCS in the UK is the long-term and open-ended nature of 
financial liability. As mentioned, it is when project developers and investors are able 
to accurately quantify the risks and their exposure to them that CCS projects will start 
to develop; absent any substantial government subsidies. According to the CCS 
Directive there are essentially two types of financial requirements storage site 
operators. The first, relates to the financial security to be made during the permitting 




It is stipulated in Article 19 of the CCS Directive, and transposed into law by way of 
the Storage of Carbon Dioxide (Licensing etc.) Regulations 2010, that project 
developers are required to have in place before injection (section 6(3)(i))
233
, a 
financial security, which should cover all obligations related to the permitting of 
storage activities. Such financial security requirements include a charge over a bank 
account or any other asset, to deposit of money, performance bond or guarantee, an 
insurance policy, or a letter of credit.
234
 The key identified concern is related to the 
uncertainty and the volatility of prices of EU emission unit allowances (EUAs) in the 
long run. Essentially, storage site operators have to surrender EUAs in case of any 
CO2 leakage to the atmosphere. Given the unknown future price of EUAs, it means 
that the size of this liability is essentially open-ended. Also, because storage sites will 
be in operation anywhere from several years up to 20 or 30 years, compounded by the 
long post-closure period before the transfer of responsibility can occur, it is again 
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difficult for project developers to come up with the costs and model variation in 
prices of European emission allowances (EUAs)
235
 and thereby quantify their 
investment risks.  
     In addition, another issue, related to the financial security provision, is the method 
with which the amount of financial security is to be calculated, as well as which 
activities it should cover. The UK regulations in this respect simply provide for the 
amount to be ‘sufficient’ to ensure that the obligations236 of the operators are met237. 
In essence the way this provision was transposed into UK law is very similar to what 
has been written in the CCS Directive already. In the UK, there are currently no 
projects operational yet, and as such no practical experience exists with the above-
mentioned issue. On the other hand, as can be seen in the case of the ROAD project in 
the Netherlands, which also has no specific regulations for calculating the amount of 
financial security, it is has been agreed between the project developers and the 
competent authority that the amount should cover the cost of monitoring, contingency 
monitoring, financial contribution and the cost of EUAs (in case of leakage). Though, 
in relation to the latter, the uncertainty in EUA prices was reported to remain an open 
issue.  
 
Financial contribution  
The second issue related to the financial obligations, as provisioned by the CCS 
Directive and subsequent UK Storage of Carbon Dioxide (Termination of Licenses) 
Regulations 2011, is the financial contribution under the financial mechanism. Article 
20 of the CCS Directive essentially requires project proponents to set up a financial 
contribution (FC) to the competent authority, before transfer of responsibility, to 
cover at least the anticipated cost of monitoring for a period of 30 years. This 
contribution can also be used to cover any costs borne by the competent authority 
after the transfer of responsibility, so as to ensure that the stored CO2 is permanently 
contained.  
     The challenge in this case, however, is in determining the degree of financial 
contribution to be made in order for the transfer of responsibility to occur. Otherwise, 
                                                     
235
 An EUA is essentially a permit to emit one tonne of carbon under the EU Emissions Trading 
System. 
236
 Ibid. Schedule 2 - 7(5). These include obligation arising under the storage permit, the obligation to 
pay the competent authority’s costs, and any obligations of the operator arising under legislation 
implementing the EU ETS Directive. 
237




if costs are not reasonably determined, an operator could potentially be liable for 
additional costs even after the transfer of responsibility occurs, given the discretion, 
or duty, awarded to the competent authority to recover costs borne as a result of cases 
where there has been fault on the part of the operator.
238
 Examples of what would 
constitute fault on the side of the operator includes cases of deficient data, 
concealment of relevant information, negligence, or wilful deceit.
239
  Questions can 
be raised, however, as to the objectivity of the competent authority’s interpretation 
and use of these provisions to bring about recovery of any additional costs. 
Essentially, this means that under this approach, it makes it again difficult for the 
project developers to quantify their financial exposure, which could lead to further 
delay in the investment decision process.  
     Pursuant to these provisions then, financial contribution in the UK should cover 
any post-transfer costs and the costs for which authority would be liable for as a result 
of the transfer of responsibility. Here again, however, given the lack of any practical 
experience with actual CCS project, this issue remains to be evaluated and discussed 
in the future. Interestingly, as was pointed out by Diana Poputoaia from the Global 
CCS Institute,
240
 in the case of the ROAD project in the Netherlands, for example, the 
project proponents and the competent authority that the financial contribution should 
cover only the cost of monitoring agreed it. While in Norway, in the case of Sleipner 
and Snohvit projects, the financial contribution depends on the specific conditions for 
storage site facility, and how much CO2 is actually stored, thereby enabling potential 
calculation of costs. However, as Ms. Poputoaia pointed out, no financial contribution 
has thus far been asked for either of the two projects.  
 
5.4 Discussion  
The purpose of this chapter was to examine and evaluate the governance framework 
for CCS in the UK. Examining the historical and legal contexts, as well as the general 
(CCS) governance network, allows us to see that not only is CCS needed in order to 
deal with the issues of climate change and energy security, but in fact, the legal 
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position of the UK in the climate change context, essentially requires CCS 
development.  
     Within the so-called CCS governance network, each of the actors possesses their 
own particular characteristics, such as relevant expertise or resources, with which they 
contribution to overall functioning and the nature of the network. The research argues, 
that the stability and interdependency between actors has allowed for the development 
of a strong legal and regulatory framework in place in the UK today.  
     As mentioned, when the governance network is considered to be well functioning, 
it will facilitate the development of CCS. However, in addition to providing the 
necessary incentives and funding for research and FEED studies for example, the role 
of the government in influencing the development and deployment of CCS is also 
seen through the regulatory framework. A well-judged, timely, and most importantly 
a clear regulatory framework can serve as an important enabler of the development of 
the technology; just as an incoherent, over-restrictive or too-broad of a framework, 
can serve as an impediment. As will be shown in greater detail in the next chapter, 
whilst the legal and regulatory framework in the UK is for the most part considered to 
be in place, it has not yet been road tested, and a number of uncertainties or issues 
remain. These included the issue of transfer of responsibility and the open-ended 
nature of liability.  
     It should also be noted here again, as research has shown, in relation to the legal 
and regulatory framework for CCS, the UK remains to a good extent influenced by 
developments at the EU level. Whereas some countries, such as the Netherlands for 
example, chose a path of literal transposition of the CCS Directive, the UK on the 
other hand went deeper on certain provisions, in particular as it relates to the 
permitting process. However, in this respect, permitting itself is not a major 
regulatory issue per se, albeit it can be argued that the process could be streamlined in 
some ways. The major challenges or concerns, relate to the mentioned transfer of 
responsibility issue and the 20-year rule, as well as the uncertainty about the amount 
of financial contribution to be made to the competent authority by the storage site 
operator, as well as the necessity, and again the lack of clarity in the amount of 
financial security to be in place before the injection commences.  
    Essentially applying to the entire EU, a potential solution in respect to the financial 
security issue could be for the EU Member States to agree on a ceiling and a floor 




for potential investors and storage site operators, giving them a better ability to 
quantify their financial risk exposure. This would lead to a better ability to secure 
financing and thus to the investment and development of CCS projects. Such a 
solution, however, may be interpreted also as a deviation from the polluter-pays-
principle, whereby Member States would essentially agree to take on the risk of price 
per EUA, meaning polluters (i.e. CCS storage projects) would not be covering the 
entirety of the liabilities.  
     It appears then that the main identified challenges for CCS, from a legal and 
regulatory perspective are of financial, and not environmental nature. However, that is 
not to say that human and environmental risks of CO2 storage are not taken seriously 
enough. This is what the following Chapter 6 attempts to address – how the industry 
perceives the environmental risks, along with the key uncertainties of the legal and 
regulatory frameworks.  
     Earlier, in Chapter 2 of this thesis, it was noted that this research has adopted a 
critical realist ontological perspective in that although risks of, for example, CO2 
escaping to the surface or leaking into the groundwater, are real, we cannot have a 
truly objective, or completely certain, knowledge of the world/risk. Rather, risk is 
seen ‘as if’ real, in that the meaning and the concept of risk are to an extent socially 
constructed. As Easton (2010) also describes it, “we behave as if it was true, as if the 
world was real.” Given the lack of complete certainty then, dealing with the said risks 
becomes about how best to manage them, and the confidence, ability and 
effectiveness of those creating those risks (i.e. project developers).  
    Based on the literary research, and speaking with those involved in actual CCS 
project development, as well as other stakeholders from academia, the industry and 
the UK government, however, human and environmental risks related to CO2 storage 
appear to be well understood, and can be effectively managed. As mentioned, Chapter 
6 explores this notion further, by speaking to those directly involved in project 
development, as well as other stakeholders from the academia, research institutions 
and the UK government 
     In any case, what the above discussion has demonstrated is that, based on the 
analysis of the context for CCS, the governance network – its structure and 
functioning - regulations remain a key way by which development and deployment of 
CCS will be conditioned. Without clarification on certain provisions of the 




perhaps even more importantly so than regulations themselves, is the need for support 
and involvement of the relevant public authorities. Only with close collaboration, can 
solutions be worked on, experience gained, and thus projects developed and deployed 
on time. 
     Lastly, it also demonstrates to the notion that the law essentially needs the 
operation of projects in order to work. Essentially, this is the nature of the policy and 
governance networks and the law. It is not simply about putting the laws in place. As 
data obtained from the interviews (see Chapter 6 below), and doctrinal analysis of 
legal scholarship, a perfect law cannot be put in place, before taking the risk. In other 
words, a law can never deal with the entire risk, essentially, because the risk is needed 
to generate the law in the first place. However, if there is too much risk, even the 
strictest legislation and regulations will not be sufficient to ensure environmentally 


























CHAPTER 6: Regulatory perspective of 
the CCS Industry 
 
 
“Living at risk is jumping off the cliff and building your wings on the way down.” 
– Ray Bradbury241 
 
The only thing certain about capturing, transporting and storing CO2 underground, is 
that there is an element of risk involved. By taking up a critical realist ontological 
perspective, this thesis argues, however, that we cannot have a truly ‘objective’ or 
certain knowledge of the world (i.e. of risk of CO2 leakage). In other words, while 
there is indeed a probability of a CO2 leak for example, or a seismic event, however 
small or large, it is impossible to know anything with complete certainty. 
Understanding and interpretation of risk, whether environmental, health and safety, 
property or financially related, is ultimately a subjective construction from ones own 
perspectives and experiences. As such, different constructs and interpretations are 
bound to exist. 
     Nevertheless, in the storage component of the CCS chain in particular we are not 
just ‘building the wings on the way down’. The technological concepts behind this 
idea have been around for decades, so it could be said that the design for the ‘wings’ 
has already been built. However, today perhaps more so than ever, a sturdier 
‘framework’ is required, to safeguard against any ‘gusts of wind’. The legal and 
regulatory frameworks, whose primary objective is to minimize and manage the risks 
and liabilities of geological CO2 storage, provide this safeguard. However, one will 
only ‘jump off a cliff’, if they have the confidence in the design of the wings, and the 
sturdiness of the framework.  
     As such, the purpose of this chapter is to examine the supporting legal and 
regulatory framework from the CCS industry’s perspective. The objective is to find 
whether, or to what extent these in any way impede or enhance the 
development/deployment of CCS, in the European and UK contexts. It should be 
noted that the majority of the respondents, upon request, have agreed to have their 
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names included in this thesis. This is done so as to give the reader a sense of the 
background of the responses and possible prejudices of each respondent. In some 
cases, however, respondents’ names and companies were asked not to be included in 
the thesis.  
     The results and analysis that underpin this chapter are based on a qualitative study 
of documents and semi-structured interviews.
242
 The responses have been coded into 
three main themes, based on which the chapter is constructed. First, the familiarity 
and perception of the legal and regulatory frameworks for CO2 storage are examined, 
followed by the relevance and importance of monitoring and verification. Lastly, the 
impact of public perception and acceptance factor for the CCS industry is considered, 
before providing a concluding summary of the chapter.  
 
 
6.1 Familiarity and perception of the legal and regulatory framework 
 




Managing the risks and liability, as well as other issues related to climate change 
commitments, commercialization policy, financial responsibility, intellectual 
property, etc. in essence all serve as the drivers shaping the CCS legal and regulatory 
framework. On the one hand, while too little or loose regulation does not adequately 
manage the risks of a particular activity, in this case CO2 storage, on the other hand, 
too much regulation, or one that is too stringent, does not necessarily lead to 
destroying all respect for the law, but can impede the industry’s competitiveness, and 
development/deployment of CCS, by imposing costly and unnecessary regulatory 
burdens.  
     A central element of legal framework in the EU, and the UK, as examined in 
chapters 4 and 5, is the permitting regime. In addition, various closure and post-
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closure obligations, financial security, and transfer of responsibility criteria come to 
characterize the legal and regulatory system as a whole. When there is a lack of 
familiarity with any of these aspects of the regime, or when perception of them is 
negative, it can in turn impede the development of a particular project.  
 
6.1.1 Managing environmental risks 
In order to improve the conduct of risk management, which begins at the point of 
identifying a risk issue (i.e. CO2 leakage), and goes through the cycle of debate, 
quantification, legislation and regulation, and finally monitoring, understanding the 
complexity of the task is essential (de Marchi and Ravetz, 1999: 744). As such, all 
interviewees were initially asked, what they believed the risks of CO2 leakage to be 
and how best we can manage them.  
     Perhaps somewhat unsurprisingly, the respondents were nearly unanimous in the 
view that the risks of a CO2 leak from a storage reservoir were minimal, with 
responses ranging from ‘very small’, ‘extremely small’, to ‘almost impossible’. It is 
important, as I have come to learn during a number of interviews, to be specific when 
discussing a risk of leakage. In this respect, it was pointed out that the CO2 is more 
likely to come through an old injection or monitoring well, than through naturally 
occurring faults or pathways. However, as Mr. Cawley
244
, CO2 Project Resource 
Manager at BP Alternative Energy, was quick to point out in this regard as well: 
 
“The risk of well leakage is very small…it is a very small risk, but245 it is a 
manageable risk. For example, we had a small leakage at one of the wells at a 
demonstration project, and that is only because it was an old appraisal well that 
was not completed/abandoned properly by the operator, and also the local 
people were stealing things off of the wellhead. During one of the routine 
surveillance passes, an operator could hear a ‘hissing’ noise, and they went to 
test it and found it was CO2. What we did was, we suspended injection, worked 
the well over, at a cost of $3 million USD to cement the thing up from the 
reservoir right up. It is fine now! I believe, we estimated, that we lost only a 
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couple of tonnes of CO2. So all the kind of stuff is doable and manageable. At 




, Technical Sage and Business Development Director at Pale Blue Dot 
Energy Limited, was also fairly optimistic when it came to discussing the risks of CO2 
storage, saying that they are “very manageable and leakage probably will not 
occur…but these need to be managed properly.” When asked if this holds true for 
both an oil and gas reservoir as well as for the saline aquifers, the latter of which is 
less certain when it comes to monitoring and verifying the CO2 plume, Phillips (2014) 
responded that: 
 
“it is much less easy to demonstrate that if your proposed target is purely an 
aquifer. There is nothing driving fluid through the barrier. You simply don’t 
know, for example, where the shale over your formation will contain the CO2 or 
not. As a result of that it is very difficult to prove that it won’t leak. So, I think 
there is an issue around how you handle that uncertainty.” 
 
As the literature review (see Chapter 3) in this thesis has pointed out, the uncertainty 
of knowing where the CO2 is underground is further exacerbated by issues arising in 
the capture and transport components of the CCS chain. These relate for example to 
CO2 streams coming from multiple sources, which could in the end put in danger the 
integrity of the storage reservoir. To the question of whether CO2 streams can be 
combined and if this creates any additional risks in terms of jeopardizing the integrity 
of a storage site, Mr. Reimink
248
, Director of Safety, Technology and Environment at 
the World Steel Association, appeared confident enough, noting that:  
 
“Of course [streams can be combined]. Even though the composition of the CO2 
stream may be different given the different sources the type of capture 
technology or the emission producing industry, there is little difference in the 
gas composition between a 98% pure CO2 stream or a slightly lower level of 
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purity. The key item to remove is dust and chemicals; this should be taken as 
part of the capture process. The transportation pipelines can be made resilient to 
handle minor impurities, as are most intended storage sites. Depending on the 
chemical reactions of the gas it influences the inner surface of the pipeline or 
affect the storage site medium or rock formation. The technical capability to 
prevent this having a detrimental effect is minimal and can be mitigated in most 
situation as is the case now with many sour gasses. A check on the gas 
composition or potential compositions will enable the system to be designed, 
installed and used to deal with the situation.” 
     
In a follow-up question, Mr. Hill
249
, Director of Carbon Solutions at British 
Petroleum, commented that as far as transportation is concerned, the industry is fairly 
comfortable that it knows enough about the technology to ensure safe CO2 transport. 
Even when it comes to the storage of the CO2, Mr. Hill (2013) notes that: 
 
“It is about location, location, location – it’s all about site selection. If you pick 
the wrong sites, you might get risks that you will have to deal with and manage 
later. It’s all about site selection and picking the right site and then monitoring 
that the way you expect that site to behave during CO2 storage process is indeed 
how you predicted that.” 
      
So, from the responses noted above, and the general sense from other interviewees, 
the industry appears to be very confident in what it is doing, whilst acknowledging the 
existence of risk of a particular event, such as leakage from a storage reservoir. The 
apparent confidence expressed by the industry representatives was also to some extent 
echoed by academic experts. One of the most prominent academics in the field of 
CCS, Prof. Haszeldine,
250
 professor of Sedimentary Geology and CCS at the 
University of Edinburgh in Scotland, for example, noted that “the risk of leakage with 
a well chosen site, that has gone past the regulatory process, is very limited”. 
     However, despite the confidence expressed by both academics and the industry, on 
being presented with the view that there is almost nothing to worry about when it 
comes to CCS, and CO2 storage, as one respondent from an environmental NGO 
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251, “there is a lot of people who work on CCS, and it’s really easy to be 
biased about something if you care about it.” This research has tried to stay as un-
biased as possible, however, it does on the other hand argue that legislation and 
regulations play a key role in mediating between the claims made on the side of the 
industry, academia, and the perceptions of the general public. In other words, the legal 
and regulatory frameworks serve to provide a neutral platform through which issues 
related to risk of geological CO2 storage, and management of those risks, can be 
assessed, and managed.  
     Managing all the associated risks, however, is anything but easy. The need for an 
understanding of the essential complexity of the task at hand is thus crucial. Here, this 
research refers to the understanding and the perception of the legal and regulatory 
frameworks for managing the risk of CO2 storage. 
 
6.1.2 Managing legal and regulatory risks 
It appears as though there is a general consensus amongst the CCS industry that the 
EU CCS Directive, as well as the regulations in the UK, for the most part does not 
serve as significant legal barriers to the development and deployment of the 
technology.  
 
Perceptions and views on the legal and regulatory frameworks 
When asked about their view of the legislation and regulation for CO2 storage in 
Europe and in the UK, Mr. Phillips (2013) for example stated that while “there is 
nothing fundamental missing…the regulatory framework is absolutely there…what is 
not there is anybody that has road-tested that framework.” Similarly, it is the opinion 
of a representative from Shell,
252
 that “overall, the regulatory framework as developed 
by the CCS Directive is robust enough, and provides the clarity to investors to build 
projects in Europe.”  
     A respondent
253
 previously involved with a CCS project, yet still active in the CCS 
field ‘at arms length’, as they described it, on the other hand, was slightly more 
critical and noted that: 
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“There is considerable irritation that when the UK government implemented the 
EU CCS Directive, it created both a lease and a license requirement…and from 
an industry’s perspective this simply creates a whole lot of extra bureaucracy 
which is just from our point of view a waste of time.”  
 
A similarly critical response was offered by a representative
254
 that is currently 
involved with a CCS project in the UK, who admitted that the CCS Directive reads 
‘quite well’, and that the issues is “in the interpretation…and the Guidance that has 
been written [being] frankly terrible.” When asked why that is the case, they went on 
to explain:  
 
“[The CCS Guidance Documents] are too detailed. If you’re a Minister in a 
country that has to transpose the Directive, and you go against the Guidance, 
then people will say ‘well, why have you done that?’ In my experience, 
Ministers and civil servants, and regulators, are very risk-averse, and that’s 
understandable. But what it means then, is that if someone has written 
something down, they take account of absolutely everything written down. So, 
the more that is written down, the more constrained they are, and the less they 
are willing to allow people to try things out. And the harder it is to allow people 
to try new things, as you have to overcome something that someone has written 
down.” 
 
Given that the Guidance Documents are technically not legally binding, the above-
mentioned industry representative was also asked whether they would still claim that 
the documents are too prescriptive, to which they responded: “I think so. I think it is 
overprescribed. Now, I know it’s not official, and that it’s just guidance, but the 
reality is that it has more power than just guidance.”  
     In essence, the power that the interviewee is referring to is the power of 
legitimacy, from which no project developer would want to stray away from. 
Legitimacy, in this respect, is a powerful determinant for assurance to the regulators 
and the general public. However, when guidance is over-prescriptive, it can deter 
investors from making the final decision in a project.   
     The general feeling from the CCS industry, in regards to the perception of the 
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current legal and regulatory frameworks, is that ‘the framework is workable’, as one 
respondent described it. However, despite some uncertainties, given that the UK has 
for the most part gone for a relatively literal transposition of the EU CCS Directive, 
the “industry is fairly comfortable with that…the key question mark is how some of 
these measures will be implemented in practice”, as Mr. Warren, Chief Executive at 
the Carbon Capture and Storage Association (CCSA) pointed out.
255
 In other words, it 
appears as though the industry is for the most part comfortable with the current 
frameworks in place, albeit some uncertainties (i.e. financial securities and CCR), and 
is waiting on more, or perhaps better said, clearer guidance, both from the UK 
government, and the European Commission.  
     Understanding the views and perceptions of those that the legal and regulatory 
frameworks are essentially written for – the industry - is important, as the identified 
issues and concerns can help in improving the frameworks in the future. This is 
particularly the case in light of the upcoming review of the CCS Directive at the end 
of 2015, and what makes this research current and valuable.  
 
Perceived remaining barriers for CCS 
While the industry seems to want greater clarity on some of the issues mentioned 
above, in particular in relation to financial securities, the EU CCS Directive, and 
subsequent UK regulations, do not seem to pose any fundamental barriers for CCS. 
When asked, for example, whether they believed that the EU legal framework, with 
the CCS Directive, and UK regulations have ensured that legal barriers for CCS 
deployment have been removed, and what issues remain Prof. Haszeldine (2013) 
noted that: 
 
“The main remaining issue, in particular for the industry, is that liability is still 
too open ended. Also, outstanding issues are still the London Convention main 
text, which does not permit the routine transfer of CO2 across member state 
boundaries. This severely limits the deployment of CCS. States with high CO2 
emissions but no consented storage such as Germany are not able to use 
validated storage beneath the UK or Norwegian North Sea. Bi-lateral contracts 
can be made, but that is complex.” 
      
                                                     
255




Warren (2014) also suggests that the biggest concern is still the financial securities 
requirements, in the context of the UK legal and regulatory framework. Miligan 
(2014) on the other hand adds that another issue is also the potential overlap of the 
licensing regimes, between a CO2 storage and petroleum development activities. On 
this note, the author suggests that this overlap could only become contentious when 
the activities are undertaken by different commercial entities that are unable or 
unwilling to establish a contractual relationship (p. 169).  
     When asked whether the current CCS permitting regime, which requires both a 
lease from the Crown Estate and a license from DECC, is perceived as a barrier, one 
respondent from the industry
256
 sector noted that the current regime has certainly 
complicated matters. However, as they pointed out, it is not a barrier per se: 
 
“But something that adds an element of cost to the complexity. It is not a 
showstopper in any way. Both UK projects [Peterhead and White Rose] have 
gone through this process…but there is still the sense that they would have 
preferred to only have one entity to have to interact with. But, due to some 
quirky issues, set up 200 odd years ago, the framework is what it is.”  
      
It would be true to say that not all barriers have been removed, given that only one 
project in Europe (the ROAD CCS project in the Netherlands) has thus far received a 
permit for CO2 storage. As Bolscher et al. (2014) point out in their report to the 
European Commission,
257
 it appears that during the phase before a final investment 
decisions (FID) for moving ahead with the project is made, the requirements for 
technical specifications may be too high. It is thus particularly important to have the 
‘learning by doing’ essence reflected in the storage regulations (p. 16). This, to a good 
extent is in fact reflective of the current state of regulations in the UK, and what is 
written in the EU CCS Directive. 
     Although several CCS industry respondents also noted that while the CCS 
Directive, and subsequent UK regulations are effective in regulating and allowing 
CCS, it could be argued that the challenge is not so much the European and UK legal 
frameworks, but rather the current economic conditions, and a lack of a sufficient 
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policy framework and demonstration funding for early deployment. This means that 
the industry for the most part cannot see it economically justifiable to make an 
investment in a project, which requires significant upfront capital expenditures, and 
has uncertain operational costs in the future.  
 
6.1.3 Removing the legal and regulatory barriers 
Another question that was asked of all industry interviewees, was what, if any 
provisions in the CCS Directive, or UK regulations, need to, or should be, revised. 
The majority of the respondents suggested that it should be the Guidance Documents 
(GD), written in order to assist Member States with the transposition of the CCS 
Directive that should be given more attention to. 
     By revising Guidance Document 4, for example, which can be done by the EU 
Commission, the need to go through the European Parliament and be subject to the 
co-decision process, a requirement in the case of Directive revision, could be avoided. 
Any revision of the CCS Directive, or UK regulations for that matter, would also not 
necessarily help to provide confidence to investors and project developers, and thus 
not be advantageous for CCS. Warren (2014) proposes that instead, “the Directive is 
not revised at this point in time. It should be perhaps revised in 5,10, 20 years time if 
we make any progress in projects and we have real experience.”  
     An industry representative
258
 currently involved with a CCS project, notes that 
what is written in the guidance documents essentially means that:  
 
“One has to prove basically 100% that nothing has happened, or will happen...I 
think this is actually impractical. The industry view is that – providing 
Guidance Document 4 is not applied literally but that Member State Competent 
Authorities are given the latitude to apply the Directive according to their local 
circumstances - it is best to ‘let sleeping dogs lie’ and work with the current 
wording.  Progress will be achieved through a pragmatic discussion between 
projects and regulators; however, making changes that could be misinterpreted 
by uninformed observers as being less than fully committed to permanent 
storage could lead to unfounded opposition.”  
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This relates back to what a number and variety of respondents, said about the issue of 
risk, and its management, in that a sense of risk, and uncertainty, will always exist. In 
other words, it is extremely difficult to prove a negative (i.e. no leakage).  
     A big issue for the industry, in this respect, is the contingent liability created by the 
inclusion of storage sites under the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS). The CCS 
Directive stipulates that storage site operators will be required to surrender EUAs in a 
case of any seepage from a storage site to the atmosphere. The extent of this liability 
is essentially unquantifiable, which creates a major barrier for investors. A potential 
solution, as suggested by Warren (2014), is that the Commission should be clearer in 
the GD-4 that risks can be shared between the storage site operator and the relevant 
competent authority.   
     However, in essence, what the industry seems to have echoed was that the CCS 
Directive is relatively clear enough to offer sufficient confidence to the investors, and 
serve as a satisfactory framework for ensuring safe and secure geological storage of 
CO2. The majority of the respondents, as mentioned, believe that there is no need to 
re-write the Directive itself, but rather review the Guidance Documents. The reason 
behind a lack of support for the revision of the Directive stems from the belief that at 
this point in time, with no commercial CCS projects in operation, doing so would 
only increase the regulatory risk and thus lead to potential additional delays – in a 





6.2 Importance of Monitoring and Verification 
 
“There are known knowns. These are things we know that we know. There are known unknowns. That 
is to say, there are things that we know we don't know. But there are also unknown unknowns. There 





Given the associated uncertainties and risks of permanent underground storage of 
CO2, as mentioned, a robust regulatory framework is important. As this research 
argues, this framework is essential for mediating between the management of risks 
and the deployment of CCS technology.  
     In order to verify the amount and composition of CO2 being injected, to understand 
how the CO2 behaves once underground, to give early warnings if something goes 
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wrong, to measure any leakage, and to provide assurance of long-term integrity of a 
storage site, the monitoring and verification process is also a key component. In other 
words, monitoring and verification is both about providing reassurance, and managing 
the risk.  
     The regulatory frameworks in the EU, and in the UK, are particularly emphatic on 
monitoring and verification, throughout the life cycle of a storage site, from 
characterization, operation, and closure and post-closure, to the period of handover of 
responsibilities to the relevant competent authority. The rationale for monitoring and 
verification are baseline studies, detection of any leakage, and flux emission 
quantification. In any case, monitoring and verification emerged as a major issue and 
extensive topic of discussion during the interviews. The next part presents some of the 
main views on the matter.  
 
Proving the negative?  
Relating Mr. Rumsfeld’s quote above to the context of CO2 storage, there are things 
that are known about the subsurface, largely from the experiences gained from the oil 
and gas exploration and extraction. For example, how to measure the CO2 that is 
injected, and whether integrity of the storage reservoir is affected. However, the 
extent of CO2 movement in a saline aquifer, or the possibility of a leakage event, can 
still be considered to be the so-called ‘known unknowns’. Precisely because there will 
always be uncertainties and residual risks related to CO2 storage, monitoring and 
verification is important for managing them.  
     Cawley (2013) for example, notes “there is always uncertainty in the subsurface 
which is why it is an expensive thing to do. You will never be 100% certain. 
Anything to do with subsurface is expensive, and anything with subsurface has risk 
attached to it. But it is a risk that you can manage.” As a number of other respondents 
have also pointed out, saying that something can be measured with 100% accuracy 
would simply not be valid. It is also not a pragmatic point of view, as it is quite 
difficult to prove a negative - guaranteeing with 100% certainty that the CO2 for 
example is exactly where it is supposed to be, or that there is no leakage happening 
anywhere. So why monitor and measure then, or, to what extent?  
     Essentially, the reasoning for and the extent of monitoring for a project, also 
comes down to the financial and business case of that project. For a project to receive 




the Electricity Market Reform (EMR), as an indirect benefit under the EU Emissions 
Trading Scheme (ETS) whereby EUAs are not required to be purchased
261
, or for it is 
to be considered as a clean development mechanism (CDM) activity, the CO2 has to 
be permanently stored, and accounted for. As such, the cost of measurement, and 
monitoring and verification, is always factored into the business case of a project.  
     One can essentially measure to the n
th
 degree, but that would most likely not be 
financially viable for a project. Rather than indefinite monitoring, what is needed is 
better and more efficient monitoring technologies that are effective, yet not expensive 
to the degree that would make a project unlikely to go ahead. Given also that the risk 
profile of every storage project will be different, the extent of monitoring and 
verification, and the use of particular techniques and technologies will also differ.  
    That being the case, if project operators are required to prove with 100% certainty 
that CO2 is where they predicted it to be, that it is not leaking, or if they are required 
to use an extensive set of monitoring and verification methods and technologies, it 
could make it not practical for them to even get started with the project. As one 
interviewee
262
 from National Grid answered to the question of what uncertainties lie 
in respect to monitoring and verification:  
 
“We can’t monitor absolutely everything because it just won’t be practical, and 
cost vs. benefits will not give us that much in return. I think the biggest 
uncertainty is not with the technologies, but rather with the regulations or what 
is required of the developers to prove that the regulator will be satisfied.” 
      
However, an interviewee
263
 from the British Geological Survey (BGS) did point out 
for example that the development of monitoring and verification technologies was 
still: 
 
 “Pretty basic at the moment. In some cases seismic monitoring could work but 
certainly the two projects [White Rose and Peterhead – only two currently in 
process of development in the UK] I’ve looked at, it wouldn’t. You can do 
modelling in advance, but you’re just not going to see it. So you are left with 
looking for esoteric new technologies.”  
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One of such new technologies for example is muon tomography, a technique/process 
currently being developed also at the University of Sheffield, which measures cosmic 
ray muons to generate three-dimensional images of volumes of CO2 beneath the 
surface. As the respondent from the BGS pointed out in reference to this method, 
however, while “the idea is good…it is the practicality of it that is problematic.” 
Practicality, in many ways then is inherently related to the financial commitments of 
the project developer, who are unlikely to use a particular technology if the costs are 
determined to be too high, and other technologies could be deployed instead and still 
meet the legal and regulatory requirements.  
     From the interviews with CCS industry representatives, as well as other 
stakeholders, it seems as though there is some difference in respect to the belief of the 
extent of development of sufficient monitoring and verification techniques and 
technologies, with the industry representatives appearing more certain in being able to 
accurately account for the injected CO2. However, on that same issue, the interviewee 
from BGS did point out “while in terms of detection the development of [M&V] 
technologies is good, [he thinks that] when it comes to quantification [of the CO2 
from storage] it is still insufficient.” Whereas detection refers to the means to detect 
any irregularity with the injected CO2, quantification refers to the measurement of that 
irregularity. In this respect, monitoring and verification is linked to the legal and 
regulatory frameworks, and where the science, technology and law interact in many 
ways.  
 
Legal and regulatory uncertainties 
The detection vs. quantification debate, in relation to monitoring and verification, is 
evident in the legal and regulatory requirements. Whereas the EU CCS Directive 
(2009/31/EC) covers detection of CO2 underground fairly extensively, as do the 
associated Guidance Documents, the EU ETS Directive covers quantification, or the 
accounting of the CO2 in case of a seepage event. Seepage is referred to as any release 
of CO2 to the atmosphere.  
     According to Article 13 of the CCS Directive, which focuses on the monitoring 
requirements, a particularly important part is the requirement that monitoring has to 
be based on a monitoring plan (Art. 13(2)) designed by the operator pursuant to the 
requirements laid down in Annex II of the Directive. This monitoring plan is then 




requirements for the transfer of responsibility have been met, following a certain 
period of time after the closure of the storage site. At present, the EU Directive and 
UK regulations require that after a storage site is closed, a minimum of 20 years must 
pass before the transfer of responsibility can occur. However, the regulations also 
state that this transfer can occur sooner, if the competent authority is satisfied that all 
available evidence indicates that the stored CO2 will be completely and permanently 
contained. An interviewee
264
 from BP summarizes the issue well: 
 
“You can imagine a site operator doing a certain amount of monitoring and then 
saying ‘look we’ve done all these monitoring activities, but nothing has 
changed. We’re not seeing any movement; all the CO2 is staying there and is 
safe. Do we really have to go on and do all the remaining years? Even then in 
the regulations it says that the CO2 has to be ‘proven’ permanently secured. But 
then, how do you interpret the word proven? How do you prove it?” 
 
In this case, for the relevant competent authority, it will essentially come down to the 
conformity by the project operator with their monitoring plan, in addition to their 
meeting the financial security requirements, as stipulated in the CCS Directive and the 
UK regulations.  
     In the UK, the Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) has taken a 
practical view when it comes to monitoring and verification requirements, essentially 
by allowing developers to come up with a proposal that is consistent with the CCS 
Directive. However, as Warren (2014) pointed out, “it will be interesting to see how 
flexible DECC are on some of the elements and whether or not they are willing to 
shift somewhat on what the guidance documents say”.  
     As mentioned, regulations for monitoring and verification also apply under the EU 
ETS Directive, which applies in the case that any leakage results in emissions or 
release to the atmosphere, or water column. In June 2010, the EU Commission agreed 
upon a set of monitoring and reporting guidelines for CCS
265
, to which the BP 
interviewee went on to say: 
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“It is a lot of complicated stuff. The kind and level of calculations and 
measurements that one needs to do is extremely complex. In particular for 
meeting the uncertainty thresholds…the technologies today would find it 
difficult to meet those uncertainty calculations. Especially when done with EOR 
and how that percentage might be achieved are still unclear.”  
 
What these comments essentially come to suggest is that not only is there still 
uncertainty as to how certain provisions of the legal and regulatory requirements will 
be met, but perhaps more importantly, that there is the widespread belief among CCS 
industry that it will come down to the interpretation from the relevant competent 
authority as to whether those requirements have been met. In relation to the 
requirements for establishing and updating the monitoring plans,
266
 a number of 
industry stakeholders believed that the criteria as stated are ‘reasonably ok’, however 
that the guidance, in particular GD-4, are too prescriptive on this issue.  
     However, as prof. Haszeldine (2013)
267
 noted in this respect, “guidance can be 
interpreted and can be changed and adapted over time.” Yet, a number of other 
industry stakeholders still believed that the monitoring and verification requirements 
placed on the project developers are ‘very onerous’.  
     An interviewee
268
, currently involved with the Peterhead CCS project in Scotland, 
also stated that “while regulations are well understood, and we know what the 
requirements are for site characterisation and development - so we know who to go to 
for permitting and such, and what various other provisions require - a key uncertainty 
for project developers is still with what happens during handover time.” 
     Will DECC be enforcing the 20-year minimum period requirement, or will it take 
an approach that is based more on the performance of the storage site? Essentially, it 
will come down to negotiation between the project operator and the competent 
authority, as to determining whether all the criteria for transfer have been met.  
 
6.3 The public factor and its influence on industry behaviour   
In addition to the understanding and perception of the legal and regulatory 
requirements, and the importance and role of monitoring and verification, a third 
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identified major theme during the interviews was the influence of the public factor on 
project development, and as such has been included in this thesis. Questions in this 
regard revolved around the risk of public perception and opposition to a particular 
project, as well as of the risks not directly related to the project itself but rather to a 
broader ‘image’ of the company.  
 
Indirect risks 
For companies involved with a project anywhere along the CCS chain, from capture, 
to transport and in particular storage, the purpose conducting public consultations and 
in doing extensive monitoring and verification, is to also manage the risks that are 
indirect to the project itself. As one industry respondent
269
 pointed out, this relates to 
mainly the impact on the brand and on share prices. As he describes: 
 
“Lets stay for example if 25% of your large scale investors are these ethical 
investors, they may question investment in your company because you’re not 
being transparent. So there are other risks that are not directly related to the 
project, but are risks nonetheless. Something quite small might cause a ripple 
effect and become quite significant. And the ripples can be whipped up by 
NGOs if they caught on to something…they are skilful in making something 
seem more alarming.”  
 
In other words, there is a lot of extrinsic brand value at stake for the company 
involved with a particular project. As an example, another respondent also pointed 
out, that such extrinsic values: 
 
 “Are a big deal for [the companies]. So consequently, for example, when they 
injected out of zone at Snøhvit270 and NGOs found about it, they stayed quiet 
and got burned really badly. They’ve sorted it out now, and there’s no problem, 
but they are very conscious of the fact that stuff was discovered and they didn’t 
come clean about it quick enough, so now they are very keen on transparency.” 
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Transparency, trust, and engagement were the three main concepts that continuously 
emerged throughout the interviews, when talking about risk and public perception. A 
number of events such as what happened in the case of Snøhvit, or in Barendrecht in 
particular, have essentially brought CCS more into the public domain. 
 
Public perception risk 
When asked about any remaining risks for CCS deployment apart from lack of 
commercial incentives, Mr. Reimink
271
 for example responded that: 
 
“One of the big risks of acceptance is lack of public and political awareness and 
acceptability. You see similar issues for example with fracking. It is more about 
ensuring that anyone has the ability to access accurate and correct information 
rather than short media announcements which do not provide the full story or 
provide adequate information for the public to judge they need all the 
information to be able to understand that the tests and many projects have been 
safely and professionally implemented.” 
      
Whilst Reimink (2013) brings up an interesting point in that the perception of the 
public, or perhaps better said, the trust of the public in a company, is a determining 
factor as to whether a CCS project will be accepted or not, a majority of the 
respondents, including within the CCS industry, agreed that the major driver for 
public acceptance or opposition of CCS, is primarily still based on the cost-benefit 
analysis of a particular individual or a community as a whole. In other words, whether 
the public will believe that the project would lead to more benefits as opposed to 
costs, or vice-versa.  
     Looking at the current situation in regards to public opposition and acceptance of 
CCS in general, and of CO2 storage, across Europe, the picture is different between 
each of the EU Member States. In the Netherlands and Germany for example, public 
opposition is believed to be a much greater of an issue as compared to in the UK, 
where CO2 storage has not, and is unlikely to become a major issue. In this respect, 
Prof. Haszeldine (2013) notes “the UK took a wise decision to not go for on-shore 
storage, which has resulted in very little mobilized public concern over this [in that 
country].” Although, even in the UK, issues around on-shore pipelines or construction 
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of large facilities could become concerns for local communities and thus lead to some 
amount of public opposition. As Warren (2014) points out during the interview, 
however, “there does not seem to be any concerted opposition…but one can never 
take things for granted.”  
     Things can never be taken for granted, as evidenced in the cancelation of the 
Barendrecht CCS project for example, where poor or lack of communication from the 
side of the project developer mobilized the general public which in turn proved to be a 
powerful determinant in the project being delayed, and ultimately cancelled. For fear 
of public opposition, CO2 storage is thus very likely to only occur offshore (Cawley, 
2013). As an interesting comparison, another person interviewed was Ms. Forbes
272
, a 
senior associate at the World Resources Institute in the United States. She notes that: 
 
“In the US, there is concern about the off-shore in a way that it is for all off-
shore activities – off-shore wind, off-shore gas, etc. It is different than the 
European perspective. I think in the US you will see public opposition for 
offshore, just because it is offshore. I think it is a fascinating difference.”  
 
Ms. Forbes (2013) indeed brings up an interesting point, in that in terms of public 
opposition, a lot of it depends also on the previous experiences of a community near a 
particular project. For example, whether the community is used to the infrastructure in 
place in their area, would certainly play a role as to the likelihood of acceptance of a 
new project developing there. However, if an area does not have a history of other 
projects going on such as natural gas exploration or mining for example, one industry 
representative
273
 noted that: 
 
“It is not so much about what people themselves think, but more about what 
others think. So of course I would object, because it might lower the price of my 
house by 30,000 or whatever. That’s what people are worried about.”  
 
So, when asked how to prevent significant public opposition, both for the people 
living around a particular project, and for the wider public, the responses from the 
industry and other stakeholders were nearly unanimous. The majority of them related 
to the importance of public engagement and communication, and early efforts of 
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doing so as being a critical factor in determining whether opposition will arise, or to 
what extent. As was evident in the Barendrecht project in the Netherlands, the project 
was ultimately abandoned precisely because of the lack of effective public 
engagement.  
Framing CCS projects 
It is important for CCS project to also be framed appropriately. In contextualising 
CCS, consideration has to be given to all perceptual positions, and not simply focus 
on CCS as a climate change mitigation tool. Given that perceptions on climate change 
differ from belief to scepticism and denialism, project developers must provide 
rationality for the local community where the project fits in, as well as where it fits in 
the national context. 
     However, the local context is particularly important to project developers, who 
need to take careful account of all potentially impacted communities, both in terms of 
the social, cultural, economic and political characteristics. This involves making sure 
there is sufficient background knowledge and awareness of the needs of the 
communities, and to minimise any false expectations or misunderstandings. Related 
to comments made above on the importance of monitoring and verification, Gardiner 
Hill (2013) adds that such information (on M&V) needs to be shared not only with 
other companies, but be communicated to the public as well.  
 
Engaging with the public 
The key goal of the legal and regulatory frameworks, and the efforts behind extensive 
monitoring and verification, is essentially to provide reassurance to the investors, 
regulators and the general public as well. As identified by all the respondents, the 
effort to emphasize the benefits that a project will bring to the community, as well as 
to the wider country-level scale, is crucial. One industry respondent,
274
 for example, 
on this note pointed out that “most importantly, it is for a project developer to keep in 
mind not only what information is being communicated, but also how this is done, 
and by whom. The public is very susceptible and can quickly mobilize around a 
particular issue.” 
     The Peterhead CCS Project for example, as part of their public consultation efforts, 
recently included a series of exhibitions
275
 in the communities closest to the proposed 
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project, as well as a number of other public events, including offering tours of the 
Peterhead Power Station. The purpose behind these consultation efforts is to “provide 
local communities with an update on how [their] design work is progressing, to 
respond to feedback received during Phase 1 and to listen to further feedback on 
[their] plans as they currently stand” (Shell, 2015).  
     There are a number of ways in which project developers can engage and 
communicate with a community, however, as research has shown, and as Dr. Esposito 
from Southern Company
276
 suggested, “most successful ways are often the ones that 
embrace a meaningful dialogue and offer a two-way street of communication. 
Openness, transparency, and trust are key here.” Trust, in particular, is a key theme 
that emerged during my conversations across the stakeholder spectrum. When 
organisations, or companies, identify themselves with the ‘affected’ communities, and 
that their messages and information are seen as trusted and reliable, it goes a long way 
in building up the level of approval necessary to develop a project. It also serves to 
deal with issues related to perceptions of risks related to CCS.  
     Recognizing individual risk perceptions and tailoring the responses are an essential 
component. In other words, if risk perceptions are high, some flexibility in project 
planning, which allows the general public to influence the outcome in some capacity, 
can actually be helpful in minimizing those risk perceptions. This holds true not only 
for CCS projects, but has been the case with other analogues such as nuclear or 
hydraulic fracturing.  
     Lastly, in relation to governance and the public factor, clearly defined processes 
for all stakeholders to get involved, or provide some input into project decisions, will 
ensure a wider acceptance, thereby reducing the risk of any opposition arising and 
thus allow the project to move forward. Following the CCS Directive’s approach, the 
UK CCS regulations are silent on public participation in the decision-making 
concerning CCS projects, as this aspect will be addressed in the context of the 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) and Integrated Pollution Prevention and 
Control (IPPC) regulations. At the EU level, the only requirement is that MS should 
make available to the public environmental information relating to the geological 
storage of CO2
277
, prescribing the information to be included in the public register 
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(i.e. about storage licenses and permits, about storage sites both before and after site 
closure, etc.).  
     While there is no specific requirements stating that project developers should 
engage with the public, it is noted in the EU Directive that it is important in CCS 
demonstration that public awareness measures are also done, so as to enhance public 
confidence and deter opposition, which could set back development and deployment. 
As such, even though the general public might not have had any ‘voice’ in the 
development of the legal and regulatory frameworks, the public factor still plays an 
important role in the overall governance process, and in potentially determining the 









When talking about CCS, and in particular when it comes to the storage component, 
one of the central emerging themes is most often the management of risk. However, 
depending on who is being spoken to, the definition, or the context of risk, is 
inherently different – i.e. financial, regulatory, health & safety, environment. While 
this research is mainly concerned on regulatory and environmental risks, this chapter 
was primarily focused on the element of risk form the perspective of the CCS industry 
and what that represents. It would be hard to argue which type of risk is prevalent 
amongst the CCS industry, as all risks are invariably related. However, to some extent 
financial risks appeared to have been a recurring topic in the interviews, thus, it could 
be said that these remain prevalent to the industry representatives. Nevertheless, that 
is not to detract form the fact that environmental and health and safety risks are taken 
extremely serious and are being dealt with by project developers.  
     From the conducted interviews, three subjects of discussion were particularly 
prevalent, thus they formed the structure of this chapter as well. These included: i) the 
familiarity with the legal and regulatory frameworks for CO2 storage; ii) the 
importance of monitoring and verification; and iii) the influence of the public factor.  
     In relation to the familiarity with the legal and regulatory frameworks for CO2 
storage, both in the European and UK contexts, the respondents seemed fairly 
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confident that they understand the content of the relevant Directives, and subsequent 
UK regulations. For the most part, the frameworks were considered to be sufficiently 
robust, however, some pointed to a number of provisions, in particular Articles 18-20 
of the CCS Directive, relating to transfer of responsibility and financial security and 
mechanism requirements, that should be made clearer, when the Directive comes 
under review in 2015. In addition, the CCS industry respondents were particularly 
confident when it came to questions relating to the management of storage risks, 
whilst at the same time, unanimously acknowledging that there are still various 
uncertainties, however, that these can be managed.  
     The second theme concerned the importance of monitoring and verification. 
Questions in this respect related to its importance to managing risks, its inclusion in 
the regulatory frameworks, and the extent of the development of various technologies 
and techniques. As mentioned earlier, all conversations revolved essentially around 
the management of risk, and the unanimous acknowledgement from the CCS industry 
of the existence of uncertainty when it comes to CO2 storage. Respondents 
emphasized that no amount of monitoring and verification will be sufficient to prove 
anything with a 100% certainty, and therefore much will depend on the interpretation 
on the side of the regulators as to whether legal and regulatory provisions are being 
complied with. As such, regulations, and the regulators themselves will need to take 
the best-available-technologies approach when doing so.  
     As far as the current status of the development of monitoring technologies and 
various techniques is concerned, there was a general consensus that current 
technologies are sufficient for detection and monitoring of the CO2 underground to a 
‘reasonable degree of certainty’. Two respondents also said that the biggest 
uncertainty remains the ability to effectively quantify/account for any fugitive 
emissions from the storage reservoirs, and suggested that this will be particular 
important in regulatory terms under the EU ETS Directive, which applies in the case 
that any leakage results in emissions or release to the atmosphere, or the water 
column. How to meet the uncertainty thresholds, as stated in the Guidance 
Documents, was identified as needing more clarification in the upcoming Directive 
review. Nevertheless, while respondents believed that monitoring and verification has 
gotten a lot better over the years, and that new technologies and techniques are being 




cost and sensitive CO2 monitoring technologies, and to be practical and pragmatic in 
their application. 
    Lastly, the influence of the public factor on the behaviour of the CCS industry was 
discussed. Questions in this respect related to how the respondents perceive the issue, 
and how they believed it has affected their practice. Not surprisingly, there is near 
unanimity again in respect to the importance of public perception and 
acceptance/opposition, when considering the development of CCS projects, in 
particular when talking about underground storage components. A number of 
respondents pointed out that the UK was smart in this respect in going for only off-
shore storage, and that is why there has been little to no public opposition thus far. 
When asked how the public factor (i.e. perception, acceptance/opposition) affects the 
practice of the CCS industry, majority of the respondents noted that previous events, 
such as cancelation of the Barendrecht CCS project in the Netherlands, have increased 
the extent to which the project developers have engaged with the general public. Early 
engagement, effective communication, transparency, and trust, were identified as key 
issues to building reassurance, and in that way managing the risk of public factor 
significantly impacting the development of a particular project.  
     In sum, based on the conducted interviews, a number of important conclusions 
about governance and management of risks of CO2 storage can be reached. First, the 
perception of the appropriateness and the good understanding of the legal and 
regulatory frameworks – in the EU and the UK respectively – show to the relatively 
effective cooperation and coordination, not only between the government/EU and the 
industry, but across the wider spectrum of other stakeholders as well. 
279
 Second, as 
the data has also shown, it is impossible to have a perfect law in place before taking 
some level of risk. Therefore, development and deployment of the technology and the 
management of environmental risks requires a continuous process of information 
gathering, monitoring and verification, and cooperation between a wide range of 
stakeholders. As such, this notion also addresses the research questions of this study, 
in that the regulation has to-date managed to mediate between the management of 
environmental risks related to CO2 storage and the deployment of CCS technology in 
Europe. A more in-depth discussion and analysis of these implications are provided in 
the concluding chapter below. 
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION AND 
DISCUSSION 
 
This chapter sets out to offer the main conclusions and findings of this study, through 
which the main research question, have been answered. First, a brief reflection is 
offered on the choices made about the theory and analytic categories used in this 
research. This is followed by a summary and discussion of the key findings. As a 
reminder to the reader, these were the main research question, and two sub-questions, 
with associated objectives, which guided this study:  
 
To what extent does the current legal and regulatory regime for CO2 storage in 
Europe mediate between the governance and development of CCS technology? 
 
Sub-question #1: what is the nature of the CCS governance regime in Europe? 
 Identify key characteristics and debates surrounding risks and uncertainties 
related to CO2 storage, with focus on the need for and role of monitoring and 
verification.  
 Analyse the use of precaution in the legal and regulatory regimes; and its role 
in seeking to mediate between technological development and governance 
 Undertake an analytical review of the governance process, and the relevant 
legal and regulatory frameworks for CCS (in Europe and the UK). 
 Discuss whether the current legal and regulatory frameworks effectively 
manage the environmental risks of CO2 storage. 
 
Sub-question #2: (how) do the regulatory framework and the public factor impact 
the CCS industry? 
 Identify key remaining legal and regulatory challenges and barriers for CCS: 
as perceived by the CCS industry. 













"All courses of action are risky, so prudence is not in avoiding danger (it’s impossible), but calculating 
risk and acting decisively.” 
– Niccolo Machiavelli280 
 
Science is a continuous process of changes and advances in knowledge, and to some 
degree holds a level of authority in our culture. However, as has been the case in the 
past with emerging technologies, such as nuclear, and more recently with CCS, 
science can be laden with a degree of uncertainty, and inherently also risk. 
Environmental and scientific risks, with them in turn then also carry and create other 
types of risk, such as political and/or financial. The primary concern of this thesis has 
been the environmental risks, and their management. 
     Based on the epistemological and ontological ideals employed, the environmental 
risks associated with CO2 storage, such as leakage or a seismic event for example, are 
seen ‘as if’ real281. In other words, this means that because of unattainability of a 
100% certainty when it comes to knowing the location of the CO2 underground for 
example, and due to the existence of varying interpretations and perceptions
282
 of the 
concept, there cannot be a single correct or objective understanding and 
representation of the world/reality. There is also no empirical test to determine which 
view is right. 
     While Chapter 3 in this thesis examined the literature on CCS, and its gaps, 
Chapters 4 and 5 analysed the governance of CO2 storage in the EU and UK 
jurisdictions, respectively. From these observations, chapter 6 then examined the 
perception, understanding and impacts on the CCS industry in the UK. In this chapter 
then, the discussions from Chapters 4, 5 and 6 are brought together, and the 




7.1 Reflection on the theory and the analytical choices made 
While the adopted philosophical approach was that of critical realism, the key 
underpinning theory of this research was the governance network theory, supported 
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by the theory of bounded rationality. The first part of this chapter, as mentioned, is 
intended to provide some personal reflection on the theory and the analytical choices 
made throughout this research and the thesis. 
 
7.1.1 Governance network theory and bounded rationality 
The intention behind using the governance network theory was essentially to provide 
for an organizing framework through which the complex reality of collective policy 
and decision making in regards to carbon capture and storage (CCS) can be examined. 
This process of policy and decision-making occurs in a setting where there is a variety 
of actors and organisations are to an extent mutually interdependent, on 
material/immaterial resources, and guided by a common goal – to develop and deploy 
CCS. A key predisposition in using this theory and argument within this research, is 
that governance networks are an effective and efficient setting in which 
environmental risks of CO2 storage can be managed, and the CCS technology itself 
can be managed. In other words, the goal of this research is to examine the extent to 
which environmental risks are dealt with and managed through joint action and 
interaction. The value of using the governance network theory lies in that it considers 
both the macro- and micro-elements of governance, or the external influences (i.e. 
economic crisis, politics, etc.) and the interactions between the individual actors 
within a network.  
     In hoping to add to the analysis of the micro-elements of governance, the thesis 
sought to add elements of the bounded rationality theory, which is in the literature still 
primarily used in the field of economics to interpret consumer and business 
behaviour, and sits in contrast to the rational choice theory. Bounded rationality is 
essentially the study of how individuals and businesses make decisions in an 
uncertain world, when optimisation is out of reach. The key premise of the bounded 
rationality theory then, is that actors are limited by things such as their cognitive 
ability, contextual factors, availability of information, resources and/or time, and as 
such what they would constitute an optimal outcome is out of reach, making them 
utility satisfier as opposed to maximisers. This means that the guiding force of 
behaviour is that which will lead to a satisfying outcome of a particular actor. For the 
CCS industry, for example, this would mean a policy framework, which would 
incentivise investments into CCS. It would also mean, not necessarily a non-




barriers to overcome. As this research found, apart from uncertainty on several 
provisions, which as the industry has echoed are likely to be ironed out as technology 
development moves forward, the legal and regulatory frameworks can be described as 
a satisfying outcome – for the industry, and other stakeholders as well.    
     Overall, I believe that the governance network theory served the goals of this 
research well. First, it helped identify the key actors and pathways of interactions 
between them, which led to the development of the legal and regulatory framework 
for CCS in Europe. Second, it emphasised the importance of resource and capacity 
sharing between these actors in managing the environmental risks and uncertainties, 
and in getting CCS technology developed and deployed. Third, on a broader level, it 
allowed for the examination of the intersection between environment, law and 
technology in the context of CCS. The overall aim of using the governance network 
theory was not a causal analysis of governance of CCS and CO2 storage, but rather, as 
mentioned, to provide for an organising framework through which a complex reality 
can be presented. To this extent, I believe the thesis has managed to achieve its goal.  
     On the other hand, although bounded rationality theory was never intended to 
serve as a ‘core’ component of the thesis, its utilisation did not work to the extent that 
I had hoped for at the commencement of this project. In a way, rather than a theory 
per se, it would have been better to refer to bounded rationality as a concept, which 
served to complement the governance network theory, as opposed to a theory in itself. 
To that end, the utilisation of the concept of bounded rationality as a theory was not 
successful. Nevertheless, bounded rationality theory leaves open an interesting area of 
further research in regards to CCS.  
 
7.1.2 Critical realism 
A critical realist perspective was adopted as an overarching, or ontological stance, in 
this research. The key underlying assumption of critical realism lies in that an 
objectively based reality is impossible. It is only partially pre-existent, in that the risks 
associated with CO2 storage are real, and also partly socially constructed. In other 
words, within the scope of this thesis, the belief is that a purely empirically based 
truth about the risks of CO2 storage is unattainable, and that risks of CO2 storage have 
different meanings to different actors. For some, the predominant concern is the 




contamination of groundwater, etc. For others, it is the financial and liability risks. 
This was the premise from which this research set out. 
     However, as the research progressed, and after speaking to a variety of 
stakeholders, including the industry, government and academia, there was almost an 
attempt at appeasement coming both from the literature and the stakeholders 
themselves in regards to environmental concerns. In other words, despite the 
recognized existence of uncertainties and risks associated with CO2 storage, key ‘risk’ 
and ‘uncertainty’ discussions in the end always turned about policy and financing. 
This was perhaps one of the main surprises, that the ability to manage the 
environmental risks and uncertainties associated with CO2 storage received such a 
large consensus among stakeholders. In a way, critical realism therefore combines the 
philosophy both about the natural and the social worlds. 
     In epistemological terms, knowledge is considered to come from human 
experience, and as such, adopting a critical realist perspective meant that as a 
researcher, I had to be in the place of inquiry, and listen and talk to the right people, 
and extract data through interviews and observation. In other words, the philosophical 
stance adopted also dictated my research design and methods used.  
     Overall, I believe the critical realism perspective is, as mentioned, well placed to 
examine and analyse the key underlying concern of this research, the management of 
environmental risks of CO2 storage in Europe. In particular, it argues that the legal 
and regulatory frameworks for CO2 storage (i.e. the CCS Directive and UK 
Regulations) are the medium through which the complex realities are encompassed. It 
then examines, whether this medium is effective in managing environmental risks, 
whilst allowing for the development and deployment of CCS technology in Europe.  
 
 
7.2 Summary and discussion of key findings 
7.2.1 Dealing with the Uncertainty Challenge 
Ralph Waldo Emerson, an American writer, once noted that “knowledge is the 
antidote to fear.”283 Placing this quote in the context of CCS is not too difficult. The 
main concerns, or fears, for example, relate to the stored CO2 escaping to the 
atmosphere, or seismic events, to the extent that the resulting impacts are devastating. 
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These fears and concerns are essentially grounded in the existence of 
scientific/environmental uncertainties associated with the process itself. Although 
CO2 injection has been used in the United States for decades for the purpose of 
enhanced oil recovery (EOR), the idea of permanently storing the CO2 is relatively 
new; despite significant progress made in the past decade or so. By progress, I refer to 
proving, or perhaps better said, demonstrating, that there is great confidence in CO2 
storage. Development of various monitoring and verification techniques and 
technologies for measuring and tracking the CO2 plume underground has played a key 
role in this respect.  
     As has been discovered through interviews with various stakeholders, discussed in 
Chapter 6, in particular those from the CCS industry, even though knowledge of what 
happens once CO2 is stored underground has greatly increased, it is still impossible to 
predict with a 100% accuracy for example, where the CO2 plume is, when, if ever, it 
will leak to the surface, or at least migrate outside the predicted boundaries.  
     The largest scientific challenge, linked to technologies such as CCS, has turned out 
to be how to best reduce these scientific uncertainties, and anticipate and prevent 
harm from unexpected events. Effects of leakage over a longer period of time remain 
one of the key uncertainties. In general words, the existence of scientific uncertainty 
predisposes any development and deployment of technologies such as CCS to a 
certain level of risk. Management of those risks then becomes a central concern for 
the policy and decision-makers as well.  
 
How much uncertainty and risk is acceptable? 
From a scientific point of view, estimating the likely and acceptable CO2 leakage 
rates has in the literature primarily been quantitatively focused, with estimates 
ranging from 0.01% to 1% per annum
284
 of total injected CO2 into a particular storage 
reservoir or aquifer. Most studies would agree that even if small percentages of CO2 
does in fact escape from the storage reservoir back into the atmosphere, or move 
laterally past its boundaries, this would not jeopardize the effectiveness of 
CCS/geologic CO2 storage as an effective climate change mitigation strategy (IEA, 
2013). It is also important to note that there is significantly better understanding of 
depleted oil and gas reservoirs, due to past experience with oil exploration and 
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extraction, as compared to the other option for CO2 storage, the saline aquifers, which 
offer greater overall storage capacity.  
     On the other hand, from an industrial perspective, economic challenges and 
uncertainty are primarily related to investment into capture technologies, which 
constitute up to 80% of the total CCS-chain (capture, transport, storage) cost.
285
 In 
some industrial sectors, such as cement production, chemical industry, or the power 
sector as well, achieving for example a composition of 90% CO2 could offer a 
significant cost saving when compared to 99% CO2 purity.
286
 As has been pointed out 
by some interviewees (see Chapter 6), more guidance on the stream criteria would 
reduce some of the uncertainties related to the CO2 stream.  
     In addition, for the up-stream part of the CCS process (capture), a great deal of 
uncertainty is also related to the price of carbon credits in the long run. For the down-
stream portion of the chain (storage), there is essentially no cap on the amount of 
financial contribution that a project operator must make after the transfer of 
responsibility to the competent authority. This means that the operators may remain 
liable for all the costs that occur after the transfer. As was pointed out in Chapter 6 by 
a number of industry respondents, when asked about the uncertainties related to the 
extent and scope of the financial security provisions, this then means that project 
developers and operators cannot accurately quantify their risk exposure, which in turn 
leads to a slower development of the projects themselves.  
     In reference to the uncertainty and risks of CO2 storage, as Phillips (2014) pointed 
out in an interview, “…it is very difficult to prove that [CO2] won’t leak. [He thinks 
that] there is an issue around how you handle that uncertainty.” 287  Furthermore, 
evidence presented in Chapter 6 also points to the distinction between quantifying and 
detecting CO2 leakage. As far as it relates to the latter, there was a general consensus 
that current technologies are sufficient for detection and monitoring of the CO2 
underground to a ‘reasonable degree of certainty’. In relation to the former, however, 
the biggest uncertainty remains the ability to effectively quantify any fugitive 
emissions from the storage reservoirs. This will be particular important in regulatory 
terms under the EU ETS Directive, which applies in the case that any leakage results 
in emissions or release to the atmosphere, or the water column. In addition, when it is 
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difficult to determine which monitoring techniques are most suitable for quantifying 
CO2 leakage, and little data exists about the uncertainty in the quantification of these 
techniques, it only complicates things further.  
     As evidenced from Chapters 4 and 5, which have analysed the legal and regulatory 
frameworks for CCS in the EU and the UK respectively, there are no provisions that 
would explicitly state what level, in numeric terms, of uncertainty and risk is legally 
acceptable. As mentioned, the CCS Directive does address the behaviour of the CO2 
plume in its provisions, but does not touch on the quantification activities, which in a 
case of a leakage event take place under the Monitoring and Reporting Guidelines 
(MRGs). Even the MRGs, however, do not specify any detection limits. While the 
CCS Directive does not address uncertainties in the monitoring program or any 
detection limits, the EU Commission did issue a Decision in June 2010
288
 on 
monitoring and reporting for CCS, in which it notes, for example, that “the amount of 
emissions leaked from the storage complex shall be quantified for each of the leakage 
events with a maximum overall uncertainty over the reporting period of ± 7,5 %. In 
case the overall uncertainty of the applied quantification approach exceeds ± 7,5 %, 
an adjustment shall be applied, as follows: 
 
CO2, Reported [tCO2] = CO2, Quantified [tCO2] × (1 + (UncertaintySystem [%]/100) – 0,075) 
 
Essentially, what the above equation implies is that CO2 storage project operators 
should be as accurate in their accounting and reporting of the estimates of the escaped 
CO2. However, given the current availability of monitoring technologies, accounting 
for the total amount of escaped CO2 from a storage complex, which in some cases 
could be kilometres wide, is to date still extremely difficult. As was sounded by a 
good majority of the interviewees in this research, monitoring is still extremely 
expensive and some monitoring technologies currently being developed are not 
practical to implement just yet.  
    Although, Wartmann et al. (2009) ask an interesting question, whether there is even 
a need to consider any detection limits
289
 in the first place. They believe that any 
                                                     
288
 EU, 2010. Commission Decision of 8 June 2010 amending Decision 2007/589/EC as regards the 
inclusion of Monitoring and Reporting Guidelines for greenhouse gas emissions from capture, 
transport and geological storage of carbon dioxide. Available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32010D0345&from=EN  
289
 Detection limits could be defined in a number of ways, such as by: the fraction of a background CO2 




seepage that is too small to be detected can by definition not be quantified and thus 
included in any emission accounting (p. 4464). In other words, any seepage that is too 
small to be detected could be disregarded, provided that a good monitoring program is 
in place and the rigorous site selection was done. A bigger question for them, in 
respect to emissions accounting is the accuracy in the estimates that can be detected. 
In relation to CO2 storage operations, under the MRGs, accuracy requirements can 
pose a much greater challenge, given the limited experience with monitoring of 
seepage from CO2 storage reservoir, and in light of the existence of uncertainties, 
especially in the case of saline aquifers.  
     The principal difficulty, in seepage estimates, thus remains the magnitude of 
uncertainty still present. As such, many of the interviewees, as well as the literature to 
an extent, argue for the imperative to continue with the scientific research and 
development of appropriate monitoring approaches, especially for estimating seepage 
from reservoirs. This will lead to a better understanding of the uncertainties, increase 
the knowledge, and serve as the ‘antidote to the fear’, as Ralph Waldo Emerson 
would say.  
     One general consensus that also seems to appear both in the literature review (see 
Chapter 3), and in the interviews with industry respondents and other stakeholders 
from the academia (see Chapter 6), is that uncertainty, and residual level of risk, will 
always be there, given that it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to prove a 
negative – i.e. no leakage. At the same time, there seems to be near unanimous 
agreement that it will in the end come down to whether it is shown to the satisfaction 
of the relevant competent authorities, that the best currently available technologies 
have been used, precautions taken, and that appropriate procedures were followed. 
     The findings from Chapters 4 and 5, confirmed by responses from the interviewees 
in Chapter 6, thus indicate that when it comes to managing the uncertainties and risks 
related to underground storage of CO2, the driving vehicle remains the so-called 
governance network, with the legal and regulatory frameworks being the main 
supportive tools.  
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7.2.2 Precaution: mediating between technological development and governance  
One of the underlying themes of this research has been the nature of the task at hand – 
safely storing CO2 underground despite the existence of uncertainties and inherent 
environmental risks. While the need for the deployment of CCS as a climate change 
mitigation tool, has to date widely been acknowledged, various observers would still 
debate as to how the associated risks can best be managed. As such, another 
underlying theme of this thesis has been this gap between the ability to effectively 
manage the environmental risks, and at the same time not restrict the technological 
innovation necessary for CCS. As chapters 3,4 and 5 have shown, the use of 
‘precaution’ sits in the middle of seeking to mediate between the two – the 
management of risk/governance and technological development. 
 
7.2.2.1 Precautionary principle and governance  
Precautionary Principle 
In explaining the European approach to CCS development, management of 
environmental risks and technology development, is seen best through the use of the 
precautionary principle. In brief, the precautionary principle is in essence a kind of 
guide for policy makers, which stipulates that in condition of uncertainty, decision-
makers should act so as to prevent potentially serious or irreversible environmental 
harm. In other words, according to this principle, uncertainty cannot be an excuse for 
regulatory inaction.  
     The precautionary principle, as Chapter 4 has examined, has to date been firmly 
embedded in many of the EU’s treaties and reflected in many of the laws and CCS-
related policies, such as waste management or integrated pollution prevention and 
control, for example. The rationale behind applying the precautionary principle in the 
EU is essentially, first and foremost, as a risk assessment tool. In other words, the 
principle in a way compels the policy and decision-makers to collect, gather and 
analyse data and evidence, and potential risks on that evidence. In particular when it 
comes to new areas and technologies such as CCS.  
     Whereas opponents of CCS for example, would use the principle to argue for 
inaction and non-deployment of this technology, in light of the uncertainties and risks 
involved, its proponents on the other hand, use it as a form or kind of reassurance 




this principle in that caution is being taken, observers should be reassured that 
appropriate safeguards are in place to ensure the safety of the technology. 
     Based on the critical realist ontological perspective adopted in this research, a 
major limitation of the precautionary principle is also in the notion that a definitive 
conclusion about the nature of risk is possible. Rather, risk is seen ‘as if’ real, 
meaning the concept of risk is essentially often about perception, and to some extent 
socially constructed. In other words, any scientific assessment is not going to be 
entirely neutral/objective, and could thus result into inconsistent policies and 
regulations, and as a result into their inconsistent application. This inconsistency in 
application then in turn can lead to companies feeling a sense of unpredictability or 
uncertainty, which can lead to further slowing down of progress, in terms of 
technological development and deployment. So, when asked about their perception of 
the current legal and regulatory framework, a number of interviewees pointed out that 
there are still limits when it comes to the application of the precautionary principle. 
This belief was evident in the context and content of the monitoring and verification 
requirements, which often costs a lot of time and money, potentially slowing down 
progress.  
     Essentially, the application of the precautionary principle entails a risk assessment 
and management framework in which the scientific uncertainties associated with 
long-term storage and possible negative impacts are addressed. In other words, the 
precautionary principle is the characteristic and guiding element of the legal and 
regulatory frameworks, and for the overall governance of CO2 storage. 
 
Governance 
As mentioned in Chapter 2 on theory and methodology, the concept of governance 
means different things to different people, and has in the literature become a 
notoriously slippery term. Governance, in this study, is thought of as the systematic 
interaction between numerous stakeholders, including the private and public sector, 
citizens, NGOs, etc. In addition, governance represents the incorporation of various 
norms and principles that are used to guide a polity (i.e. the EU) in a particular 
direction. As Chapter 3 has demonstrated, as far as it relates to the governance of CCS 
in the EU, a key element has been the institutionalization of the precautionary 




     In case of the latter, the term ‘governance network’ emphasizes and focuses on the 
recurring or institutionalized formal and informal resource exchanges between 
governmental and non-governmental actors (Davies, 2011: 3). In other words, the 
nature of the so-called governance network is mainly about information gathering and 
resource exchange. As was discussed in Chapter 4 as well, the EU institutions 
themselves are relatively resource poor, in that even though they possess their own in-
house experts in an area, outside expertise from various stakeholders, including the 
industry and research institutions, for example, are often sought and are seen as 
crucial.  
     As described in Chapter 2, on the theoretical framework of the thesis (section 2.2), 
looking at the act of governing has become the matter for both public and private 
actors, neither of which, as Damgaard (2005) points out, have the capacity to address 
the public policy problems alone, but rather “find themselves participating in 
governing schemes characterized by resource dependencies” (p. 2). As such, 
governance, as mentioned, becomes in large part about information gathering. 
However, the nature of governance is then also about gathering support, in particular 
from those who will be most implicated by the technology. This includes the industry, 
or project developers, as well as the general public. The latter, however, is for the 
most part formally excluded from the policy-making process.  
     As mentioned, in Chapters 4 and 5, where the legal and regulatory frameworks for 
CCS in the EU and the UK were examined, respectively, there are no explicit 
provisions that would require include the general public in CCS project development 
and deployment. The public’s voice/view is mostly represented in the policy and 
decision-making process by various environmental NGOs, such as Bellona, Green 
Alliance, E3G, and Greenpeace, to name a few. Even though, technically, project 
developers are not required to consult the general public on matters relating to their 
projects, apart from mandatory consultations during the environmental impact 
assessment (EIA) process, most project developers will have some extent of public 
engagement in place. This has been the case primarily in light of the cancelation of a 






7.2.3 Regulation: a mediating tool between technological development and 
governance 
In light of what was discussed in Chapter 3 and mentioned in Section 7.1 of this 
chapter above, the main uncertainties and challenges continue to lie in the storage 
component of the CCS chain. Given the existence of these uncertainties, and the 
identification of a growing range of unknowns (i.e. tracking CO2 underground), and 
the unknown-unknowns, which cannot be eliminated, permanent risk management is 
required. Essentially, this is the goal and objective of the legal and regulatory 
frameworks for CCS. In Europe, as focused on in Chapter 4, this is mainly the 2009 
EU CCS Directive, whereas in the UK, risk management is embedded in the legal 
framework which came in anticipation of the CCS Directive (i.e. Energy Act 2008), 
and a number of Regulations which came as a result of its transposition into national 
law. 
     Apart from providing a comprehensive overview of the governance of CCS in 
Europe, and in the UK as a case example, given the set out central research question, 
the central aim of this study was an analysis of how, and to what extent, regulations 
help mediate between CCS technology development and the management of CO2 
storage risks, in the presence of scientific uncertainty. As the section above explains, 
and the research argues, the application of the precautionary principle essentially 
serves as the building block of this bridge between technology development and 
governance, or management of risks related to CO2 storage. 
 
Managing the risk of leakage  
Both the CCS Directive, and CCS Regulations in the UK take as their primary 
objective to regulate a safe and environmentally sound geologic storage of the 
captured CO2. These legal and regulatory frameworks are based on the notion of 
minimizing the risks and verifying storage, as well as the remediation of potential 
damages that may occur.
290
 In other words, the CCS Directive and UK regulations on 
CCS represent a risk management framework, set to ensure that this technology 
would be deployed in an environmentally safe way. As mentioned, the primary 
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objective of this research was to assess whether these frameworks mediate between 
the management of the risks of CO2 storage, and the deployment of the CCS 
technology.  
     In the review of the scientific literature, it was shown that when it comes to 
geologic storage of CO2, one of the main risks, and concerns is related to the leakage 
of the CO2 from a storage reservoir. As mentioned above, the theoretical 
understanding of ‘risk’ in this study is one of critical realism, meaning that while 
potential for CO2 leakage is there, the level of risk, and its acceptability will often 
vary between stakeholders. Moreover, there is no agreement as to what leakage rates 
are likely from any given reservoir. Various studies have come to estimate these to 
range from 0.01% to 1% per annum
291
. Most authors agree, however, that leakage is 
likely to occur, and that the rate of that leakage is heavily dependent on many factors, 
in particular on the surrounding geology or the vicinity of other exploration wells.  
     Well integrity is another issue that increases the risk of CO2 leakage. However, as 
Hepple and Benson (2004) conclude in their study on the implication of surface 
seepage on the effectiveness of geologic storage of CO2, even if small amounts of the 
CO2 do escape form a reservoir back to the atmosphere, this does not preclude the 
process and technology from being an effective climate change mitigation strategy. 
Both the scientific and legal communities, for the most part acknowledge that the risk 
of leakage is there, and will vary between storage sites.  
      In order to prevent, or better said, manage the risk of leakage, and thereby to 
human health and the environment, the CCS Directive, and subsequent regulations in 
the UK lay down extensive requirements for the entire life cycle of a storage site – 
from exploration, selection and permitting, operation, closure and post-closure. This 
research has shown that the central features of both the CCS Directive as well as the 
regulations in the UK, as well as the governance framework as a whole, are the 
permitting regime and monitoring and verification, which in essence also characterize 
the management of risks related to CO2 storage. 
 
Permitting and monitoring 
Injection of CO2 is essentially only allowed to occur in carefully assessed and 
characterized storage sites
292
, and is preconditioned on the project operator obtaining 
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both an exploration permit
293
 and a storage permit.
294 295
 Once issued, the storage 
permit also needs to be submitted to the European Commission for review. This is 
done so as to increase the transparency of the process, thereby aiming to enhance the 
public confidence in the process and a particular project. 
     However, the current legal and regulatory regimes in the EU and the UK set a 
number of requirements and criteria (i.e. on reporting and inspection – Art. 14 and 15 
in CCS Directive) that have to be met by the permit holder. Failure to do so, or in case 
of failure to communicate any matters of concern related to the operation and integrity 
of a storage site, can result in the competent authority (CA) or the European 
Commission to either change, update or withdraw a storage permit (Art. 11 in CCS 
Directive). In a case when a permit is revoked, the CA is responsible for closing the 
storage site, as well as for remediation. All associated costs, however, are to be born 
by the previous operator.  
     The main purpose of the CCS permitting regime is, as mentioned, to provide 
environmentally safe geological storage of CO2. A key part of the permitting regime, 
and a pre-condition for approval of the permit, is the monitoring plan (Art. 13(2) in 
CCS Directive), which has to be submitted for approval together with an application 
for a storage permit.
296
 A number of interviewees, as shown in Chapter 6, also pointed 
out that it will come down to project operators’ conformity with the monitoring plan, 
that will serve as the basis for CA’s decision on whether requirements for the transfer 
of responsibility have been met.
297
  
     As this thesis has demonstrated in Chapters 3,4 and 5, as well as confirmed in 
Chapter 6, where interpreted results of the interviews conducted are presented, 
monitoring and verification is the essential component in assessing whether the CO2 
is behaving as expected, and if any identified leakage or irregularities are damaging to 
the environment or human health. In this process, a number of different monitoring 
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technologies are available, for example, to help define vertical and lateral migration 
of injected CO2, and help to reassure that the injected CO2 remains underground.  
     As several studies
298
 have also pointed out, there is no ‘cookie cutter approach’ to 
the selection of monitoring technologies, as every site will be different based on its 
geology and/or capacity. The legal and regulatory frameworks take account of that 
fact, and are not prescriptive in terms of the types of monitoring technologies that are 
to be used. The CCS Directive, as well as the UK Regulations, when it comes to the 
type of monitoring technologies to be used to meet the requirements of establishing 
and updating the monitoring plan, only state that the choice of monitoring technology 
shall be based on the best practice available, at the time of the design. 
     Essentially, this research has thus far demonstrated that, when it comes to the 
management of environmental risks of CO2 storage, what is written in the current 
legal and regulatory frameworks for CCS in the EU, and in the UK given that it was 
taken as a case study country, in theory at least, serves to provide a sufficient level of 
risk management. It would not be true to make claims as to their effectiveness, given 
that no commercial-scale projects exist. However, as results from Chapter 6 have 
shown, it is the belief of those involved with the development of current CCS/CO2 
storage projects, as well as other stakeholders, that for the most part, ‘everything is 
there – it just needs to be road-tested’.  
 
Facilitating or slowing down technological development? 
One of the goals of this research, as mentioned above, was to examine the impact of 
the CCS legal and regulatory frameworks acting as constraints or drivers for the 
development and deployment of the CCS technology.
299
 In other words, the research 
has attempted to clarify whether the current frameworks in place today, at the EU 
level, and in the UK, has led to an improved environment in which innovation and 
CCS technology development can take place, or whether as a result of these 
regulations, they are being suppressed.  
     However, as has already been noted in this study, both via references from the 
literature and with responses from the interviews with various stakeholders, one of the 
primary reasons for the slow development of CCS technology in the EU, has for the 
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most part been the lack of sufficient policy incentives for the project developers. This 
refers to both short- and long-term perceptions that the investments into CCS projects 
will eventually pay off. Policy (un) certainty has been identified as the key barrier for 
CCS at this moment in time in 2015. 
     Nevertheless, in the UK, the recent Electricity Market Reform (EMR)
300
, under 
which long-term contracts in the form of feed-in-tariffs with contracts for difference 
(FiT CfD), the introduction of a carbon price floor, and an emissions performance 
standard, was for the most part welcomed by majority of the stakeholders as the first 
market based incentive mechanism that would support investment in not only CCS, 
but in other low-carbon power generation technologies as well. While the EMR is 
said to increase the degree of certainty for CCS, given that commercial-scale projects 
are needed as soon as possible, uncertainty still exists about the timing for the 
implementation of this framework remains, the application of the FiT CfD to 
emissions-heavy industries and power generation projects currently not in the CCS 
Competition. 
     In any case, analysis in chapters 4 and 5 has also shown that there are still a 
number of other potentially contentious issues that could prevent the investment in, 
and development of CCS projects. These relate particularly to the issues of transfer of 
responsibility, and lack of clarity on the financial security and financial mechanism 
provisions. Nevertheless, as interviewee responses, presented in Chapter 6, have 
shown, on a general level, there is a wide consensus among the stakeholders, in 
including the CCS industry, that as it stands, the legal and regulatory frameworks do 
not present any major barriers to the development of CCS. The lack of clarity on 
certain provisions, and any uncertainties, are expected to be ironed out between the 
project developers and the competent authorities, before the final investment 
decisions (FIDs) are made. 
     A good example of such cooperation and negotiation, between the project 
developer, the competent authority, and the European Commission, is seen in the case 
of the ROAD project in the Netherlands
301
. One of the key outstanding issues in this 
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project appeared during the permitting stage. The developers believed that the 
required level of detail in the monitoring and corrective measure plans, as required by 
the CCS Directive to be submitted at the time of the permit application, was too great. 
A suggested solution by TAQA Energy B.V., the ROAD project’s storage permit 
holder and storage operator, was to lower the level of details in all the plans in the 
application, but update these plans prior to injection. They argued that the plans in the 
permit application provided sufficient information and the level of detail to prove that 
the CO2 can safely be stored, thereby complying with the CCS Directive 
requirements.
302
 In the end, the competent authorities, as well as the European 
Commission, were satisfied with the level of detail and the characterization and 
assessment of the storage site and complex, confirming the suitability of the chosen 
storage location, thereby granting the storage permit.
303
 
     These examples go to show how project developers have interpreted outstanding 
legal and regulatory issues and were then able to reach an agreeable solution with the 
competent authorities.
304
 It also supports the view of this research, that for mediation 
between managing the environmental risks and development and deployment of CCS 
technology to be most effective, the regulators must work closely with storage site 
operators. As such, governance networks are as important, if not more so, than the 
regulations themselves.  
 
7.3 Concluding remarks 
7.3.1 Implications and originality 
This research has set out to uncover and provide a more in-depth look into both the 
process and the nature of governance and regulation of CCS, in particular for CO2 
storage, in Europe, while taking the United Kingdom as a case study example. 
Pursuant to the main research question, the main objective was to determine whether 
the legal and regulatory frameworks effectively mediate between the management of 
                                                                                                                                                        
B.V. is the partner for CO2 injection and permanent storage. The latter is also the storage permit holder 
and storage operator.  
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environmental risks associated with CO2 storage, and the development and 
deployment of CCS technology.  
     As discussed in Chapter 3, and mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the 
literature on CCS, let alone on the governance of the technology, is still relatively 
new. Thus, one of the contributions of this research is on the general level, in that it 
adds to the growing literature on both the governance, as well as regulation of CCS, 
and the storage part of the chain in particular. More specifically, it provides an 
updated picture of the current regulatory situation, in 2015, which could be a useful 
reference for a number of stakeholders, in particular in light of the upcoming review 
of the EU CCS Directive in 2015. Claims to originality are also based in that the study 
of governance, or the management of risk as this thesis understands the concept, is 
approached from a critical realist perspective, which sits between the still prevalent 
positivist and interpretive approaches.
305
  
     Apart from solely environmental or technical challenges still at hand (i.e. in 
managing risks and development/deployment of CCS), given the existence of various 
other economic, political, legal and/or social challenges, the literature on governance 
and CCS should continue to increasingly focus on best-practice and what can be 
learned from different levels of governance (i.e. national, state and local). At the same 
time, gathering as much information as possible from other polities that share some of 
these challenges would also be beneficial. As such, further and comparative research 
on governance between different jurisdictions such as the EU and the US for example 
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that the management of risks and deployment of CCS technology resists either a positivist or 
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APPENDIX A: (Changes) in the EU voting procedures  
Prior to the signing of the SEA, the European environmental policy, as mentioned, 
had fairly little legal basis. Legislations related to environmental matters could only 
be passed if they were directly relevant to the completion of the internal market, and 
even then must have passed by on the basis of unanimity in the Council of Ministers. 
     The SEA, on the other hand, in hopes of making the decision-making in the EU 
more efficient and thus expedite the single market integration, increased the 
participative role of the European Parliament (EP) in the decision-making process
306
. 
It also expanded the areas covered by the quality majority voting (QMV) procedure. 
Nevertheless, legal acts, which pursued environmental protection as an independent 
objective, were still based on unanimous vote in the Council of Ministers, and the role 
of the EP remained merely consultative (Bähr, 2010).  
     The TEU in 1993 then considerably extended the areas where QMV applies, albeit 
with certain exceptions
307
. This, in conjunction with the co-operation procedure, made 
it regarded as the norm and the standard legislative procedure for environmental 
matters (Wilkinson, 2002). Nevertheless, even though the TEU established a more 
efficient decision-making procedure for environmental policy, some of its 
arrangements were still seen as complex with certain procedures existing side by side, 
and there being a potential for conflict between environmental measures and the 
approximation of laws in connection with the internal market (Europa, 2013).  
     The Treaty of Amsterdam, which entered into force in 1999, then further addressed 
the decision-making procedures. Its most significant contribution came in the form of 
a procedural change with the extension of the co-decision procedure
308
, originally 
introduced by the TEU in 1993, on most environmental protection issues
309
.The co-
                                                     
306
 The EP’s role was increased by giving it the power of second reading of legislative proposals, via 
the co-operation procedure. For example, if the EP would disagree with a position of the Council, 
following its second reading, the Council could either adopt the EP’s decision via QMV, or reject it by 
unanimity only. 
307
 Ex-Art. 95 TEC, now Art. 114 TFEU. Exceptions to QMV include things like environmental taxes, 
town and country planning and land use. 
308
 This was achieved by amending ex-Art. 130 into Art. 175 TEC (now Art. 192 TFEU). 
309
 Exceptions to the co-decision procedure in environmental policy, in which the EP receives only a 
consultative role and thereby also no veto power, and the Council has to decide unanimously, refer to 
policy outputs which relate to: i) fiscal provisions; ii) town and country planning; iii) quantitative 




decision procedure is essentially the legislative process central to the EU’s decision-
making system, and has become widely used for decisions in environmental 
matters
310
 (Krämer, 2006). With the passing of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, this 
procedure became known as the ordinary legislative procedure, and has essentially the 




























                                                                                                                                                        
choice of energy sources and the general structure of energy supply in the Member States (Art. 175(2) 
of the TEC).  
310
 It starts with a legislative proposal from the Commission, which submits it to the EP and the 
Council. At this point the Council may then amend the proposal only by unanimity, and following the 
reading and opinion from the EP, may adopt it by QMV, if it approves the EP’s amendments contained 
in its opinion, or if the EP does not suggest any amendments. Otherwise, the Council establishes a 
common position, which if approved by the EP, or if it opts out of the second reading, the legal act is 
adopted. A legislative proposal is deemed to have failed if an absolute majority in the EP rejects the 
common position. An amendment to the Councils common position may also be proposed by an 
absolute majority in the EP, which upon acceptance by the Commission, the Council may adopt the act 
by QMV. However, if the Commissions makes further amendments, the Council has to vote 
unanimously in order to pass the proposal. If the Council does not agree with all amendments, a 
Conciliation Committee is established, which if it does not reach a compromise, deems the legislative 
proposal as rejected. However, if the Committee reaches an agreement on a joint text, this text then 
requires the approval of an absolute majority in the EP and a qualified majority in the Council for it to 
be adopted as a legal act (Bähr, 2010: 92-93; Krämer, 2006: 71-72). 
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The ide that when individuals and/or 
businesses make decisions, their 
rationality is limited by a variety of 
factors such as their cognitive limitation, 
availability of information, and the 
availability of time.  
Carbon capture and storage 
The process whereby the CO2 is the 
process, whereby up to 95% of the CO2 
emissions produced from large stationary 
emission sources in electricity generation 
and industrial processes is captured and 
thereby prevented from entering the 
atmosphere. The CO2 is first captured, 
then under extreme pressure put into a 
liquid-like state, transported to a pre-
selected storage site, and stored up to 3km 
below the surface. Storage can occur 
either on- or off-shore.  
Carbon dioxide 
A colorless, odorless, and the primary 
greenhouse gas emitted through human 
activities such as fossil fuel burning. 
Burining of carbon-based fuels has lead to 
its increased concentration in the 
atmosphere, leading to climate change, 
such as global warming and ocean 
acidification. 
Carbon Sequestration Leadership Forum 
An international initiative, consisting of 
23 member countries and the European 
Commission, to advance carbon capture 
and storage (CCS) technology. 
CCS Industry 
A concept used to describe the private 
sector companies that are involved in the 
development of carbon capture and 





A concept which refers to the changes in 
the Earth's climate over time. Although 
climate change is caused by many factors 
such as biotic processes, variations in 
solar radiation received by Earth, plate 
tectonics and volcanic eruptions, among 
others, the largest contributor to the 
changing climate - global warming - over 
the past 150 years has been found to be 
anthropogenic (human). 
CO2 storage 
Part of the CCS chain, where the CO2 is 
injected deep (up to 3km) below the 
surface for permanent storage. It can 
occur either on- or off-shore, in saline 
aquifers or depleted oil and gas reservoirs. 
Competent authority 
The primary government authority in each 
EU Member State, which is delegated the 
lead authority, capacity and responsibility 
to issue, review and terminate CO2 
storage and exploration permits. Once 
injection ceases, and a certain period 
elapses, the competent authority will also 
accept the responsibility for all legal 
obligations from a storage site operator.  
Critical realism 
A philosophical approach, originally 
developed by Roy Bhaskar, which 
combines the philosophies of science and 
social science in order to describe the 
interface between the natural and social 
worlds. This research adopts a critical 
realist perspective in that it views risks of 
CO2 storage 'as if' real - given the 
uncertainties and different meanings to 
different stakeholders.  
Department of Energy and Climate Change 
A UK government department created in 
2008 to deal with climate change issues. 
Majority of the department's budget is on 
managing UK's historic nuclear sites. It is 
also entrusted to develop strategy and 
policies on energy and the environment. It 
is headed by the Secretary of State (for 
Energy and Climate Change), who is also 






The availability of natural resources 
required to meet energy consumption 
demands. Uneven distribution of energy 
supplies (i.e. coal, natural gas) has led to 
vulnerabilities for a number of countries, 
who are highly dependent on natural 
resources from other countries (i.e. 
Russia).  
Enhanced oil recovery 
A process whereby the remainder of crude 
oil can be extracted from an oil field. It is 
also referred to as improved or tertiary 
recovery of oil, as the process is done 
after primary and secondary extraction. 
The captured CO2 can be used for this 
purpose; in the US it is also the primary 
driver for the development of CCS 
technology.  
Environmental Impact Assessment 
A formal process which is used to predict 
environmental impacts/consequences, 
both positive and negative, of a proposed 
plan, policy or program prior to the 
decision to move forward. For CO2 
storage projects, an EIA must be made 
during the scoping/characterisation phase 
- before any injection occurs. No EIA is 
required for experimental CO2 storage 
projects in Europe.  
Fracking 
A process of extracting natural gas/shale 
gas. The gas is located in tightly 
compressed shale rocks deep below the 
surface. The drilling is done thousands of 
meters below the surface, normally at 
depths of 1500m to 5000m. In contrast to 
conventional gas extraction techniques, 
however, the drilling is done horizontally, 
so as to maximize its economic 
feasibility. Once the boreholes are lined 
with steel and concrete casing, a mixture 
of water, chemicals and sand is injected at 
very high pressure in order to fracture the 
shale, after which the shale gas flows 




Global Carbon Capture and Storage Institute 
An international institute, established in 
2009, whose mission is to accelerate the 
development, demonstration and 
deployment of CCS. Its members consist 
of governments, corporations and smaller 
companies, as well as research bodies and 
NGOs. Every year it produces a 
comprehensive report (Global Status of 
CCS) which provides an overview of 
global and regional developments in CCS 
and what is required to promote the 
development and deployment of the 
technology.  
Governance 
A process of governing, which 
encompasses efforts undertaken by a 
government, the private and public sector 
institutions, including NGOs. In this 
research, governance is understood as the 
management of risks related to CO2 
storage.  
Governance network 
A relatively stable horizontal articulation 
of interdependent yet autonomous actors, 
whose interactions occur through 
negotiations within a regulative, cognitive 
and imaginary framework. This 
framework contributes to the production 
of a public purpose; in this research the 
development of CCS technology and 
management of associated risks, in 
particular in relation to CO2 storage. 
Governance Network Theory 
A general theory which focuses on the 
manner in which environmental risks are 
dealt with and managed through joint 
action and interaction.  
Greenhouse gases 
A gas in the atmosphere which absorbs 
and emits radiation; a fundamental cause 
of the greenhouse effect. Primary 
greenhouse gases include water vapor, 
methane, ozone, and carbon dioxide 
(CO2). It is estimated that up to 40% of 
the increase in atmospheric CO2 
concentrations since the industrial 
revolution in 1750 has occurred as a result 
of human activities - combustion of 






A top layer of rock, soil and ecosystem 
which lies above a coal seam. In respect 
to CO2 storage, it should provide a seal so 
that the CO2 injected into the ground does 
not escape to the surface.  
Oxy-fuel combustion CO2 capture 
A process of capturing the CO2. The fuel 
(i.e. coal, biomass) is burned in pure 
oxygen, as opposed to air, such as in other 
two capture methods. Once Nitrogen (N) 
is removed from the air, by an air 
separation unit, the remaining pure 
oxygen is combined with the fossil fuel in 
a boiler, where combustion takes place. 
This generates steam, which is used to 
power the turbines and generate 
electricity, while the flue gas consisting of 
CO2 and water vapour is recirculated to 
control the boiler temperature and to be 
cooled. The CO2 is then dehydrated, 
compressed and made ready for 
transportation and storage.  
Parts per million 
A commonly used measure to refer to the 
concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere. It 
refers to the number of molecules of CO2 
divided by the number of all other 
molecules in the air. As of 2015, the 
average global CO2 concentration level is 
400ppm; highest ever.  
Plume 
Dispersing volume of CO2-rich phase 
contained in a formation, such as an oil 
and gas reservoir or saline aquifers. 
Post-combustion CO2 capture 
A process of capturing the CO2. In this 
method, combustion of fossil fuels is done 
in a traditional manner (i.e. using a boiler 
or a combined cycle gas turbine), 
followed by a separation of the CO2 from 
the flue gas, most often by a chemical 
sorbent such as amines or ammonia. For 
majority of the already existing power 
plants, this will be the main option for 
capturing CO2, given the space 
requirements of other two options to 
construct new equipment, which in many 





Pre-combustion CO2 capture 
A process of capturing the CO2. In this 
method, carbon is removed from the fossil 
fuel prior to combustion in a gas turbine. 
Coal is combined with oxygen to create a 
gas (‘syngas’), made up of Hydrogen (H) 
and carbon monoxide (CO). Water (H2O) 
is then added to the ‘syngas’, through a 
water gas shift reaction, whereby CO is 
converted to CO2, which is then removed 
from the fuel by a separation process. 
Hydrogen is then burned in a combined 
cycle gas turbine to generate electricity; 
process referred to as Integrated 
Gasification Combined Cycle (IGCC).  
Risk society 
A term used to refer to a modern society, 
and the manner in which the society 
organises itself in response to risk. This 
society is considered to be preoccupied 
with the future and safety, which in turns 
generates further notions of risk. In other 
words, modernisation has brought with it 
risks, and in dealing with these risks, 
other risks are generated. i.e. as a 
response to climate change, CCS, and 
CO2 storage in particular creates other 
risks such as water contamination, 
earthquakes, etc. 
Saline aquifer 
An underground rock formation where 
saline water occupies the small spaces 
between the grains of rock.  
Single European Act 
The 1986 Act was a first major revision of 
the 1957 Treaty of Rome, which aimed to 
remove some of the barriers to economic 
integration, increase harmonization and 
competitiveness among the Member 
States, and to streamline the decision-
making within the EU. Amongst other 
commitments, the SEA is significant in 
that for the first time the EU also became 
committed to include environmental 




The Carbon Capture and Storage Association 
A leading CCS industry lobby, based in 
London, UK. Its members consist of 
companies in manufacturing and 
processing, power generation, 
engineering, oil and gas, as well as other 
stakeholders including from the energy, 
legal, banking, consultancy and project 
management sector. Its goal is to promote 
the business side of CCS and ensure 
commercial-scale CCS deployment. It 
also works together with the UK 
Government and the EU Commission on 
policy and regulatory developments.  
The European Commission 
The executive body of the European 
Union. It is responsible for proposing 
policy and legislation, including the 2009 
CCS Directive, which established the 
legal framework for the environmentally 
safe geological storage of CO2. Although 
competent authorities in each Member 
States are responsible to implement the 
Directive within their respective 
frameworks, the European Commission 
retains the authority to issue opinions and 
review CO2 storage permits.  
Uncertainty 
Although the term is subtly used 
differently depending on the discipline, it 
generally refers to the state of being 
uncertain about a particular outcome. In 
this case, although there is strong 
evidence that permanent CO2 storage is 
safe, there is still uncertainty about the 
precise movement of the CO2 once it is 
injected underground, and the extent of 
this movement, and potential leakage to 





United Nations International Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) 
A scientific intergovernmental panel, 
under the United Nations, which is set up 
to assess the scientific information 
relevant to human-induced climate 
change, its impacts and options for 
adaptation and mitigation. Established in 
1988, it consists of thousands of scientists 
and other experts, which contribute to the 
writing and reviewing of the reports, and 
in essence is also considered to be the 
highest accepted authority on climate 
change. 
 
 
 
 
